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INTRODUCTION 
Recent corporate scandals involving Enron Corp., Global Crossing 
Ltd., Tyco International Ltd., and WorldCom Inc. (among others) 
have focused regulatory, media, and overall public attention on 
corporate and individual securities fraud, including insider trading.  
This focus is driving a new, fast-moving, aggressive regulatory agenda1 
                                                          
 1. The agenda to date has included, among other things, the adoption by 
Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley], and a series of regulatory initiatives at the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.1-205.7 
(2003); id. § 240.10A-2 (2003); id. §§ 228.303(c), 229.303(a)(4)-(5), 249.220f (Form 
20-F Items 5E-5G), 249.240f (Form 40-F ¶¶ (11)-(13)) (2003).  Interestingly, 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge predicted this phenomenon with uncanny accuracy, 
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consisting principally of proposed changes to public company 
accounting practices, corporate governance, and federal securities 
regulation and fraud enforcement.2  What a difference a few years 
make . . .  
It was just two years ago, on July 19, 2001, that Harvey L. Pitt, then 
the newly confirmed Chairman of the SEC, announced a 
comprehensive review of the SEC’s rules, noting, as reported in The 
New York Times on July 20, 2001, that the complexity of the current 
rules makes it “difficult for those obliged to comply with the rules to 
understand their obligations . . .”3  Soon thereafter, concern over 
corporate fraud—together with Chairman Pitt’s deemed ineffectual 
(and allegedly biased) management of that issue—stole the 
spotlight.4  While seemingly all but forgotten by some, former 
Chairman Pitt’s original regulatory agenda continues to have validity 
in the current environment.5  In particular, in the insider trading6 
                                                          
some might say, in 2000.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:  A 
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1058 n.169 (2000) (“[A] few well-
publicized securities fraud cases could result in the adoption of onerous securities 
regulation even if the vast majority of corporate managers are honest and 
trustworthy.”). 
 2. These changes have been heralded and trumpeted by the press from the time 
that news of the full extent of Enron Corp.’s corporate fraud first became public.  
See, e.g., David Callahan, Private Sector, Public Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A21; 
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Leader Evolves Slowly in a Climate Enron Altered, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 2002, at C1; David Leonhardt, A Prime Example of Anything-Goes Executive Pay, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2002, at C1; Bruce Nussbaum, Can Trust Be Rebuilt?, BUS. WK., July 
8, 2002, at 32; Lee Walczak et al., Let the Reforms Begin, BUS. WK., July 22, 2002, at 26. 
 3. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Says Rules Need a Review, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2001, at C1. 
 4. During former Chairman Pitt’s term in office, reports of his ineffectuality 
and bias were widely disseminated and analyzed by national and local news media.  
See, e.g., Christopher Byron, Congratulations, Bill—Here’s a Friendly To-Do List for the 
SEC, N.Y. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at 031 (describing former Chairman Pitt as “hilariously 
ineffectual”); Greg Farrell, SEC Chief Discovers Public Relations Can Be the Pits, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 14, 2002, at 3B (setting forth a chronology of controversies during 
Pitt’s term at the SEC); What Brokers Want From Pitt:  How’s the SEC Chairman Doing?, 
ON WALL STREET, Oct. 1, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business Library, News Group File 
(reporting the results of a survey of brokers regarding their views on former 
Chairman Pitt). 
 5. Interestingly, former Chairman Pitt, himself, publicly admitted that he had 
accelerated his original regulatory agenda in the wake of the publicized fraud at 
Enron Corporation.  See Labaton, supra note 2. 
 6. The term “insider trading” as used in this Article refers to the classical theory 
of insider trading, as opposed to the misappropriation theory adopted by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  Under the classical 
theory of insider trading, liability results from the trading of an issuer’s securities by 
an insider while the insider is in possession of “material, nonpublic information.”  See 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (describing the objectives of this 
classical theory of insider trading liability); Trading “on the basis of” material 
nonpublic information in insider trading cases, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2003) 
(defining when a purchase or sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material 
nonpublic information in insider trading cases).  Moreover, this Article focuses on 
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area, the Pitt regulatory agenda could have represented an extension 
of the SEC’s recent foray into rule-making that attempts to bring 
more clarity to the murky substance of U.S. insider trading regulation 
under Rule 10b-57 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as 
amended (the “1934 Act”).8  Substantive reform to add clarity to our 
federal securities laws and regulations, especially those governing 
aspects of securities fraud, is more needed now than ever.  Only with 
this enhanced clarity can specific actions be proscribed; only with 
enhanced clarity can those who violate antifraud provisions be 
efficiently prosecuted and convicted or otherwise held accountable or 
liable.9 
Moreover, greater substantive clarity in U.S. insider trading 
regulation enhances the transaction planning process for public 
issuers10 of securities and their insiders.11  A key aspect of U.S. insider 
                                                          
trades (not tips) by primary insiders (not their tippees).  For information on tipper 
and tippee liability for insider trading, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) [hereinafter Rule 10b-5].  Among other things, 
Rule 10b-5 prohibits individuals and entities from directly or indirectly using 
interstate commerce, the mail, or a facility of a national securities exchange: 
[t]o employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . [t]o make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or . . . [t]o 
engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit on any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security. 
Id. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2003). 
 9. See Mike France & Dan Carney, Why Corporate Crooks Are Tough to Nail, BUS. 
WK., July 1, 2002, at 35 (noting that successful prosecution of corporate wrongdoers 
is difficult because, among other things, “[t]he laws regulating companies are 
ambiguous”). 
 10. “Public issuers” or “issuers” refers to issuers of publicly traded securities 
registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act.  Penalties, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2003).  
These issuers must comply with the same restrictions on insider trading to which 
their insiders are subject under Rule 10b-5.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 
F.3d 1194, 1203-04 (1st Cir. 1996) (conceptualizing, by analogy, corporate issuers as 
individual insiders for disclosure purposes); Steven E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The 
Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform:  The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure 
Initiatives, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 225, 229 (2002) (discussing generally the duty of 
issuers and insiders to disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from 
engaging in stock sales and market transactions); Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising 
Capital Directly from Investors:  What Disclosure Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 111, 116 (2002) (stating that “[a]ll courts and most commentators have assumed 
that the issuer of securities is the ultimate insider” for purposes of U.S. insider 
trading regulation); Nicholas J. Guttilla, Securities Regulation-Disclosure of Intra-Quarter 
Performance Information Constituting Extreme Departure from Public Information Required in 
Shelf Registration Prospectus-Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 
1996), 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1023, 1028-29 (1998) (noting that SEC insider trading 
proscriptions apply equally to insiders and corporate issuers); Donna M. Nagy, The 
“Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders:  Why 
Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1177-78 (1999) (describing the 
operation of the “disclose or abstain” rule to issuer trading transactions). 
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trading regulation that impacts transaction planning is the concept of 
materiality.  Although materiality is defined using the same, well-
known legal standard for many different purposes under the federal 
securities laws, the concept of materiality as implemented in U.S. 
insider trading regulation has created unique planning problems for 
public companies and their insiders.12  This unique effect results from 
the fact that the judicially ordained law of insider trading in the 
United States acts as a transactional disclosure rule that, unlike other 
disclosure rules under the federal securities laws, provides issuers and 
their insiders with no specific disclosure content guidance. 
Accordingly, while corporate issuers and their directors and officers 
know that they cannot trade when they are in possession of material 
undisclosed information, the imprecise existing legal standard 
defining what is “material” makes it difficult for those issuers, 
directors and officers to understand their legal obligations.13 
This Article argues, based on applicable policy and related 
elements of stockholder value, that issuers, insiders, and their legal 
advisors, as well as investors and courts, would benefit from 
additional guidance in making materiality determinations in the 
insider trading context and suggests a method for constructing that 
guidance.  In so doing, the article does not attempt to challenge the 
existing scheme of regulation of insider trading, although certain of 
the criticisms and observations made in the article could be used to 
mount such a challenge.  Rather, the ideas presented in this Article 
are designed to work within the confines of the current regulatory 
system to make insider trading prohibitions clearer and fairer 
through, among other things, the expanded use of per se rules, 
presumptions, and safe harbor provisions.14 
                                                          
 11. In U.S. insider trading regulation, the term “insiders” includes an issuer’s 
directors and officers, but also includes others with “a relationship of trust and 
confidence” to the issuer’s stockholders.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 12. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1028-34 (noting that a public issuer’s 
determination of what constitutes material information is complicated by the notion 
that the value of corporate disclosure declines when the market is flooded with too 
much information); Bochner & Bukhari, supra note 10, at 228 (discussing ways in 
which materiality assessments as to financial results often are difficult). 
 13. See supra note 12; infra Part II (describing the current legal standard defining 
materiality and its application in the insider trading context); see generally John M. 
Fedders, Qualitative Materiality:  The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable 
Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (1998) (describing the continually evolving SEC 
mandatory disclosure requirements and the difficulty of determining whether a fact 
not mandated to be disclosed by an SEC rule is otherwise material to the total mix of 
information). 
 14. An actor’s complete compliance with all terms of a safe harbor provision 
ensures that the actor is protected from a violation of the legal rule as to which the 
safe harbor is provided.  See Christopher Dean Olander & Cynthia L. Spell, Interest 
Rate Swaps:  Status Under Federal Tax and Securities Laws, 45 MD. L. REV. 21, 58 n.134 
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I. BACKGROUND 
At the core of our nation’s insider trading prohibitions is the 
notion that public issuers of securities and their insiders cannot trade 
in the issuer’s securities while in possession of material nonpublic 
information.  Accordingly, when a public issuer or one of its insiders 
is in possession of undisclosed material information, the issuer or 
insider must either disclose the material information before trading 
in the issuer’s securities or abstain from trading in the issuer’s 
securities.15 This notion, referred to as the “disclose or abstain” rule, 
is based in decisional law under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,16 and 
Rule 10b-5, which interprets Section 10(b). Most insider trading cases 
are brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.17 
                                                          
(1986) (“By ‘safe harbor,’ the SEC means that if all conditions of such a rule are met, 
compliance with the underlying statutory exemption is assured”); see also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1336 (7th ed. 1999) (a safe harbor is “an area or means of 
protection . . . a provision (as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from 
liability or penalty”). 
 15. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980) (endorsing the 
imposition of a corporate insider’s obligation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to 
disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from market transactions when in 
possession of such information); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (imposing a duty under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that 
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the 
investing public, or abstain from trading in or recommending the securities while 
such information is undisclosed).  In 1961, the SEC first articulated the “disclose or 
abstain” rule in an enforcement action against a brokerage firm and one of its 
partners.  In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see Nagy, supra note 10, at 
1129 (noting the “disclose or abstain” rule was first articulated by the SEC in Cady, 
Roberts & Co. and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella); Jennifer 
L. Neumann, Insider Trading:  Does “Aware” Really Resolve the “Possession” Versus “Use” 
Debate?, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 191 (2002).  Under the facts in Cady, Roberts & 
Co., the partner of the brokerage firm was informed by one of his colleagues (a 
board member of the issuer) that the issuer’s board of directors had approved a 
reduction in the issuer’s quarterly dividend.  Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 908.  
While in possession of this as-yet-undisclosed information, the partner sold shares of 
the issuer held in customer accounts and in trust for his children, and he sold shares 
short for his own account.  Id.  The SEC found facts indicating that the trading 
partner had violated Rule 10b-5.  Id. at 915-17.  The “disclose or abstain” rule is 
effectively codified in the recently adopted Rule 10b5-1 under the 1934 Act.  17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2003). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003) [hereinafter Section 10(b)].  Section 10(b) 
provides, among other things, that a person or entity may not use interstate 
commerce “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”  Id. 
 17. The current text of Section 10(b) expressly mentions rules promulgated 
under its authority to regulate insider trading (in connection with the applicability of 
Section 10(b) to security-based swap agreements).  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  However, 
it is not clear from the original text of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, reproduced in 
pertinent part supra notes 7 and 16, that the provisions of either are intended to 
cover insider trading claims.  In fact, a number of scholars note that the drafters of 
Section 10(b) did not intend for it to be used for insider trading claims.  See, e.g., 
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The definition of the word “material” in the context of the 
“disclose or abstain” rule is neither statutory nor static.  Moreover, 
this materiality definition is not specific to insider trading regulation.  
Rather, the definition of the word “material” in the context of the 
“disclose or abstain” rule is based on a generic, judge-made legal 
standard applicable to materiality determinations under Rule 10b-5 
and other elements of disclosure regulation under both the 1934 Act 
and the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “1933 Act”).18  This 
broadly applicable judicial standard generally requires that a 
transaction planner19 or court assess the likelihood that a reasonable 
investor (or stockholder) would consider a particular fact or 
particular information important in making an investment decision.20  
In the context of insider trading, the investment decision involves a 
purchase or sale of securities.21  Alternatively stated, in determining 
                                                          
Michael P. Dooley, Insider Trading:  Comment From an Enforcement Perspective, 50 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 319, 319 (1999) (“There is absolutely no evidence in the legislative 
history of section 10(b) or accounts of the SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b-5 eight years 
later that either Congress or the Commission was even thinking about insider trading 
as a target of the statute or the rule.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider 
Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 70 (2002) (asserting that the 1934 Act 
did not prohibit anyone from trading on inside information); Steve Thel, The 
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 
385-86 (1990) (challenging the courts’ misconception of Section 10(b) as a whole).  
Since the decision of the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co. and the Second Circuit’s opinion 
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have been the principal 
sources of insider trading regulation outside the more narrowly tailored areas of 
short-swing profit reporting and liability, both of which are governed by Section 16 of 
the 1934 Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78p (2003); see Gevurtz, supra, at 70-72 (providing a brief 
and accessible description of the use of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to regulate 
insider trading in the United States). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2003).  The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly noted 
that materiality determinations in the context of insider trading are to be made using 
the same standard that is applicable in other disclosure contexts.  See Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (finding “no authority in the statute, 
legislative history, or previous decisions for varying the standard of materiality”).  
Lower federal courts have followed this lead.  See SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 
1148 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that insider trading cases use the same standard for 
materiality as cases alleging a fraudulent failure to disclose on the part of a 
company); Rosenfeld v. Parentcare Ltd., No. 91 Civ. 1956 (KTD), 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14532, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1993) (presenting defendants’ argument that the 
same materiality standard applies to both Section 10(b) and Section 12 claims). 
 19. For purposes of this article, the term “transaction planner” includes any 
issuer of securities, any insiders of that issuer, and their respective advisors on any 
transaction at issue, including without limitation legal counsel. 
 20. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (adopting the Section 14(a) standard of materiality 
established in TSC Indus. for cases brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); 
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (setting forth the 
general standard of materiality for use under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act to include those 
facts that are substantially likely to be considered important by a reasonable 
shareholder in deciding how to vote). 
 21. In this respect, purchase and sale decisions under Rule 10b-5 are 
distinguishable from voting decisions under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act.  As the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Basic, the materiality standard adopted in TSC 
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the materiality of a particular omitted fact, a transaction planner or 
court must assess whether there is a substantial likelihood that the 
omitted information would affect the “total mix” of market 
information available.22  Accordingly, if a fact is substantially likely to 
be considered important to a reasonable investor in making an 
investment decision (or is substantially likely to affect the total mix of 
available market information), it is material.23  A fact that is not 
substantially likely to be considered important to a reasonable 
investor in making an investment decision (or is not substantially 
likely to affect the total mix of available market information) is not 
material.24 
The facial simplicity of the basic legal standard governing 
materiality masks the complexities encountered by transaction 
planners, litigants, the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”),25 
and courts in interpreting and applying that standard.26  The 
                                                          
Industries is fact-sensitive, but it does not provide guidance as to whether and when a 
“reasonable investor” would consider a fact significant.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 238.  Thus, 
a reasonable investor may find different information important in the investment 
context than in the voting context.  See infra note 64. 
 22. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449); see also TSC 
Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 (concluding that, for an omitted fact to be material, “there 
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ 
of information made available”).  The Court apparently views its two statements on 
the meaning of materiality (regarding investor importance and the “total mix” of 
market information) as alternative formulations of the same legal standard.  Some 
subsequent courts, however, view them as separate tests or use only one of the two 
formulations in describing or assessing materiality.  See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares v. 
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (referencing investor importance 
formulation); SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (referencing investor 
importance formulation); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 619 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(using “total mix” formulation); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217-18 
(1st Cir. 1996) (referencing “total mix” formulation); Nappier v. Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers LLP, 227 F. Supp. 2d 263, 273 n.2 (D.N.J. 2002) (referencing the investor 
importance formulation); In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 131, 150 (D. 
Mass. 2001) (referencing “total mix” and citing to Shaw). 
 23. See supra notes 20 & 22 and accompanying text. 
 24. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding plaintiff could not show that a one day delay in availability of funds would 
have been material in a decision to purchase treasury bills); Feinmann v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that in civil cases customers 
failed to show that misrepresentations of transaction fees were material to their 
securities transactions). 
 25. The U.S. Department of Justice has the power and authority to bring criminal 
enforcement actions on the basis of violations of Rule 10b-5, including those 
involving insider trading.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2003) (providing criminal penalties 
for willful violations of the 1934 Act). 
 26. One commentator notes: “[e]ven with the benefit of the definition, 
disclosure decisions are arduous.”  Fedders, supra note 13, at 44-45; see Glenn F. 
Miller, Comment, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99:  Another Ill-Advised Foray into the 
Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 389-94 (2000) 
(highlighting difficulties in interpreting the standard for materiality in light of recent 
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interpretation and application of the materiality standard are highly 
fact-dependent and do not always produce predictable or certain 
planning options or judicial results.27  Moreover, current regulatory 
guidance on materiality does not serve to clarify in any meaningful 
way the interpretation and application of the legal standard.28  In the 
absence of better regulatory guidance, the current legal standard is 
inadequate for transaction planning and judicial decision-making.  
This current, inadequate regulatory guidance disproportionately 
affects the interpretation and application of Rule 10b-5 in the insider 
trading context because, in contrast to other areas of disclosure 
regulation29 under the securities laws, there are no line-item 
disclosure obligations or specific guidelines applicable to issuers and 
their insiders in complying with the “disclose or abstain” rule.30  
                                                          
SEC guidance). 
 27. These results are memorialized in a dauntingly large, and rapidly growing, 
body of decisional law.  Over 200 securities fraud class actions were filed in each of 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, many of which involve insider trading or 
disclosure claims that implicate materiality issues.  See Stanford Law School, Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu (last modified May 31, 
2003). 
 28. See sources cited infra note 32 (regarding the SEC’s failure to more clearly 
define materiality); see also Jason Michael Craft, What’s All the Commotion?:  An 
Examination of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL BUS. 
L.J. 119, 156 (2001) (commenting that “[o]ne of the largest failures of Regulation 
FD is the SEC’s lack of any meaningful guidance or direction as to what information 
will be considered material”). 
 29. Of course, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are antifraud provisions, not mandatory 
disclosure rules—rules that call for specific substantive disclosure based on a 
transactional or periodic reporting requirement.  See, e.g., Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 228 (2003) (containing line-item disclosure rules for small business securities 
issuers); see id. pt. 229 (containing line-item disclosure rules for other securities 
issuers); see id. pt. 210 (containing specific disclosure requirements for financial 
statements).  In the insider trading context, however, the “disclose or abstain” rule 
has the effect of a macro mandatory disclosure rule.  The existence of a duty to 
disclose arising out of issuer or insider securities trading activity compels disclosure 
of all material nonpublic information before any trade is made.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b5-1 (2003) (effectively codifying the “disclose or abstain” rule).  
Accordingly, it is appropriate to refer to the regulation of insider trading under Rule 
10b-5 as a form of disclosure regulation.  See Gerla, supra note 10, at 116-18 
(describing an issuer’s duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 generally by reference to 
insider trading cases). 
 30. In fact, although public offerings by issuers, public offerings by insiders, and 
tender offers require the filing of comprehensive public disclosure documents under 
SEC rules and regulations, the market transaction that typically forms the basis of an 
insider trading violation does not trigger a disclosure document filing obligation by 
an issuer or insider under the federal securities laws.  See Gerla, supra note 10, at 111-
12 (noting generally an issuer’s “extensive” disclosure requirements for registered 
offerings and raising the question, by contrast, as to the disclosures required to be 
made by issuers in other contexts, where only Rule 10b-5 is operative).  An insider 
who is an affiliate for purposes of Rule 144 under the 1933 Act, may be required to 
file a Form 144 with the SEC in advance of a sale of securities in order to enjoy the 
safe harbor protections of that Rule.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2003); id. 
§ 230.144(h) (2003).  The disclosures provided on Form 144, however, relate to the 
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Among other things, this failure of guidance may more easily lead to 
allegations that there has been a failure of adequate disclosure, even 
with thoughtful advance planning. 
In fact, the SEC, the federal regulatory agency charged with 
interpreting and enforcing the U.S. securities laws,31 purposefully has 
left ambiguous the effect of applying the existing materiality standard 
to any specific factual situation.32  The high degree of imprecision 
inherent in this standard not only creates legal uncertainty and 
headaches (sometimes nightmares) for transaction planners, 
litigants, enforcement agencies, and courts, but also is inessential to 
(and potentially distracts from) achievement of the basic policy goals 
underlying the regulation of insider trading under Rule 10b-5, on the 
one hand, and those underlying Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the 
1934 Act as a whole, on the other hand.33  Specifically, existing 
ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the current 
materiality standard in the insider trading context are not necessary 
to ensure: (1) the fair and honest operation of the U.S. securities 
                                                          
insider and the proposed securities trading transaction, not the issuer.  See SEC Form 
144, available at 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 7411.  Similarly, an insider subject to 
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act may be required to report a transaction in the issuer’s 
securities by filing a Form 4 or a Form 5 with the SEC after engaging in that 
transaction.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (2003).  Again, these public filings include 
information about insiders and their transactions, but not comprehensive disclosure 
regarding the applicable issuers, attributes of their securities, or even the manner of 
sale by the insider.   
 31. The SEC was created under Section 4 of the 1934 Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) 
(2003). 
 32. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (“While we acknowledged in the Proposing 
Release that materiality judgments can be difficult, we do not believe an appropriate 
answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of 
‘material’ items for purposes of Regulation FD.”); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 
99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 12, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) 
(“quantifying, in percentage terms, the magnitude of a misstatement is only the 
beginning of an analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute 
for a full analysis of all relevant considerations”); Fedders, supra note 13, at 42 
(“[T]he SEC stubbornly refused to promulgate rules designed to fill in the details of 
a broadly stated qualitative standard of materiality . . . “); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Rereading Cady, Roberts:  The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1337-38 (1999) (generally noting the SEC’s failure to clarify 
insider trading prohibitions and specifically noting ambiguities around the 
“probability versus magnitude” materiality test).  The reluctance of the SEC to better 
define materiality in the insider trading context is unremarkable when viewed in the 
light of Congress’s reluctance to statutorily define insider trading as a whole.  See 
MEREDITH M. BROWN, TAKEOVERS:  A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
157-61 (2001) (describing unsuccessful congressional efforts to define insider 
trading); RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 4.05 
(2002) (noting that the 1934 Act and subsequent legislation “still [do] not contain a 
formal definition of insider trading prohibited by Section 10(b)”); THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 661 (4th ed. 2002). 
 33. See infra Part III. 
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trading markets, free from any breach of trust by issuers and their 
insiders; (2) the protection of investors and promotion of the 
integrity of U.S. securities markets through the prevention of fraud, 
manipulation, and deception in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities; and, (3) the complete and accurate public disclosure of 
important information about issuers and transactions.34 
Inherent ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the 
existing materiality standard not only are nonessential to the 
achievement of applicable policy goals, but also create certain 
undeniable negative impacts on stockholder value that may undercut 
those policy goals. These impacts include, among other things, 
foregone value-enhancing transactions (including issuer offerings 
and stock repurchases), management distractions, and outside 
counsel fees and disbursements.35  Negative impacts on stockholder 
value might be reduced or eliminated if materiality were more 
precisely defined.36  The negative impacts on stockholder value 
associated with ambiguities in the interpretation and application of 
the current materiality standard are not apparently outweighed by 
perceived benefits associated with those ambiguities.37 
Moreover, it is probable that the existing legal standard for 
materiality enhances prospects for non-meritorious or marginal, 
speculative, settlement-focused, expensive, time-consuming class 
action litigation against issuers and their insiders, further eroding 
stockholder value.38  Securities fraud class actions are less frequently 
dismissed than settled.39  Those that are settled may result in high 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Part IV. 
 36. See infra note 149 (regarding the relationship among insider trading, 
stockholder value, and investor confidence); see also infra note 218 (regarding overall 
benefits of clarity and precision under Rule 10b-5).  
 37. Nevertheless, these benefits may, in some part, explain the reluctance 
exhibited by Congress, the courts, and the SEC to define insider trading.  See sources 
cited supra note 32 (regarding the SEC’s and Congress’s reluctance to better define 
materiality); see sources cited infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (regarding 
the possible benefits of ambiguity in statutory construction, interpretation, and 
application). 
 38. See infra Part V (describing the current insider trading class action 
environment and the need for substantive reform). 
 39. See Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:  Will 
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides?, at http://www.nera.com/wwt/ 
publications/6143.pdf, at 6 (June 2003) (stating that 80% of federal securities class 
actions are settled and approximately 19% are dismissed);  Lisa Klein Wager & 
Adrienne M. Ward, Securities Class Actions:  A Company’s Bad News Gets Worse, BUS. L. 
TODAY, July/Aug. 2002, at 15, 16, 18 (explaining that 24% of class actions are 
dismissed; 99.5% of the remainder are settled); Richard Painter et al., Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act:  A Post-Enron Analysis 7, at http://www.fed-
soc.org/pdf/PSLRAFINALII.PDF (last visited Apr. 22, 2003) (citing a 22.2% 
dismissal rate for 2001 and a 25.1% average dismissal rate for cases from 1996-2001); 
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dollar-value settlements,40 paid by the issuer, that ensure to the 
detriment of holders of the issuer’s stock at the time the settlement is 
paid, who or which may not be entitled to receive an offsetting 
portion of any settlement amounts as plaintiffs in the class action.41  A 
significant number of securities fraud class actions include insider 
trading allegations.42  In many insider trading actions, materiality 
determinations have a significant role in the case.43  Where neither 
trading nor possession of nonpublic information is at issue, 
materiality becomes the key unproven element of the plaintiff’s 
claim.44  Under these circumstances, existing ambiguities in the 
                                                          
see also Buckberg et al., supra, at 5 (noting that dismissals of securities class actions 
have “fallen by a statistically significant measure” since the adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley). 
 40. Through year-end 2001, the mean and median settlement value of 303 
identified settlements of securities class action complaints were $24.9 million and 
$5.5 million, respectively.  See Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse, Post-Reform Act Securities Case Settlements, at http://securities. 
stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2001/REVIEW_1995-2001.html (last 
modified Mar. 15, 2002); see also Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 7 (identifying and 
commenting on mean and median settlement values on an annual basis from 1991 
through 2002 and to date for 2003). 
 41. Plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action are not required to hold the issuer’s 
securities during the pendency of the suit.  See George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in 
Federal Securities Law:  A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 894 (1983) 
(noting that securities class actions “may produce ‘error costs,’ such as the hindrance 
of capital formation, and these costs may ultimately be borne by shareholders, whom 
the securities laws are supposed to protect, without necessarily compensating the 
victims of the violation of the law.”).  Accordingly, they can, and sometimes do, sell 
their entire position in the issuer’s securities before a settlement or judgment is 
reached in the class action.  Moreover, to have standing to bring a private action 
under Rule 10b-5, a prospective plaintiff actually must have sold or purchased the 
issuer’s securities.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 
(1975) (holding that for the purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, private 
damage actions are limited to purchasers and sellers of securities).  Therefore, 
certain class action plaintiffs may have standing to sue only because they have sold off 
their entire positions in the issuer’s securities.  Under these circumstances, the 
selling security holders would receive their proportionate share of any class action 
settlement or judgment and would not be negatively impacted by any payments made 
by the issuer. 
 42. See infra note 206. 
 43. See sources cited infra note 61; see, e.g., Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 
555-56 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 656-
58 (E.D. Va. 2000); Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 90,439 (Feb. 3, 1999).  Scienter and materiality often go hand-in-hand in insider 
trading cases.  See Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of Materiality and 
Recklessness in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 55 BUS. LAW. 1023 (2000) (identifying cases in 
which the relationship between scienter and materiality is at issue). 
 44. In such cases, assuming the existence of standing, scienter, reliance, and loss 
causation, materiality is the key (if not the only) element of the insider trading claim 
at issue in the case.  When an issuer or one of its insiders purchases or sells stock in 
the market, any omission to state an alleged material fact known by that issuer or 
insider is considered to be in connection with that purchase or sale. See Michael P. 
Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate 
Universe:  the Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 182-83 
(1995).  Moreover, the fact that an insider has traded while in possession of 
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interpretation and application of the current materiality standard, 
combined with (arguably) plaintiff-friendly procedural aspects of 
class actions, act to encourage class action plaintiffs’ counsel to bring 
suit (and defendants to settle) in circumstances where the facts raise 
any possibility of an insider trading violation. Given the ongoing 
debate around procedural reforms in the area of federal class 
actions,45 it is time we looked to other ways of clearing court dockets 
of speculative insider trading class actions.  Additional guidance on 
materiality in the context of insider trading could reduce the number 
or settlement value of these insider trading class actions. 
In short, for a variety of reasons, it now is time for more detailed 
interpretive guidance on materiality in the context of U.S. insider 
trading regulation.46  If properly crafted, this guidance would do no 
                                                          
nonpublic information may be sufficient to establish the required scienter.  See 
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing the 
evidentiary relationship between allegations of insider trading and scienter); 
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Insider trading in suspicious 
amounts or at suspicious times is, of course, presumptively probative of bad faith and 
scienter.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Robert S. Green, Class Action Reform Does Not Provide ‘Fairness’ to 
Anyone, CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP., Feb. 26, 2003, LEXIS, News & Business library, 
News Group file; Sean Higgins, Shareholder Suits Near A High Despite ‘95 Reform 
Legislation; Dismissals Also Climb, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 10, 2002, LEXIS, 
News & Business library, News Group file; Blair A. Nicholas, Restoring Investor 
Confidence in the Securities Markets, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 26, 2002, at B-7.  The 
tension in this debate, especially in the post-Enron era, is between those who argue 
that existing procedural rules applicable to securities fraud class actions represent an 
unacceptable bar to important, investor-protective class action litigation and those 
who contend that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter PSLRA], did not go far enough in curbing attorney-controlled, 
speculative, settlement-oriented class action litigation.  This same tension, albeit with 
different procedural focal points, framed the debate that preceded Congress’s 
adoption of the PSLRA.  Professor Jill Fisch describes these circumstances well when 
she writes: 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . reflects an 
innovative congressional effort to refine securities fraud class actions. In 
adopting the PSLRA, Congress recognized that although the class action is a 
valuable tool for increasing plaintiff access to the legal system, its structure 
presents opportunities for abuse. In particular, collective action problems 
and small claimant stakes limit plaintiff participation in litigation decisions. 
Decisions are made by entrepreneurial lawyers who effectively control the 
litigation. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have a substantial interest in the litigation—
frequently a larger interest than any individual class member. Lawyer control 
of class actions coupled with the potential divergence between the interests 
of the lawyers and those of the class creates a risk that litigation decisions will 
not reflect the best interests of the plaintiff class or society as a whole. 
Jill E. Fisch, Complex Litigation at the Millennium:  Aggregation, Auctions, and Other 
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 53, 53 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
 46. This Article focuses on the role of materiality in U.S. insider trading 
regulation.  With increased and highly publicized allegations of corporate fraud, 
which are frequently accompanied by allegations of insider trading, this focus is 
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violence to applicable policy and would enhance predictability and 
certainty in the application of Rule 10b-5 in the insider trading 
context.  This enhanced predictability and certainty would come 
from the identification and analysis of key areas of disclosure in 
which materiality guidance should be provided and the construction 
of sufficiently detailed guidance in a disciplined, thorough manner 
based on applicable policy and existing regulatory principles. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in six additional parts, 
followed by a conclusion.  Part II describes the current legal standard 
defining materiality and its application in the insider trading context, 
including by way of analysis of two sample fact patterns.  Part III 
identifies key regulatory policies underlying Rule 10b-5 and the 1934 
Act, in general and in the insider trading context, and shows that 
these policies do not dictate imprecise materiality guidelines in the 
insider trading context.  Part IV illustrates how the lack of 
predictability and certainty in interpreting and applying the existing 
legal standard for determining materiality for insider trading 
purposes may impact stockholder value.  Part V describes the current 
securities fraud class action litigation environment, both generally 
and as it relates to insider trading cases, and contends that 
ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the existing 
materiality standard contribute to a drain on stockholder value 
created by continued speculative and abusive class action litigation.  
Part VI suggests an approach that can be used in more precisely 
defining materiality in the insider trading context, consistent with 
applicable policy and existing regulatory principles.  The suggested 
approach is designed to enhance predictability and certainty in the 
interpretation and application of the existing materiality standard, 
                                                          
warranted.  See Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive 
Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 298 (1999) (analyzing the relative 
importance of insider trading allegations and private actions after the PSLRA); see 
also infra note 206.  Materiality is, however, omnipresent in the antifraud and 
disclosure rules under the federal securities laws, and the U.S. Supreme Court has 
endorsed a uniform materiality standard.  See sources cited supra note 18.  The 
author, therefore, acknowledges that materiality guidance in the context of U.S. 
insider trading regulation also would have an undeniable effect on materiality 
analyses under Rule 10b-5 generally and in other federal securities law disclosure 
contexts.  See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 32 (noting 
observations about the potential effect of materiality guidance offered for a limited 
purpose on the overall interpretation and application of the materiality standard).  
Any such effect would, in the author’s view, be desirable, even if the grounds for 
enhanced guidance in other contexts are not as compelling as those supporting 
enhanced guidance in the insider trading context.  While the rationale for enhanced 
materiality guidance is most strong in the insider trading area, much of the 
argument set forth in this Article applies equally to other areas of antifraud and 
disclosure regulation under the federal securities laws, especially other areas under 
Rule 10b-5. 
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thereby reducing negative impacts and inefficiencies created by the 
imprecision of that standard.  Part VI also provides examples that 
illustrate the suggested drafting approach, drawn from the fact 
patterns first used in Part II. 
II. MATERIALITY AND INSIDER TRADING 
A. Two Examples; One Key Question 
The highly significant role of materiality in insider trading 
regulation is best understood by reference to specific facts and 
circumstances.  Consider, as examples, the two fact patterns 
described below, each of which represents trading by an insider47 
while in possession of one or more different types of undisclosed 
information.48 
1. Example #1—Improper balance sheet accounting 
The first example involves the exercise of employee stock options 
and the public sale of underlying shares of common stock of a 
Corporation by the Corporation’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) at 
a time when the Corporation’s publicly available financial statements 
                                                          
 47. Although the examples posit that the trading transaction, in each case, has 
been effected by an insider, the examples easily could have been focused around 
issuer trading transactions without implicating any change in the legal analysis, since 
the same “disclose or abstain” rule applies to issuers and their insiders.  See sources 
cited supra note 10.  One might question, however, whether the legal analysis for 
issuers and insiders should be the same.  See Gerla, supra note 10, at 118 (noting that 
several scholars have questioned the premise that issuers are insiders when they trade 
in their own securities).  The impacts on stockholder value described infra Part IV, 
for example, are most compelling when the issuer, rather than an insider, engages in 
the subject trading transaction.  In fact, insider trading legislation in a number of 
countries only regulates trading by insiders, not the issuer.  See, e.g., Canada 
Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-32, §§ 100(1), 100(4) (1970) (Can.) (proscribing 
action by an “insider,” defined without reference to the issuer); Criminal Justice Act, 
c. 36, § 52 (1993) (Eng.) (specifying liability for “[a]n individual who has 
information as an insider”); Heinz-Dieter Assmann, The United Kingdom, in GERHARD 
WEGEN & HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE, CURRENT 
STATUS 33, 42-43 (1994) (describing then-existing U.K. insider trading legislation); 
James N. Dudley & Ken Casey, Luxembourg, in GERHARD WEGEN & HEINZ-DIETER 
ASSMANN, INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE, CURRENT STATUS 171, 173-74 (1994) 
(describing then-existing Luxembourg insider trading legislation).  Arguments for 
the application of different legal standards to analyses of insider trading and issuer 
trading, while intriguing, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 48. The two examples set forth in this Part have been chosen because they 
represent somewhat typical fact patterns that raise interesting interpretive issues.  
Examples that lend themselves to a more simple analysis (i.e., where nonpublic 
information is certainly material or obviously immaterial) are not the subject of this 
article.  As to these simple examples, the legal standard governing materiality does its 
job well enough; the lack of clarity and precision in that legal standard should not 
result in the transaction costs and other detriments described in this article under 
those circumstances. 
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do not fairly present the financial position of the Corporation in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.49 
The Corporation assembles and markets computer hardware and 
has experienced very rapid growth.  Transactions in the 
Corporation’s common stock are quoted on the NASDAQ National 
Market System.  The Corporation’s filings with the SEC indicate that 
an investment in its common stock carries certain identified risks, 
each of which is set forth in detail in these filings.  The described 
risks include many generalized cautionary statements regarding the 
financial condition of the Corporation. 
The Corporation misapplies an accounting rule and consequently 
misrepresents the adequacy of certain balance sheet reserves in its 
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for its third fiscal quarter.  As is 
typical with Forms 10-Q, the Corporation’s Form 10-Q underwent 
only a limited, informal review by the Corporation’s independent 
auditors.  The misrepresentations in the Form 10-Q result in the 
Corporation overstating its assets as shown in its Form 10-Q balance 
sheet by $6.8 million, representing 2% of the Corporation’s total 
assets.  The misrepresentations are identified and corrected in 
connection with the Corporation’s preparation of its next Annual 
Report on Form 10-K, as to which the Corporation’s independent 
auditors perform a full audit review, at which time the Corporation 
also files an amended and restated Form 10-Q for its preceding fiscal 
quarter. 
During the time that the Corporation’s publicly disclosed assets are 
overstated, the Corporation’s CFO, who knew, or should have known, 
at that time of the overstatement of the Corporation’s assets, (a) 
exercises options for the purchase of the Corporation’s common 
stock that had been granted to her by the Corporation and (b) sells 
the shares acquired upon exercise of the options in the market.  The 
CFO files in a timely manner the required Form 144 and makes all 
required filings regarding the stock sale in accordance with Section 
16(a) of the 1934 Act. 
2. Example #2—Failed merger discussions 
A second example involves securities trading by Target’s directors 
in the public market in the wake of undisclosed discussions regarding 
the acquisition by Acquiror, a large, publicly traded corporation, for 
                                                          
 49. The facts regarding materiality set forth in this example are based in part on 
the facts found by the court in Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1147 
cash, of Target, an issuer with common stock traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange (the “NYSE”).50 
In July, Acquiror offers to acquire Target at a price of $9.50 per 
share.  This offer follows two other undisclosed acquisition proposals 
made by Acquiror to Target in the preceding 18 months.  After 
consideration of the July offer by Target’s board of directors, Target 
rejects the offer as unfair to Target and its stockholders.  Neither 
Acquiror nor Target then discloses to the public either the offer or its 
rejection. 
In mid-October of the same year, Acquiror again offers to acquire 
Target, this time at a price of $10.50 per share.  This revised offer 
represents a 79% premium over the then current closing price of 
Target’s common stock on the NYSE.  After consideration of this 
revised offer by Target’s board of directors, Target again rejects as 
unfair Acquiror’s revised offer in late October.  At this time, neither 
Acquiror nor Target publicly discloses the pre-July proposals, the July 
offer and rejection, or the October offer and rejection. 
In March and April of the following year, three directors of Target 
acquire shares of Target in the public market.  Each director makes 
all required filings regarding the share purchases in accordance with 
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.  Late in April, after these purchases 
have been made, Acquiror publicly discloses the July and October 
offers, and Target immediately responds by publicly disclosing its 
rejection of the July and October offers as unfair to Target and its 
stockholders.  The disclosures cause Target’s stock price to increase 
fifty percent over a two-day period (from $6.00 per share to $9.00 per 
share). 
In early May, Acquiror commences an unsolicited tender offer for 
the shares of Target at a price of $10.50 per share.  In early June, 
Target announces that it has agreed to be acquired by Acquiror for 
                                                          
 50. This example is based on publicly reported facts relating to premerger 
discussions and disclosures of Sara Lee Corporation and Chock Full O’Nuts 
Corporation in 1998 and 1999, resulting in the eventual acquisition of Chock Full 
O’Nuts by Sara Lee.  See generally Company News:  Chock Full O’Nuts Agrees To Sweetened 
Sara Lee Offer, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at C4; Company News:  Sara Lee To Pursue Its 
Hostile Bid For Chock Full O’Nuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1999, at C4; Edward Wyatt, Chock 
Full O’Nuts Shares Bought After Merger Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at C3; Company 
News:  Chock Full O’Nuts Says It Rejected Offer From Sara Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at 
C3; James P. Miller, Chock Full O’Nuts Executive Draws Fire For Not Disclosing Sara Lee 
Overtures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1999, at B16; Schedule 13D of Sara Lee Corporation, 
filed Apr. 22, 1999, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/20041/ 
0000950172-99-00046 (last visited May 31, 2003) (disclosing, among other 
information, Sara Lee’s acquisition of more than five percent of a class of equity 
securities of the Chock Full O’ Nuts Corporation as required by 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
1(a) (2003)). 
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common stock of Acquiror with a then current market value of 
$11.00 per share. 
3. The materiality question 
Did the officer and directors who traded securities as described in 
the foregoing two examples conduct those trading transactions while 
in possession of material nonpublic information in violation of the 
insider trading prohibitions under Rule 10b-5?  The officer and each 
of the directors are corporate insiders; each traded in the company’s 
securities (each sold or bought common stock), and each had 
possession of nonpublic information (specifically, an undisclosed 
inadequacy of reserves and overstatement of assets in Example #1 and 
nonpublic information regarding unsolicited acquisition offers in 
Example #2).  Accordingly, assuming satisfaction of the other 
elements of a Rule 10b-5 insider trading cause of action,51 the 
determination as to whether the CFO (in example #1) and directors 
(in Example #2) violated Rule 10b-5 rests on an assessment of the 
materiality of the nonpublic information possessed by each.52  The 
key question:  what is “material?” 
B. The Applicable Legal Standard 
At the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, a “Sorting 
Hat” is used to assign students to their respective rooming houses.53  
                                                          
 51. Like other cases under Rule 10b-5, the elements of an insider trading claim 
generally are acknowledged to include:  a misstatement (or an omission at a time 
when there exists a duty to speak) or another element of fraud or deception, 
materiality, scienter, causation, reliance, and damages.  SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 
596, 620 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see Susan A. Wetzel, New Rule 16b-3:  The SEC’s Attempt 
to Aid Insiders by Revising Rule 16b-3 is Much Ado About Nothing, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
125, 143 (1998) (listing common elements of insider trading claims).  These 
elements are difficult to apply in the insider trading concept.  See JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 946 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing that this 
scheme is more effective for combating false publicity and other frauds that involve 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure).  Accordingly, elements of an insider trading 
claim also have been described in a more tailored fashion.  See Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 
817 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D. Mass. 1993) (“The essential elements of an insider trading 
claim as generally derived from Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-
53 (1972), include:  (1) trading in securities by corporate insiders (2) while 
withholding material inside information (3) which they have a duty to disclose to the 
investor public.”). 
 52. See sources cited supra notes 49 & 51 (regarding the relationship between 
materiality and the other necessary elements for private actions under Rule 10b-5, 
each of which—other than materiality—are assumed to be both existent and 
demonstrable in Example #1 and Example #2). 
 53. Readers familiar with the Harry Potter series of children’s books will 
recognize the references in this paragraph to the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and 
Wizardry and the Sorting Hat as being from that series.  Except as otherwise noted, 
the information in the first paragraph of Part II.B is from J. K. ROWLING, HARRY 
POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 117-22 (1997). 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1149 
When placed upon the head of each new Hogwarts student, the 
Sorting Hat shouts out the name of the house to which the student 
then is assigned.54  The determination made by the Sorting Hat is 
unqualifiedly conclusive; by its own admission, the Sorting Hat has 
not yet been wrong.55 
Materiality is the Sorting Hat embedded in many disclosure rules 
under the federal securities laws, including the “disclose or abstain” 
rule that operates in the area of securities fraud, including insider 
trading regulation.56  Where there is a duty to disclose a material fact, 
whether in accordance with mandatory disclosure rules or anti-fraud 
rules, the materiality of that particular fact determines whether an 
individual or entity is obligated to disclose that fact.57  Either the fact 
is material and must be disclosed, or it is not material and need not 
be disclosed.58  Stated differently, where materiality is used to qualify a 
disclosure obligation, it is a key device that sorts information required 
to be disclosed from that which is not required to be disclosed. 59  In 
those circumstances, the law addresses only two options—“material” 
and “not material.”  Unfortunately, application of the current 
standard for determining materiality frequently yields a third result—
”possibly material.”  While, perhaps, tolerable in circumstances 
involving the use of materiality as a disclosure determinant in 
                                                          
 54. See id. (describing the Hat’s power to magically sort children). 
 55. J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 177 (2000). 
 56. As the authors of one popular securities regulation casebook note: 
Materiality is a controlling concept when there are allegations of fraud.  
While the fraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not impose a duty 
to disclose information simply because it is material, they do require 
affirmative disclosure of material information in certain circumstances.  And 
they bar both material misstatements and half-truths whenever information 
is given to investors. 
COX ET AL., supra note 51, at 39. 
 57. See generally id. at 39-40 (explaining the materiality is more critical in 
ambiguous disclosure decisions than in line-item disclosure for SEC filings). 
 58. See generally Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 732-36 (1989) (discussing the overall 
relationship between materiality and disclosure). 
 59. Note that, as a general matter, materiality is necessary, but not sufficient, as a 
disclosure regulator.  A duty to disclose also must exist.  See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not 
misleading under Rule 10b-5.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Corporate Accountability:  
Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow:  The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 
WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 459 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“At least since Chiarella v. United 
States, it is clear that no duty to disclose arises simply because a trader or issuer 
possesses material nonpublic information.”).  In the insider trading context, 
however, the very fact that the corporation or one of its insiders is trading in the 
issuer’s securities gives rise to that duty under the “disclose or abstain” rule of the 
Chiarella case.  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (noting that 
the duty to disclose comes from the relationship of trust and confidence between the 
insiders and the issuer’s stockholders). 
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connection with narrowly tailored line-item disclosure obligations, 
this element of uncertainty is more troublesome in the insider 
trading context (and Rule 10b-5 disclosure cases generally) because 
of its wholly outcome-determinative nature.60  The difference between 
materiality and immateriality in these cases often means the 
difference between liability and no liability.61  If only materiality were 
as precise a sorting device as the Hogwarts Sorting Hat . . .  
The word “material,” as used in the “disclose or abstain” rule under 
Rule 10b-5, is not defined in the 1934 Act or the rules and regulations 
under the 1934 Act.62  Moreover, the SEC has adopted little in the way 
of guidance as to the substance of the definition.63  Accordingly, the 
standard governing materiality largely has been left to judicial 
determination and interpretation.  For over fourteen years, there has 
been a single, judicially created and construed, legal standard 
applicable to materiality determinations under Rule 10b-5.  This 
materiality standard is set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc.64 and was explicitly held applicable to cases brought under Rule 
                                                          
 60. See Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“The central issue at trial was whether the April and October projections 
constituted material facts that had to be disclosed under the federal securities laws.”); 
see also sources cited infra note 61. 
 61. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model:  A Recipe 
for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 411 (1984) (“An insider trading case 
often turns on whether particular information, allegedly not generally available to 
the market, was material.”).  Overall, the role of materiality in disclosure regulation is 
a large one.  See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 823 (1995) (“The important difference between materiality in 
the free-standing context as addressed by the Court and materiality in the disclosure 
and insider-trading contexts is that in the latter contexts materiality has meaning.”); 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering:  Beliefs, Biases 
and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 631 n.5 (1997) (“[M]ateriality and 
risk disclosure is at the heart of disclosure regulation, especially with respect to 
potential liability for fraud or nondisclosure.”). 
 62. See Kwang-Rok Kim, The Tender Offer in Korea:  An Analytic Comparison Between 
Korea and the United States, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 497, 531 (2001) (explaining that 
there is no statute defining materiality).  Rule 12b-2 under the 1934 Act does define 
the word “material, when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of 
information as to any subject” (i.e., for the purpose of line-item mandatory disclosure 
rules) by reference to the materiality standard articulated in TSC Indus. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).  17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2003); see id. § 230.405 (including 
an analogous definition relating to mandatory disclosure rules under the 1933 Act).  
The Rule 12b-2 definition does not apply to disclosures made under the insider 
trading “disclose or abstain” rule.  Id. § 240.12b-2 (2002).  
 63. See sources cited supra note 32; see also infra note 250. 
 64. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.  TSC Industries was not an insider trading case 
brought under Rule 10b-5.  Rather, the case involved a misleading proxy statement 
and alleged a violation of Rule 14a-9 under the 1934 Act.  The ambiguities inherent 
in the TSC Industries materiality standard likely are largely responsible for the 
relatively effortless importation of the standard from the Rule 14a-9 context to the 
Rule 10b-5 context.  Without the flexibility arising from these ambiguities, there 
would be some illogic to having the same standard for two wholly separate rules that 
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10b-5 in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.65  As defined in TSC Industries (and 
applied in Basic): 
[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to vote.  This standard . . . does 
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable 
investor to change his vote.  What the standard does 
contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, 
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have 
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the 
reasonable shareholder.  Put another way, there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the “total mix” of information made 
available.66 
In addition to expressly adopting the materiality standard set forth 
in the TSC Industries case, the Basic Court formulated a test for 
interpreting and applying this legal standard in the context of 
preliminary corporate merger discussions, thereby resolving a circuit 
split on the appropriate materiality analysis in that factual context.67  
                                                          
protect investors from fraud, manipulation, and deception in connection with two 
distinct types of investment decision.  In the Rule 14a-9 context, stockholders are 
protected from fraud, manipulation, and deception in connection with a voting 
decision.  In the Rule 10b-5 context, investors are protected from fraud, 
manipulation, and deception in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.  17 
C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14a-9 (2003).  That which is important to a stockholder in 
deciding how to vote may be very different from that which is important to an 
investor in deciding whether to purchase or sell. 
 65. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988)  (declaring the TSC 
Industries materiality definition the official standard for all Rule 10b-5 claims). 
 66. 426 U.S. at 449. 
 67. Prior to the advent of the Basic case, two principal judge-made tests had been 
developed and used by federal circuit courts of appeal in the context of premerger 
discussions:  the “agreement-in-principle” test and the “probability versus magnitude” 
test.  To this developed body of law, the federal appellate court hearing the Basic case 
added a third, new test:  the “materiality by denial” test.  The “agreement-in-
principle” test was developed in the Third Circuit.  Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 
F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984).  Under this test, merger discussions do not become 
material until an agreement-in-principle is reached by the parties as to price and 
transaction structure.  The “probability versus magnitude” test was articulated by the 
Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), and 
applied to preliminary merger discussions in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 
47-48 (2d Cir. 1976).  The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this test in Basic.  The 
“materiality by denial” test was formulated by the Sixth Circuit in its first decision in 
the Basic case.  786 F.2d 741, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986).  Under this test, “once a 
statement is made denying the existence of any [merger] discussions, even 
discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material 
because they make the statement made untrue,” thereby merging the determination 
of the falsity of the disclosed information with its materiality.  Id. 
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Under Basic, the materiality of premerger discussions is assessed 
based on a balancing of the probability of occurrence of the 
proposed merger transaction against the expected magnitude of the 
transaction to the issuer.68  This test maybe referred to as the 
“probability versus magnitude” test.69 
Although use of the TSC Industries materiality standard in Rule 10b-
5 cases is well settled, its interpretation and application (both as a 
general matter and in specific factual scenarios) often are not clear.70  
Many pages of judicial and scholarly ink have been spent assessing 
the conceptual or contextual importance or significance of a wide 
variety of facts and events,71 the nature of a “reasonable shareholder” 
or “reasonable investor,”72 and the composition of a “total mix” of 
                                                          
 68. 485 U.S. at 238-39. 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 239 n.16 (describing the test as the “probability/magnitude 
approach of Texas Gulf Sulfur”); see also Erin M. Hardtke, Comment:  What’s Wrong 
with the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements?  A Call to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to Reconsider Codification of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 
133, 159 (1997) (referencing “the probability versus magnitude test”); Edward A. 
Fallone, The Clinton Court is Open for Business:  The Business Law Jurisprudence of Justice 
Stephen Breyer, 59 MO. L. REV. 857 (1994) (citing to “the ‘probability versus 
magnitude’ test set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1998)”). 
 70. One scholar notes: 
 Ambiguous legal standards governing disclosure ensure that even honest 
managers will cause some fraudulent omissions. Corporate managers and their 
counsel assessing the “materiality” of a given fact receive little guidance from the 
courts. Disclosing a potential problem or opportunity may look deceptive in 
hindsight if the event does not come to pass, but omitting that fact will certainly 
look deceptive if the event does occur. The materiality requirement protects the 
corporation from having to disclose every potential eventuality. Materiality 
determinations, however, are among the most difficult faced by securities lawyers 
and their clients, and additional disclosures may give the corporation's 
competitors important information. Disclosure errors are inevitable. 
A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors:  A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as 
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 936-37 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
 71. See, e.g., SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a major 
factor in determining whether information was material is the importance attached 
to it by those who knew about it”); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 
489 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that “generally earnings projections of a company 
constitute a prime factor in estimating the worth of its stock, especially when made 
close to the end of the fiscal year” and therefore are material); Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 
F. Supp. 2d 610, 618 (E.D. Va. 1999) (listing “[e]xamples of events in the life of a 
corporation that are material and which an insider is duty-bound to disclose”). 
 72. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 636-39 (1988) (referencing the average 
small investor); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir. 
1989) (noting that “[r]easonable investors do not want to know everything that could 
go wrong, without regard to probabilities; [because]that would clutter registration 
documents and obscure important information . . .” and implying that “professional 
traders and investors” may be an appropriate audience for certain corporate 
disclosures); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849 (“[S]peculators and chartists of 
Wall and Bay Streets are also ‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same legal 
protection afforded conservative traders”); Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary:  
Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 98 (1998) (stating 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1153 
information,73 among other things, in order to determine whether a 
particular fact is or was required to be disclosed.74  Unfortunately, 
however, applicable decisional law and scholarship often do not 
permit a definitive determination as to the materiality of facts or 
events, even if recurring.75  Accordingly, the widespread acceptance of 
the TSC Industries standard is of small comfort. 
Attempts to more clearly define materiality for various federal 
securities law purposes, both before and after Basic, have failed.76  
These failures may be attributable to concerns that the task is too 
fact-dependent, seemingly making the job too difficult.77  The failures 
                                                          
that “investors are not homogeneous”); Miller, supra note 26, at 384 (noting the 
difficult and dynamic nature of the “reasonable” investor part of the materiality 
standard). 
 73. See, e.g., Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1533 (2d Cir. 
1991) (exploring the meaning of the “total mix” formulation); Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 
518 (articulating a truth-on-the-market argument for use by defendants in arguing 
immateriality on the basis that  “the market had in its possession all significant 
information”); Dennis, supra note 61, at 419 (contending that the “efficient market 
model . . . quantifies the total mix concept”). 
 74. When a court is assessing materiality, these judgments typically are made on 
the basis of all information then made available to the court, including facts not in 
the possession of the issuer or its counsel at the time disclosure assessments are 
made.  For example, the very fact that an insider of an issuer trades in the issuer’s 
securities may be seen as an indication of the materiality of undisclosed merger 
discussions.  See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.  Moreover, “[w]here 
appropriate, courts assessing the materiality of nonpublic information also can 
consider what actually transpired following disclosure.”  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see Daniel J. 
Bacastow, Comment, Due Process and Criminal Penalties Under Rule 10b-5:  The 
Unconstitutionality and Inefficiency of Criminal Prosecutions for Insider Trading, 73 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 96, 108 (1982) (“While courts that make the assessment [of 
materiality] . . . from a position of hindsight, the insider must follow this calculus 
without the certainty that such hindsight provides.”). But see Reiss v. Pan Am World 
Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[H]indsight is of limited value and the 
fact that the ultimate disclosure of the negotiations affected stock price is not 
compelling.”). 
 75. Many commentators discount, ignore, or dispute the significance of the 
ambiguity of the current materiality standard, presumably because many reported 
cases involve unambiguously material or immaterial facts.  See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, 
Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through PreTrading Disclosure, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 303, 336 (1998) (“[I]n practice, lower courts have been reluctant to find 
information ‘material’ unless it concerns a ‘bombshell event’  . . .”); Marleen A. 
O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading:  The Repeal of Section 
16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 364 (1989) (“To date, most insider trading cases have 
involved information that was clearly meaningful to the rational investor.”).  A focus 
on reported cases ignores the reality of class action securities litigation described in 
greater detail in Part V—that plaintiffs frequently bring insider trading claims as 
nuisance suits (where the objective of the lawsuit is early, lucrative settlement, rather 
than vindication on the merits at trial).  Accordingly, the ambiguity of the existing 
materiality standard should be assessed through an examination not only of reported 
cases but also of cases brought and dismissed or settled before or during trial. 
 76. See BROWN, supra note 32, at 157-61; see generally Anne L. Barragar, Disclosure of 
Preliminary Merger Negotiations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 WASH. L. REV. 81, 94 (1987) 
(noting that commentators have called for quantifiable materiality standards).  
 77. See Barragar, supra note 76, at 92, 94 (discussing various problems associated 
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also may result from fears that a bright-line test would result in one of 
at least three potentially undesirable outcomes, namely: (1) issuers 
and their insiders interested in trading while in possession of 
arguably material nonpublic information then would have a clear 
roadmap to trade for personal gain without liability;78 (2) issuers and 
insiders would be discouraged from buying, holding and selling the 
issuer’s securities;79 or (3) issuers and insiders would be forced to 
disclose an overwhelming amount of information, much of it not 
important to investors.80  In Basic, the Court rejected a bright-line test 
then utilized by a number of courts in assessing the materiality of 
premerger discussions and negotiations.81  The Basic court scorned 
this bright-line test in part because it assumed investors are not 
intelligent or sophisticated enough to understand the subtleties of 
speculative disclosure regarding a possible acquisition transaction.82 
                                                          
with defining more precisely the materiality of merger negotiations). 
 78. This argument has been made with respect to defining insider trading 
generally.  See generally George C. Nnona, International Insider Trading:  Reassessing the 
Propriety and Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
185, 194-95 (2001) (noting that “[a]s the law currently stands, a defendant may be 
liable for insider trading on the basis of a transaction, the wrongfulness of which was 
not apparent at the time it was contemplated and executed.”).  This concern is 
understandable in that current deterrence of insider trading, even with an 
ambiguous, judge-made standard defining materiality, is not totally effective.  See 
Fried, supra note 75, at 331-32 (“For although the penalty for violating Rule 10b-5 
can be quite severe, there are many situations in which the probability of 
apprehension and punishment is very low.”). 
 79. The reasoning of those who may have this concern likely is focused on 
unease about the potential materiality threshold resulting from application of any 
bright-line test.  The argument here is that Congress, the SEC, or the courts would 
adopt a bright-line test for materiality in the insider trading context that is over-
inclusive, effectively making illiquid any insider holdings in an issuer’s securities 
(since the issuer is unlikely to volunteer disclosure of all material information at all 
times, especially under that rule).  Interestingly, however, application of the existing 
formulations of the materiality standard may have the same effect for those officers 
and directors that are conservative decision makers.  These insiders may decide, for 
example, that they would prefer not to hold the issuer’s securities if they cannot buy 
and sell those securities relatively freely.  See O’Connor, supra note 75, at 365-66 
(“Like any general standard, the absence of precise contours . . . will deter lawful as 
well as unlawful behavior.”); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16:  Regulating the 
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 413 (1991) (“Legal 
sanctions are imprecise, and any effort to prevent insiders from buying stock on the 
basis of inside information risks discouraging insiders from buying stock at all.”); see 
also infra note 105. 
 80. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231, 233 (1988) (referencing the TSC 
Industries opinion, 426 U.S. at 448-49, which asserted that a low materiality threshold 
would cause issuers “simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial 
information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed decision making.”). 
 81. See id. at 233-37 (explaining that the test determined merger negotiations to 
be material only when there had been an agreement in principle as to price and 
structure). 
 82. See id. at 234 (“The agreement-in-principal test assumes investors are 
nitwits . . . unable to appreciate that mergers are risky propositions up until the 
closing.”). 
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Most recently, a task force of the Section of Business Law 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar 
Association has recommended a more rigorous approach to the 
concept of materiality in the context of Regulation FD.83  The task 
force notes: 
The concept of materiality may be too blunt and imprecise a 
standard to trigger affirmative disclosure obligations . . .  At 
the same time that uncertainties regarding materiality can 
reduce the flow of information, at least as to quality, they can 
lead to a profusion of detail, which can obfuscate and 
confuse, rather than inform, the investing public.  Disclosure 
is most helpful to the investing public when it is focused, 
understandable and easily accessible.84 
In two recent pronouncements, the SEC has explicitly avoided 
adoption of a more precise definition of materiality in its rule-making 
and public guidance.  In fact, both the promulgating release for 
Regulation FD (and Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2), published in August 
2000,85 and SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, released in August 
1999,86 expressly reaffirm (in the context of selective and financial 
disclosure, respectively) the continued applicability of the existing, 
imprecise, TSC Industries standard defining materiality.  Additionally, 
the SEC declined to offer sufficient guidance as to what is and is not 
material under Rule 10b-5.87  In the Regulation FD release, the SEC 
                                                          
 83. 17 C.F.R. 243.100-243.103 (2002); see American Bar Association Section of 
Business Law Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities Report on Regulation FD, THE 
SEC. REP., Spring 2002, 11, 14, at   http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/fedsec/sec_ 
reporter/sec7-1.pdf (proposing and analyzing possible alternative approaches to a 
more precise definition of materiality for use in making determinations under 
Regulation FD) [hereinafter Reg. FD Report]; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (noting the pitfalls of selective disclosure but rejecting 
the adoption of a bright-line test for materiality); John Tishbi, Comment, Regulation 
FD:  The Year That Passed and the Years Ahead, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2002) 
(presenting various criticisms of the SEC’s use of the existing common law standard 
for materiality, as supplemented by a non-exclusive list of information that may be 
material, as noted infra note 250). 
 84. Reg. FD Report, supra note 83, at 14; see Anthony T. Horgan, Comment, 
Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective Disclosure High Wire, 46 VILL. L. REV. 645, 
656 n.71 (2001) (sampling and characterizing comments on proposed Regulation 
FD). 
 85. Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).  
 86. 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999); see Miller, supra note 26 (providing an 
interesting description and critique of this Bulletin).   A Staff Accounting Bulleting 
(“SAB”) reflects the views held by the staff of the SEC regarding the disclosure of 
accounting-related practices.     
 87. See sources cited supra notes 85-86.  In both the Staff Accounting Bulletin and 
its release on Regulation FD, the SEC does list types of information that may help 
determine materiality, but neither the bulletin nor the release goes further than that 
in giving materiality guidance.  See 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000); 64 Fed. 
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reasoned that the materiality standards set forth in the applicable 
decisional law “encompass the necessary flexibility to fit the 
circumstances of each case,”88 and any bright-line rule “must 
necessarily be over- or under-inclusive.”89 
C. Materiality Analysis in Insider Trading Cases 
The concept of materiality is critically important to insider trading 
analysis because undisclosed information always exists and securities 
trading by an issuer or one of its insiders triggers a duty to disclose.90  
When a corporate issuer desires to proceed with a transaction in the 
issuer’s securities, the issuer’s board of directors must identify the 
nonpublic facts in the issuer’s possession, determine the materiality 
or immateriality of those facts, and consider the potential effects 
(positive or negative) of the possible public disclosure of those facts 
that are material.91  Based on this process of identification and 
consideration, the issuer can determine whether the desired 
securities trading transaction requires disclosure of any facts then in 
its possession, and, if so, whether it is willing or able to disclose those 
facts and proceed with the transaction.92  The concept of materiality is 
undeniably significant in the issuer’s analysis.93  When an insider 
desires to proceed with a transaction in the issuer’s securities, the 
insider must identify the nonpublic facts in the insider’s possession 
and determine their materiality or immateriality.94  If the insider 
determines that the undisclosed facts then in the insider’s possession 
are material, absent cooperation from the issuer in the transaction, 
                                                          
Reg. at 45, 150 (Aug. 19, 1999); see also infra note 250. 
 88. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 51, 721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)). 
 89. See id.; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 565 (1992) (referencing the “familiar suggestion that rules tend to be 
over- and under-inclusive relative to standards”).  One might argue that this 
deference to the judicial standard in determining materiality is part of a strategy 
employed by the SEC to enhance its own power by preserving enforcement and rule-
making flexibility.  See Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top:  State 
Competition for Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
681, 698 (2003) (noting that the SEC generally may behave in this manner). 
 90. See sources cited supra notes 59 (regarding the duty to disclose) & 61 
(regarding the importance of the concept of materiality to insider trading analysis). 
 91. See sources cited supra note 70 (commenting on the management decision 
process in this context).  
 92. See id.; see also sources cited infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing 
the relative inability of insiders to trade securities given the omnipresence of 
material, nonpublic facts). 
 93. See sources cited supra note 61 (emphasizing the importance of the concept 
of materiality in disclosure regulation). 
 94. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract:  The New Direction of 
the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984) (describing different 
approaches to ascertaining property rights in corporate information). 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1157 
the insider must forego the transaction.95  The nonpublic information 
at issue is not the insider’s to disclose; the issuer has paramount 
rights and interests in regulating its disclosure.96  Accordingly, the 
concept of materiality is critically important to the insider’s ex ante 
transaction analysis. 
But that is not all.  Issuers and insiders must contend with 
materiality case law that creates an unfavorable environment for 
potential and actual defendants in the insider trading context.  A key 
Rule 10b-5 insider trading case that addressed issues of materiality is 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.97  The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion 
includes a frequently cited discussion of the appropriate legal 
standard applicable to materiality determinations in insider trading 
cases.98  While the materiality standard chosen by the Second Circuit 
in Texas Gulf Sulphur was later supplanted by the existing standard 
adopted by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and Basic,99 the Texas 
Gulf Sulphur court makes a number of provocative observations about 
materiality that expressly or implicitly survive TSC Industries and 
Basic.100  Two are particularly relevant here. 
                                                          
 95. See sources cited infra note 105 (discussing an insider’s limited ability to sell 
securities in this context). 
 96. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 194 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing 
situations in which an issuer has an interest in keeping nonpublic information 
private or in regulating its disclosure); Condus v. Howard Sav. Bank, 781 F. Supp. 
1052, 1057 (D.N.J. 1992) (describing information as one of a corporation’s most 
valuable assets); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob:  The Corporate 
Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1161 (1996) (noting the 
need for directors to manage information assets for the benefit of stockholders 
where stockholders are engaging in decision making); A.C. Pritchard, United States 
v. O’Hagan:  Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. 
L. REV. 13, 28-29 (1998) (highlighting the duty of the insider to protect the 
confidentiality of the issuer’s information). 
 97. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969). 
 98. See id. at 849-50 (stating that a fact is material if it reasonably might affect the 
value of the issuer’s securities and asserting that whether facts are material within 
Rule 10b-5 depends upon a “balancing of both the indicated probability that the 
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event”). 
 99. Specifically, TSC Industries and Basic reject the notion that a fact is material if 
it reasonably and objectively might affect the value of the issuer’s securities because 
that formulation sets the standard for materiality too low and may subject the 
corporation and its managers to liability for insignificant omissions.  Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 
(1976).  Rather, the current legal standard for materiality under Rule 10b-5 relies on 
whether it is substantially likely that the fact would be important to a reasonable 
investor.  See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (adopting the TSC Industries standard for 
materiality).  
 100. For example, the probability versus magnitude test adopted in the Basic case 
is directly attributed to the Texas Gulf Sulphur court.  See Basic, 485 U.S. at 238-39 
(citing to the Texas Gulf Sulphur and according deference to the endorsement of the 
test by the SEC). 
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One of the most interesting issues discussed in the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur case is whether the fact of an insider’s trade can be used as 
evidence of the materiality of the nonpublic information possessed by 
that insider.101  A number of courts allow the fact of a trade by an 
insider to be used as evidence of materiality in Rule 10b-5 actions 
against issuers,102 including the Supreme Court in Basic.103  In the 
classical insider trading setting, this practice obviates the requirement 
that materiality be proven separate and apart from the fact of a 
trade.104  Moreover, this judicial practice makes it impossible for a 
transaction planner to give advice on materiality, except to say: “just 
don’t trade.”105  If this advice were the intended effect of U.S. insider 
trading regulation, one would think the law would be expressly stated 
in these terms. 
A second important aspect of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case that bears 
on materiality analysis in insider trading cases is Texas Gulf Sulphur’s 
invocation of a so-called “market effect” test as a means of 
determining materiality.106  Under this test, a determination as to the 
materiality of information is made based on whether that information 
is “reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price 
of the security.”107  The “market effect” test was not endorsed by the 
                                                          
 101. 401 F.2d at 851. 
 102. See, e.g., Abromson v. Am. Pac. Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 903 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(qualifying the presence of insider sales as, at most, probative of materiality); Halye v. 
The Lamson & Sessions Co., 752 F. Supp. 822, 826 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (citing Basic 
and noting insider trading during the relevant class period); Royce de R. Barondes, 
Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, 74 TUL. L. REV. 883, 921-
22 (2000) (explaining that trading by insiders can be probative of materiality since it 
may be a manifestation of an insider’s assessment of nonpublic information). 
 103. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n.18 (recognizing that trading by insiders may be 
one indication of materiality). 
 104. Although this practice typically is observed by courts adjudicating corporate 
disclosure claims, it may indicate a predisposition to finding materiality in cases 
raising insider trading claims (especially when those claims accompany claims of 
corporate nondisclosure or misstatements). 
 105. See Kitch, supra note 61, at 876 (arguing that there will never be a time when 
an insider is not in possession of information that a reasonable investor would 
consider important, thereby in effect prohibiting such key personnel from ever 
trading).  Moreover, in light of insider trading allegations in connection with recent 
public reports of corporate fraud, some have suggested that corporate management 
should be prohibited from selling stock altogether.  See Pearl Meyer, Should Directors 
Ever Sell? Director Accountability; Should Law Forbid Corporate Directors From Selling 
Company Stock?; Panel Discussion, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 2002, at 15, LEXIS, 
News & Business Library, News Group File  (discussing the benefits and dangers of 
prohibiting directors from selling their shares during their board terms). 
 106. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(remarking that a company drilling activity was too remote in time and place to have 
had any significant market impact). 
 107. See id. at 848 (quoting Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information 
Practices:  The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289 
(1965)). Versions of this test are widely used in insider trading regulation outside the 
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Supreme Court in the Basic case, and it has not been endorsed by the 
Supreme Court since that time.108  Accordingly, it is difficult to 
predict with certainty how much of this test may survive scrutiny in a 
decision made at that high a level of judicial review.109  However, the 
“market effect” test continues to be used to some extent by lower 
courts, at least as a component in their materiality analyses.110  
                                                          
United States.  See, e.g., Financial Services Reform Act, 2001, pt. 1 § 1042A (Austl.) 
(covering “information [that is] not generally available,” where “if the information 
were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material 
effect on the price or value” of securities); Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., c. C-32, 
§ 100.4(1) (1970) (Can.) (covering “confidential information . . . that, if generally 
known, might reasonably be expected to affect materially the value of the 
securities”); Companies Act, pt. V, § 108(2)(a) (1990) (Ir.) (covering “information 
that . . . is not generally available, but, if it were, would be likely materially to affect 
the price of . . . securities”); Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, pt. V, § 52 (1993) 
(Eng.) (covering “securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the 
information”). 
 108. In fact, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has refused to endorse the idea that 
different standards of materiality should apply when insider trading is involved.”  
Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect 
Paradigm of Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218, at 1244 n.131 (1987); see 
sources cited supra note 18.   
 109. What we do know is well summarized by Professor Gabaldon in an article 
released close in time to the release of the Basic decision: 
The main problem with the ‘market effect’ test inheres in the argument that 
lack of market effect does not necessarily establish lack of importance.  The 
test, therefore, is not necessarily compatible with the Supreme Court’s 
primary test of materiality.  Even though lack of effect on price may not be 
definitive proof of lack of importance, however, it is safe to say that if a fact, 
when disclosed, would be substantially likely to affect market price, its 
significance to reasonable investors (and thus its materiality) is conclusively 
demonstrated. In other words, facts that satisfy the “market effect” test are a 
subset of all material facts. Accordingly, the “market effect” test may be 
regarded as a useful tool for proving, if not for disproving, materiality. 
Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 1244-45 (footnote omitted). 
 110. See, e.g., No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. 
W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 n.13 and accompanying text (9th Cir. 2003) 
(noting the market effect of disclosure in its materiality analysis); Oran v. Stafford, 
226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing and emphasizing the role of the market 
effect on the stock price by the company’s disclosure in materiality analysis); In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1987) (declaring 
that “[b]ecause the market for BCF stock was ‘efficient’ and because the July 29 
disclosure had no effect on BCF's price, it follows that the information disclosed on 
September 20 was immaterial as a matter of law.”); Geiger v. Solomon-Page Group, 
Ltd., 933 F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Evidence of stock price movement 
may be relevant to the issue of materiality but it is not determinative.”); Simon v. Am. 
Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.R.I. 1996) (viewing a negative 
reaction by the stock price as indicative of materiality).  One attorney noted in his 
argument at the District Court level : 
I don’t want to beat a dead horse, but I believe Bloomberg, Dow Jones and 
the Wall Street Journal constitute a good surrogate for reasonable investors. 
They all picked this up as headline news and the market reacted. So, I don’t 
believe that we can find that this matter is dismissible on materiality grounds 
on a motion to dismiss. 
Buxbaum v. Deutsche Bank A.G., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,969 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2000).  The SEC has argued for use of the “market reaction” test in the years since 
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Indeed, the test may most frequently be used in insider trading 
cases,111 where hindsight may be 20/20 vision but ex ante 
determinations may be uncomfortable at best.  The possible use of 
the “market effect” test in the ex ante analysis and ex post evaluation of 
materiality is problematic for issuers and insiders, as well as judges.112 
Precision and clarity on materiality are extremely important to 
disclosure regulation inquiries, especially those under Rule 10b-5 and 
other antifraud rules.113  However, dependence on materiality analysis 
is nowhere more significant than in the insider trading context.  
Regardless of whether an insider’s trade or a market reaction is or 
will be evidence of the materiality of any nonpublic information then 
in the insider’s possession, materiality is a crucial issue—perhaps the 
only issue—in a case where a trade by that insider can be proven.114  
The critical nature of materiality in insider trading analysis is strong 
incentive to proceed toward greater precision and clarity in defining 
what is “material” in the insider trading context.115 
                                                          
the Basic case was decided.  See Hoover, 903 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (describing the SEC’s 
argument that a market reaction to subsequent disclosures reflects materiality). 
 111. Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 1244 n.131. 
 112. Ex ante determinations are “based on assumption and prediction.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 582 (7th ed. 1999).  On the other hand, ex post determinations are 
“retrospective” and “based on knowledge and fact.”  Id. at 601. 
 113. See id. at 1240 (providing an overview of the concept of materiality as limiting 
the reach of certain disclosure obligations under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act); see 
also sources cited supra note 61. 
 114. See sources cited supra note 61 (including citations regarding the importance 
of materiality in insider trading cases).  Further complicating the matter is the fact 
that, because historic information about the issuer likely has been or will be disclosed 
in periodic reports, nonpublic information in the insider trading setting is likely to 
be speculative (uncertainty about a possible future event), forward-looking, or soft 
(opinions, estimates, projections) information, not historic or otherwise definitive 
data or information.  Although the Basic Court specifically limited its ruling to the 
merger negotiation context, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 n.9 (1988) 
(declining to address any other kinds of contingent or speculative information), 
many lower federal courts use the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test to 
determine the materiality of speculative information, even in factual circumstances 
not involving premerger discussions or negotiations.  See, e.g., In re Rockefeller Ctr. 
Prop., Inc., 184 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing to Basic for the proposition that 
“[m]ateriality of contingent or speculative information or events depends on  ‘a 
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the 
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.’”); 
SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing to Basic for the same 
proposition); Gay v. Axline, No. 93-1491, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 8989, at *17 (1st Cir. 
Apr. 26, 1994) (stating that “[w]e further have recognized that if an alleged omission 
involves ‘speculative judgments about future events,’ . . . materiality will depend 
upon ‘a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the 
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity’”); 
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating 
generally that “[m]ateriality depends not only on the magnitude of an effect but also 
on its probability.”). 
 115. See Fried, supra note 75, at 340 (contending that, with a lower materiality 
standard, “there would be less trading on inside information”). 
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D. Inconclusive Answers 
The foregoing description of materiality in the insider trading 
context would not be complete without an analysis of the materiality 
of the nonpublic information possessed by the insiders in our two 
examples.  Yet, in spite of relatively simple facts, application of the 
TSC Industries materiality standard to the two examples set forth in 
Section A of this Part proves to be a somewhat difficult assignment.  
Results obtained from that application of law to facts are not certain 
enough to make transaction planners, litigants, enforcement 
agencies, and courts comfortable about materiality determinations; 
whether made ex ante or ex post. 
1. Example #1—Improper balance sheet accounting 
In Example #1, a corporate officer, the CFO, sells the Corporation 
stock at a time when she may have been in possession of nonpublic 
information about the Corporation’s financial statement 
misrepresentation.  The application of the TSC Industries materiality 
standard to the Corporation’s misrepresentations regarding the 
adequacy of its reserves (and the corresponding overstatement of its 
assets) described in Example #1 raises some interesting questions.  Is 
it substantially likely that a reasonable investor would find it 
important to know about a misstatement of reserves that results in a 
two percent overstatement of total assets in making an investment 
decision about the Corporation’s securities?  Is it substantially likely 
that a reasonable investor would view information relating to the 
Corporation’s misstatement of reserves that results in a two percent 
overstatement of total assets as significantly altering the “total mix” of 
information available?  On the one hand, the “reasonable investor” in 
an immediate post-Enron market is likely to be quite sensitive to asset 
overstatements accompanied by executive stock trades.116  On the 
                                                          
 116. The facts regarding Enron’s reported corporate fraud involve, among other 
things, an understatement of liabilities associated with off-balance sheet accounting.  
See Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance:  
MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business after Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 718 (2002) 
(positing that “[a]t the risk of oversimplifying a complex set of circumstances, Enron 
used certain foreign partnerships to take liabilities off of its balance sheet.”); David 
Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should 
Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 895 (2002); Lisa H. Nicholson, A 
Hobson’s Choice For Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment:  Striking a Balance 
Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 
96 n.18 (2002).  Moreover, allegations of insider trading by former Enron executives 
and others have accompanied the public reports of Enron’s corporate fraud.  See 
Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer:  A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 
58 BUS. LAW. 143, 171 (2002) (indicating, generally, the possibility of insider trading 
violations by Enron executives among others); Peter Elkind & Bethany McLean, The 
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other hand, the Corporation in Example #1 is no Enron.  The 
financial impact of the Corporation’s misrepresentations is 
quantitatively relatively small, as a percentage of the Corporation’s 
total assets, and was rapidly corrected in connection with the 
Corporation’s preparation and filing of its next periodic report 
under the 1934 Act.  Moreover, the Corporation had outlined in its 
public filings certain generalized financial risks of investment.117  The 
Corporation’s misrepresentation of its reserves, and the related asset 
overstatement was caused by the misapplication of accounting rules, 
not (apparently) by an aggressive, strategic, goal-oriented use of 
accounting rules.  So, perhaps the misstatement is immaterial . . . 
But . . . perhaps not.  SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 
instructs against exclusive reliance upon quantitative measures in 
determining materiality;118 but does it not seem rational that there is 
some level of financial impact that is so de minimis as to be 
immaterial—or at least presumptively immaterial?  Is there not some 
threshold level of financial impact at which we are comfortable 
presuming or declaring nonpublic facts to be material?  Absent 
decisional law that is determinative (or at least highly instructive) as 
to the answers to these questions,119 one cannot say that any particular 
threshold has any particular significance.  To what extent (if at all), 
then, can a transaction planner rely on a good faith judgment that 
known, undisclosed facts are immaterial in weighing the risks of 
proceeding with a desired securities transaction?120  Although the 
                                                          
Feds Close In on Enron, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 36 (noting that investigators may be 
interested in possible insider trading violations in connection with corporate fraud at 
Enron); Reuters, Enron Probe Likely to Expand, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at 3 (reporting 
that “[i]nvestigators were said to be burrowing into Enron's ill-fated broadband 
venture, while still scrutinizing murky off-balance-sheet deals and insider trading 
allegations.”). 
 117. Such warnings give rise to a possible argument that the Corporation’s public 
filings “bespoke caution” to an extent that the misstatements are not material.  See 
generally Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing the 
“bespeaks caution” doctrine); In re Trump Castle Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (same). 
 118. See Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 
Fed. Reg. 45,150-01 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (expressing the 
view that financial misstatements are not immaterial simply because they fall beneath 
a numerical threshold). 
 119. Decisional law in this area tends to focus on both the misrepresentation of 
financial fact and the circumstances surrounding the financial misstatement.  See 
Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the role 
of numerical benchmarks in determining materiality); Blatt v. Muse Techs., Inc., 
Nos. Civ. A. 01-11010-DPW, Civ. A. 01-12173-DPW, 2002 WL 31107537, *8 (D. Mass.  
Aug. 27, 2002) (indicating that context may be relevant to determining materiality of 
financial misstatements, and citing, inter alia, Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 
539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997), on which certain of the facts in Example #1 are based). 
 120. In a subsequent proceeding questioning the legality of a trading transaction 
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facts of Example #1 are relatively simple, the analysis is not as simple 
as one might believe it should be, and the conclusion is uncertain.121 
2. Example #2—Failed merger discussions 
In Example #2, directors of the Target buy the Target’s shares 
while they are in possession of nonpublic information about previous 
offers and premerger discussions regarding the possible sale of 
Target to Acquiror.  Example #2 is a more complex example to 
analyze than Example #1.  The facts apparently do not allow for the 
use of a compelling quantitative analysis or other simple application 
of the relevant legal principles.  In assessing materiality, one first 
faces the task of determining the appropriate formulation of the 
materiality standard to apply to these facts.  The facts of Example #2 
indicate that the directors bought the Target’s securities in March or 
April after the Board had last rejected Acquiror’s offer for Target in 
October.  In March and April, were those October merger discussions 
with the Acquiror still speculative information about a potential 
merger (in which case the “probability versus magnitude” 
formulation from Basic would apply) or has enough time passed by 
March or April that the fact of the October merger discussions is 
historical information calling for the application of one of the two 
                                                          
made on the basis of that kind of good faith determination, scienter may be 
questionable.  See infra note 121.  Apart from this effect, the good faith nature of the 
determination, however, does not help the issuer or insider in the area of materiality, 
since materiality analysis focuses on an objective test-the importance of the 
undisclosed information to the reasonable investor.  See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (articulating the test for materiality). Under this 
standard, which focuses on the reasonable investor (rather than the actual investor 
in any specific cause of action), the good faith of an individual issuer or insider in 
determining to trade while in possession of nonpublic information is likely to be 
deemed irrelevant. 
 121. Among other things, Example #1 raises questions about the relationship 
between materiality and scienter, the requisite state of mind of the alleged insider 
trader.  If the CFO actually knew about the Corporation’s asset overstatement (and 
accompanying reserve understatement) prior to selling the shares, then the CFO 
may be deemed to have had the requisite intent, at least to the extent needed to 
survive a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP 
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that “allegations of 
unusual insider trading by a defendant with access to material non-public 
information can support a strong inference of scienter”); Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 169 
(positing that pleading requirements for scienter may be met by allegations and 
factual evidence of unusual trading while in possession of significant nonpublic 
information).  All that is at issue, then, is the materiality of the known misstatements.  
If, however, the CFO traded in reckless disregard of the existence of the 
misstatements, her intent or state of mind in trading is less clear.  See In re Initial 
Public Offering Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 365 n.111 (S.D.N.Y.  2003) (discussing 
the “reckless disregard” standard in insider trading cases).  Among other things, the 
CFO would not have been on notice to evaluate the materiality of the misstatements.  
Under these circumstances, any materiality guidance only would be relevant to ex post 
judicial determinations. 
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alternative formulations of the TSC Industries standard?  It is hard to 
say.  Of course, the two formulations of the TSC Industries standard 
and the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test are intended to 
provide the same result in materiality determinations based on the 
same facts.  The application and interpretation of the standards and 
test may, however, yield different results, principally because each 
focuses attention on different facts or different factual contexts. 
Under the “probability versus magnitude” test, absent facts 
unknown to us indicating that the Acquiror still is interested in 
pursuing an acquisition of Target in March and April, a merger of 
Acquiror and Target intuitively has a low probability of occurring, 
even though a merger is of the highest magnitude to Target.  
Information about the offers or discussions regarding a possible 
merger of Acquiror and Target (given that the Target had rejected 
the Acquiror’s last offer over five months earlier) may seem too 
speculative to disclose and, therefore, not material. 
If we apply the TSC Industries alternative formulations, our 
questions become whether there is a substantial likelihood (a) that a 
reasonable investor would find information about the earlier 
premerger discussions important in deciding whether to sell Target’s 
securities or (b) that a reasonable investor would view that 
information about the earlier premerger discussions as significantly 
altering the “total mix” of information about Target then available in 
the market.  Given (for example) that Acquiror’s overtures were at 
significant premiums to then existing market prices for Target’s 
common stock, one could (but need not) conclude that there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find 
information regarding the earlier merger discussions with Acquiror 
important.  Acquiror’s valuation of Target may, for example, be a 
truer indicator of firm value than the market capitalization of Target.  
Moreover, one could (but need not) conclude that there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view 
information about the earlier merger discussions as significantly 
altering the “total mix” of information about Target available in the 
market.  Based on the market’s reaction to the information (once 
disclosed), and assuming no other information or events then 
impacting the Target’s market price for the securities,122 it seems clear 
that the market did not know or had not absorbed all of the facts 
                                                          
 122. See sources cited supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (describing the 
“market effect” test as a means of assessing materiality). 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1165 
regarding Acquiror’s overtures.  Still, the materiality determination is 
inconclusive based on the TSC Industries standard. 
3. An important, albeit limited, analytical role for decisional law 
Any attempt to definitively settle the materiality questions posed in 
Example #1 and Example #2 would involve a thorough canvassing of 
existing decisional law in an effort to find analogous (or otherwise 
instructive) cases.  Because cases are fact-specific, a conclusive 
determination regarding materiality only can be made if one locates a 
case completely on point with the fact scenario in the case being 
analyzed.  While occasionally (and luckily) a case on point can be 
located, it is a relatively rare occurrence.  Even an exhausting and 
exhaustive search for decisional law may not yield a case or group of 
cases affording a clear answer.123  Given the obvious inefficiencies of 
this process, there must be a better way . . . 
E. Why Ambiguity Matters 
The reader may now say: “Okay, okay.  So, the existing legal 
standard defining materiality for use in the insider trading context is 
ambiguous; but why should I care?  Why not just leave things the way 
they are?”  Perhaps the reader even realizes that there can be 
advantages to ambiguity in legal standards.  Truly, ambiguity in a 
substantive statutory or regulatory provision can be a valuable tool if 
used in an appropriate manner to advance an underlying policy 
goal.124  For example, ambiguity allows for more facile development of 
                                                          
 123. For instance, in the case of Example #2, decisional law research would lead us 
principally to a few federal judicial opinions in post-Basic cases that were decided on 
pretrial motions.  In each case, the court found that information regarding the 
existence of premerger discussions up to and including approximately two years 
before a securities trading transaction affected by an insider was not immaterial as a 
matter of law.  See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 871 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1989) (asserting 
that merger discussions undertaken over a two-year period may be material); see also 
Caruso v. Metex Corp., No. CV 89-0571, 1992 WL 237299, *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 1992) 
(maintaining that information regarding buyout a proposal may be material two 
years later); Salit v. The Stanley Works, 802 F. Supp. 728, 732 (D. Conn. 1992) 
(indicating that meetings regarding a possible merger that occur less than two years 
before release of a subject proxy statement may be material in an action under Rule 
14a-9 under the 1934 Act); Ross v. A.H. Robins, 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that “[n]o general 
rule of time can be applied to all circumstances;” therefore, information in a four-
year-old annual report may still be material and subject to a duty to correct).  These 
opinions do not give us our answer, although they put us on notice that information 
regarding the earlier premerger discussions between Acquiror and Target may be 
material. 
 124. But see Fedders, supra note 13, at 87 (arguing, with respect to the federal 
securities laws, that “the Commission must avail every opportunity to specify what 
conduct is illegal [and] . . . should be unwilling to establish new rules through 
enforcement action, and should always expose its new theories through 
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and adjustments in legal rules among the three branches of 
government and maintenance of a “political equilibrium between the 
judicial and legislative branches.”125  Moreover, ambiguity can have a 
deterrent value in that it may force potential violators to assess their 
behavior on a conservative basis in order to avoid liability.126  
Encouraging that kind of conservatism could be one desirable effect 
of the ambiguity in the meaning of the term “material” in the context 
of the “disclose or abstain” rule, if it advances an applicable statutory 
or regulatory objective. 
However, in order to assess the effect of ambiguity on a statutory or 
regulatory regime, one must assess the ambiguity in its overall context 
and, in judging its relative merit as a legal device, balance any positive 
impact of the ambiguity against its undesirable effects.127  For 
example, issuers and insiders may decide to take risks in their 
securities trading transactions because the lack of clarity and 
precision in insider trading law, including the concept of materiality, 
lessens the risk of being caught and found liable.128  There may be 
                                                          
rulemaking”).  A search for the meaning of ambiguity in a legal test necessarily 
invokes the debate of whether, and for what reasons, an ex ante-focused rule may be 
preferable to an ex post-oriented standard.  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992) (articulating along these lines, 
the differences between rules and standards).  There are notable cost/benefit 
tradeoffs with either.  See id. at 562-63 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than 
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s content, whereas 
standards are more costly for legal advisors to predict or enforcement authorities to 
apply because they require later determinations of the law’s content.”).  Although 
this article does not make a net social efficiency argument for better ex ante 
materiality guidance, the need for that guidance also may be supportable on that 
basis.  Id. 
 125. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality 
Disorders:  The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
627, 636 (2002). 
 126. See sources cited supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that 
transaction planners may be incentivized to advise insiders not to trade at all); see also 
Lisa J. Finnell, United States v. Carpenter:  Second Circuit Overextends the 
Misappropriation Theory of Criminal Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 605, 
612 n.34 (1987) (“market participants may act conservatively in trading on nonpublic 
information for fear that their conduct may inadvertently fall under the prohibitions 
against insider trading.”); Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global 
Marketplace:  A Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 856 (1992) 
(“[T]ransactions that may in fact be legal will be avoided by the risk averse because 
of the chilling effect that results from ambiguous standards . . . .”).  But see Fried, 
supra note 75, at 331 (reasoning that although “Rule 10b-5 prohibits trading on 
inside information only when the information meets the strict legal standard of 
materiality . . ., even in these cases, Rule 10b-5 cannot always deter insiders from 
trading on such information.”). 
 127. See generally Finnel, supra note 126 (discussing an advantage and disadvantage 
of ambiguity in insider trading law). 
 128. See id.  (asserting that “market participants with access to inside information 
and who are planning to use such information to their advantage may consider that 
the ambiguity of the law reduces their likelihood of being caught”); see also Nnona, 
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other hidden or ignored costs associated with the statutory or 
regulatory ambiguity that more than offset the perceived benefits of 
the ambiguity.129  These offsetting costs may neutralize any perceived 
positive relationship between the ambiguity and underlying statutory 
or regulatory policy and, in extreme cases, may cause the ambiguity 
to do violence to underlying policy.130 
Accordingly, to assess the overall impact of ambiguity in the 
interpretation and application of the existing materiality standard in 
the context of insider trading, it is important first to understand the 
net effect of this ambiguity on the key policies underlying U.S. insider 
trading regulation.  Parts III and IV principally are dedicated to this 
task. 
III. KEY LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES 
A. Policies Underlying the Application of Rule 10b-5 
to Insider Trading Cases 
Existing ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the 
current materiality standard are not necessary to a fair and honest 
operation of U.S. securities trading markets, free from any breach of 
                                                          
supra note 78, at 221-23 (describing the difficulty faced by the SEC in defining and 
detecting violations of insider trading laws); Salbu, supra note 126, at 856-57 
(indicating that “transactions that may be illegal will be entered into by those who 
are relatively risk prone under unclear guidelines . . . ”); see also sources cited infra 
note 134. 
 129. See Nnona, supra note 78, at 223-25 (examining the costs associated with 
enforcing the insider trading prohibition); see also Salbu, supra note 126, at 856-57 
(noting that another cost of the ambiguities in U.S. insider trading regulation is the 
deterrence of legal trading activity).  Undue risk of criminal enforcement also may 
be a cost associated with ambiguities in current U.S. insider trading regulation.  
Professor Hicks notes: 
[T]he United States considers insider trading a threat to fair and efficient 
securities markets . . . .  At present, neither the federal statutes nor the 
Commission’s rules define this crucial term and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that have addressed the issue do not resolve ambiguities about 
either the scope or the underlying theory of this variety of fraud. The 
uncertain parameters of insider trading under U.S. law are more than an 
inconvenience. In addition to creating the risk of civil liability, a violation of 
statutory provisions or SEC rules that prohibit insider trading can result in a 
criminal conviction. 
J. William Hicks, Securities Regulation:  Challenges in the Decades Ahead, 68 IND. L.J. 791, 
801-02 (1993). 
 130. See Nnona, supra note 78, at 224 (arguing that the inability of the SEC to keep 
up with all of its duties compromises the purpose of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act); 
Salbu, supra note 126, at 858 (noting that ambiguities in U.S. insider trading 
regulation result in an overall reduction in the volume of market trading transactions 
and asserting that “[u]nnecessary impediments to the voluntary and lawful 
functioning of securities markets are inefficient and insupportable.”) 
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trust by issuers and their insiders.131  It is a fundamental principle of 
U.S. insider trading regulation that issuers and their insiders not be 
permitted to benefit personally from any information advantage they 
may have over other traders in the secondary markets.132  Better 
guidance on materiality, if well crafted, should not detract from 
adherence to this policy and principle.133  Rather, such guidance 
should allow easier identification of the nature of information that, if 
possessed at the time of a purchase or sale of securities, creates an 
improper benefit and, as a result, should lead to more certainty and 
success in civil and criminal enforcement.134 
                                                          
 131. See Panel Discussion:  The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
273, 278 (2001) (comments of Harvey Goldschmid noting that the insider trading’s 
capacity to undermine “investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our 
markets” is a policy underlying insider trading regulation); Roberta S. Karmel, 
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 83, 103 (1998) (“The SEC's insider trading policy is best understood as an 
effort to achieve fair pricing in the public securities markets in furtherance of the 
general goals of the statute.”).  A key element of this policy is the “investor 
confidence” rationale for federal insider trading regulation.  See Joel Seligman, The 
Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1115 (1985) (asserting that investors must be confident that they can trade 
securities without being victims of informational disadvantages); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts:  The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading 
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1325-28 (1999) (acknowledging this policy 
rationale in current U.S. insider trading regulation, but contending that “the 
connection between insider trading regulation and the necessary baseline of investor 
confidence is at best speculative”); Nnona, supra note 78, at 208 (stating that “[t]he 
contention here is that insider trading harms the market by eroding public 
confidence” and that “[a]t its root, this contention is related to notions of fairness”); 
Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407 (2002) (discussing 
investor confidence in the context of investor behavior); see also sources cited infra 
note 149 (regarding the relationship among insider trading regulation, stockholder 
value, and investor confidence). 
 132. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961) (explaining that 
an important purpose of the 1934 Act was to eliminate the idea that corporate 
officials use inside information for personal gain); Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in 
the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 614-15 (1987) (commenting that “the evil 
of insider trading is the trader’s misuse of business information for personal gain, 
which justifies taking away the trader’s profits.”). 
 133. See Salbu, supra note 126, at 855-59 (making this argument with respect to 
ambiguities in insider trading regulation generally). 
 134. One scholar notes: 
Only the government has been reluctant to value lucidity and 
predictability; in its opposition to legislatively-defined insider trading, it 
valued enforcement flexibility above all else. Clarity and certainty have 
special force in criminal prosecutions, but also retain great importance in 
the civil area. If guided by these concepts, insider trading law would likely 
yield either new statutory or administrative definitions or, at the very least, 
bright-line liability criteria in case precedent. 
Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading:  The Supreme Court Misappropriates the 
Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1206 (1997); see Fried, supra 
note 75, at 310 (“Rule 10b-5 cannot easily deter insiders from trading on material 
inside information in the many cases where there is little likelihood that a violator 
will be detected and punished.”); Salbu, supra note 126, at 857-58 (stating and 
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B. Policies Underlying Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
From a more general policy perspective, Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 were designed to protect investors and promote the integrity of 
our securities markets by preventing fraud, manipulation, and 
deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.135  
While the inherent ambiguities in the current legal standard 
governing materiality may allow courts more latitude to find, or 
otherwise fashion relief for, fraud, manipulation, or deception based 
on notions of equity not inconsistent with existing legal precedent 
(which power undoubtedly serves as a deterrent), these ambiguities 
are not necessary to the protection of investors and the promotion of 
integrity in our securities markets. 
In fact, these ambiguities may negatively impact investor protection 
and market integrity because of their effect on the decisions of 
governmental bodies and private parties as to whether (and if so, 
how) to pursue conduct that the investing public believes should or 
does constitute illegal insider trading.136  In an environment with 
limited resources, a prospective plaintiff, enforcement agency, or 
prosecutor logically would be more likely to invest those limited 
resources on a clear-cut case than a case that promises complex and 
difficult issues of proof.137  If public and private enforcement of the 
                                                          
critiquing the argument that greater specificity leads to less enforcement).  
Difficulties encountered in enforcing current law in the area of insider trading and 
other corporate fraud have been noted in the press.  See, e.g., Andrew Countryman, 
Window of Opportunity; Talk About Good Timing:  Execs Sell Before the Fall, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 2, 2003 (noting various enforcement difficulties with respect to purchases and 
sales of securities by insiders); France & Carney, supra note 9, at 35 (suggesting that 
the uncertainties (among other things) that prosecutors face in pursuing corporate 
fraud cases may limit the number of convictions). 
 135. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997) (examining the 
congressional purpose behind Section 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 473 n.13 (1977) (noting the legislative history of Section 10(b) regarding intent 
to cover manipulation and deception); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
201-03 (1976) (citing to legislative history to show that Section 10(b) was enacted to 
prevent the use of “manipulative” and “deceptive” devices, indicating the implicit 
requirement of an element of scienter); Bryan S. Schultz, Casenote, Feigning Fidelity to 
Section 10(b):  Insider Trading Liability After United States v. O’Hagan, 66 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1411, 1416-18 (1998) (summarizing the legislative history behind Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5); Seligman, supra note 131, at 1115 (examining the importance of 
the integrity of the market as a policy underpinning for Section 10(b)); Thel, supra 
note 17 (describing, in detail, the policy underpinnings of Section 10(b) in the 
context of the 1934 Act). 
 136. See David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 
In Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 
1792-93 (2000) (contending that ambiguity as to the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim 
may have  adverse consequences). 
 137. See Fried, supra note 75, at 333.  This phenomenon may occur less frequently 
in a plaintiffs’ bar-initiated class action in which the plaintiff’s counsel may assess 
litigation risk based more on the probability, timing, and dollar value of a possible 
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securities laws is to be an effective method of preventing and 
punishing fraud, manipulation, and deception as a means of assuring 
investors of the integrity of our securities markets, then U.S. 
securities regulation should allow for more straightforward 
identification and punishment of violators. 
A less ambiguous materiality definition can be fashioned that 
neither affords issuers and insiders a clear path around liability for 
fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive conduct nor forces issuers and 
insiders to disclose minutia.138  Clearer, more precise, materiality 
guidance would better support efficient and effective action against 
alleged insider traders by more clearly defining conduct that 
constitutes fraud, manipulation, or deceit, thereby enhancing 
investor protection and market integrity.139 
C. Policy Support for Disclosure Under the 1934 Act Generally 
The 1934 Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, taken as a 
whole, are geared to the protection of investors and engenderment 
of public confidence in the integrity of the securities markets, 
primarily through the complete and accurate public disclosure of 
important issuer and transaction information.140  The 1934 Act 
mandates both periodic and transaction-based public disclosures by 
issuers and others.141  Moreover, in requiring the complete and 
                                                          
settlement than the probability, timing, and dollar value of a favorable judgment.  See 
infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. 
 138. That was a stated objective of the Court in Basic.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). 
 139. Even in the class action area, a firm may be more willing to take on a case 
where the materiality of the nonpublic information at issue in the case is clear.  See 
generally O’Hagan, supra note 134 (noting the enforcement issues arising from an 
ambiguous body of insider trading law). 
 140. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).  One 
commentator notes: 
Disclosure serves the underlying purposes of the securities laws.  The market 
is protected against the prolonged effects of selective disclosure of material 
information.  Disclosure provides a sorely needed disincentive against insider 
trading that is not dependent on SEC enforcement against identified 
individuals.  Market integrity is promoted.  Finally, disclosure insures that 
investors who have no special sources of information and are less adept at 
following market signals have important information before them in an 
understandable form.  Any other rule would imply that investors who fail to 
watch the Dow Jones tape do so at their own peril. 
Barragar, supra note 76, at 103 (footnote omitted). 
 141. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2003) (providing for required disclosure by 
issuers in periodic reports); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2003) (providing for required 
disclosure by “persons acquiring more than five per centum of certain classes of 
securities”); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (2003) (providing for required disclosure by issuers 
and others in proxy and information statements in connection with meetings of 
stockholders); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2003) (providing for required disclosure by 
issuers and others in connection with tender offers); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2003) 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1171 
accurate disclosure of material facts in specific contexts, anti-fraud 
rules act as gap-filling disclosure rules.142  The regulation of insider 
trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through the “disclose or 
abstain” rule is but one example of many.143 
Yet, the ambiguities encountered by transaction planners in 
interpreting and applying the existing legal standard for materiality 
frequently discourage, rather than encourage, public disclosure of 
important issuer and transaction information.144  An issuer or insider 
may forego securities trading (and the attendant public disclosure 
obligation) rather than trade and assume the risk of a lawsuit that 
second-guesses, ex post, the issuer’s or insider’s ex ante materiality 
analysis.145  While this may be appropriate (and ultimately 
unavoidable) under certain circumstances, those circumstances 
should be limited.  More specific materiality guidance can provide 
appropriate limits and should result in a higher quantity and quality 
                                                          
(providing for required disclosure of beneficial ownership of securities by directors, 
officers, and principal stockholders); see also infra note 209. 
 142. See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough:  The 
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 291-92 (discussing how mandatory 
disclosure sets “a minimum disclosure floor” and “ensures that silence is not always 
an option for issuers when evading the antifraud provisions”).  But see Gregory S. 
Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?:  Public Company Disclosure and 
the Mythical Duties to Correct and Update, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2255 (2000) 
(arguing against the use of antifraud rules in this manner). 
 143. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2003) (governing misstatements and omissions in 
1933 Act registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2003) (governing 
misstatements and omissions in prospectuses and other communications under the 
1933 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2003) (governing fraud in the offer or sale of 
securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2003) (governing misstatements and omissions in 
proxy statements); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003) (governing fraud in connection with 
tender offers). 
 144. See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 353, 355 (1988) (noting, with respect to insider trading law generally, that 
“[f]ew believe that a rule requiring the possessor of inside information to disclose or 
abstain from trading results in more disclosure than abstention.”); Dennis S. Karjala, 
Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities 
Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1473, 1517 (1986).  In a recently released study, the Securities 
Industry Association (“SIA”) reports that Regulation FD (a two-year-old disclosure 
regulation that, like Rule 10b-5, uses materiality as a disclosure filter) has resulted in 
the public disclosure of less information by the public companies to which it applies 
than had been made before adoption of Regulation FD.  See Reg. FD Report, supra note 
83, at 12.  Other studies and surveys also indicate that, to some degree, Regulation 
FD has had this effect.  See id.  The same SIA study finds that there also has been an 
adverse effect on the quality of publicly disclosed information.  See id. at 12-13.  
There is also some corroboration of this finding in other surveys.  See id.  
Accordingly, it may not be true that “the flexibility of the materiality standard 
provides an efficient balance between the investors’ informational needs and the 
benefits provided by allowing managers to trade.”  O’Connor, supra note 75, at 363. 
 145. See infra Part IV.B. 
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of disclosure in circumstances in which disclosure is required to be 
made.146 
IV. IMPACTS ON STOCKHOLDER VALUE 
Neither policies underlying insider trading regulation, Section 
10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the 1934 Act as a whole, nor the federal 
securities laws and regulations provide a guarantee of value 
preservation or value enhancement to investors.147  Yet, the effects of 
law and regulation on stockholder value148 do affect public 
perceptions about the effectiveness of investor protection and public 
                                                          
 146. See Saul Levmore, Licensing:  Permission Slips in Corporate and Fourth Amendment 
Law, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 709, 714 n.14 (1999) (noting in another context the 
argument that “disclosure would be more likely if courts would articulate the ‘real’ 
rule applicable”).  The validity of this contention depends upon at least three things:  
(1) the ability of the rule maker (Congress, the SEC, or the courts) to clearly and 
comprehensively articulate more specific materiality guidance; (2) the benefits of 
disclosure under that enhanced guidance outweighing the detriments (such that 
issuers and insiders are encouraged to disclose, rather than abstain from trading); 
and (3) actual compliance by issuers and insiders with the enhanced guidance.  
Assessment of these factors is, to some extent, dependent on a more detailed analysis 
of the incentives provided by specific and generalized disclosure obligations.  See 
Bernard S. Black, Legal Theory:  Is Corporate Law Trivial?:  A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 546 n.9 (1990) (noting that “the debate over whether 
disclosure rules should be mandatory would benefit from analysis of when SEC 
disclosure rules simply mandate disclosure that companies would provide anyway, 
when they require more than private actors would provide, and when securities law 
liability discourages disclosure that would otherwise be made.”). 
 147. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 62 F.R.D. 181, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1974) 
(“[H]owever broadly the terms of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be construed, the Act 
and the Rule do not protect all who may have sustained a loss as a result of deceptive 
practices.”). 
 148. The concept of stockholder value is not widely recognized in the law and can 
mean different things to different people in different contexts.  See Panel Discussion, 
Reform:  Are There Too Many Cooks in the Corporate Kitchen?, 2 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX 
L. F. 67, 89 (1997) (including definitions of stockholder value in response to a 
question regarding the same from moderator Jill Fisch); see also Janis Sarra, 
Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corporate Governance at the Crossroads:  Governance 
Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Principles for Corporate Governance, 33 OTTAWA L. REV. 
177, 210 (2001-02) (discussing the differing views of stockholder value in Europe and 
the United States); Symposium, Corporate Citizenship:  A Conversation Among the Law, 
Business and Academia, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 726, 747 (2001) (referencing the 
comments of Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell on stockholder value).  For purposes of 
this article, stockholder value is defined simply as a net dollar-value enhancement in 
a stockholder’s equity holdings of an issuer, measured most easily (but not 
exclusively, or even accurately) by reference to the price of the issuer’s stock in the 
public securities markets.  Increases should reflect the proportional sharing of net 
corporate benefits (dollar-value enhancements) and decreases represent the 
proportional sharing of net corporate detriments.  In so defining stockholder value, 
this article does not argue the merits of a market value-driven method, or any 
particular method, for valuing the firm or measuring stockholder value.  These 
matters are part of a broader scholarly debate beyond the scope of this Article.  
Michael R. Schwenk, Valuation Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 
649, 658-62 (1994); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation 
Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457 (1996). 
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confidence in the integrity of our securities markets.  If insider 
trading regulation has negative impacts on perceived or actual 
stockholder value, investors are likely to feel either totally vulnerable 
or under-protected and lose confidence in the integrity of those 
markets.149  Accordingly, it is important to identify perceived and 
actual negative impacts of the current materiality standard on 
stockholder value as additional support for the institution of 
enhanced substantive clarity in U.S. insider trading regulation, 
including by way of more specific materiality guidance. 
A. Insider Trading and Stockholder Value 
The overall effects of insider trading regulation on stockholder 
value have been debated for decades, with no absolute truth 
emerging.150  Some scholars argue that unregulated insider trading 
enhances stockholder value.151  These scholars generally articulate two 
bases for their arguments:  (i) unregulated insider trading tends to 
increase the price efficiency of the market by more accurately 
                                                          
 149. Although the relationship among insider trading regulation, stockholder 
value, and investor confidence is unclear, these themes permeate various debates 
regarding the desirability of insider trading and existing insider trading regulation.  
See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 313, 321 (2002) (describing and noting Henry Manne’s work on the 
relationship between insider trading regulation and stockholder value); Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, Transnational Business Law in the Twenty-First Century:  The Globalization of 
Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 95-96 (2002) (contending that 
enforcement, rather than mere enactment, of insider trading prohibitions may 
promote “deep and liquid markets”); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A 
Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1468 (1986) (positing that 
“the legal prohibition against insider trading prevents shareholders from reaching 
compensation agreements with the managers of their firms that would make both 
sides better off.”); Spencer Derek Klein, Note:  Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, 
and the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 673 (1988) (noting that 
“investor confidence is not simply a function of the ability to enforce the securities 
laws’ prohibition of insider trading” and that “the factors that impact upon investor 
confidence are numerous and interrelated.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, 
Roberts:  The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 
1325-26 (1999) (describing perceived relationships between insider trading 
regulation and stockholder value); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract:  The 
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 10 n.2 (1984) 
(noting that insider trading itself may undermine investor confidence); Alan 
Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
375, 383 n.26 (1999) (“the economic arguments in favor of insider trading law that 
rely on arguments about promoting investor confidence depend in part on an 
assumption that investors are more likely to invest funds in markets that are felt 
generally to be ethical or fair.”). 
 150. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); 
Richard W. Painter, Insider Trading and the Stock Market Thirty Years Later, 50 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 305 (1999) (describing Henry Manne’s work and legacy in the economic 
analysis of insider trading). 
 151. See Painter, supra note 150 and sources cited infra notes 152 & 153. 
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reflecting all available information in the market price of securities152 
and (ii) unregulated insider trading efficiently compensates 
corporate insiders for managing the firm in a manner that leads to a 
higher firm value.153  Others argue that some form of insider trading 
regulation is needed, at least for some issuers and their insiders, to 
maximize stockholder value.  These scholars state varying points of 
view.  Some acknowledge the value-enhancing attributes of insider 
trading, but document costs that exceed these benefits while others 
quarrel with the contention that all unregulated insider trading is 
value-enhancing.154 
This Part does not propose to enter into the general debate about 
the effects of insider trading regulation on stockholder value.  
Rather, it assumes that insider trading regulation is here to stay and, 
instead, focuses on ways in which existing U.S. insider trading 
regulation—with its unclear, imprecise materiality standard—detracts 
from stockholder value.  Specifically, this Part supports the 
proposition that the lack of clarity and precision in that materiality 
standard creates additional transaction costs that are not apparently 
offset by any resulting benefit. 
B. Foregone or Delayed Transactions 
One impact on stockholder value is created by the issuer or an 
insider determining to not engage in, or to delay the commencement 
of, a value-enhancing transaction155 because of dual determinations 
                                                          
 152. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983).  But see Fried, supra note 75, at 315-16 (critiquing 
this claim). 
 153. See James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure:  The Market for 
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1033 (1989) 
(“[S]everal commentators assert that, if corporate managers were partially 
compensated by being allowed to utilize the value of the nonpublic information that 
they discover through their positions, the corporation and its shareholders would 
benefit due to the generation of certain managerial incentives.”); Manne, supra note 
150, at 30-31; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 152; Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of 
Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION:  THE 
EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (1974); Henry G. Manne, 
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 554-55 (1970). 
 154. See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in 
Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 110-12 (1998); see also Amir N. Licht, 
International Diversity in Securities Regulation:  Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 270-71 (1998). 
 155. Value-enhancing transactions by issuers are relatively easy to conceptualize in 
this context.  See Koenig, supra note 153, at 1046, 1076 (noting, with respect to 
materiality in the insider trading context, that “[s]tandards that are not in the form 
of a bright-line rule, like the probability/magnitude test, fail to provide managers 
with the flexibility and freedom necessary to maximize shareholder value by entering 
the arena for corporate control”).  The stockholder value-enhancing nature of an 
insider’s trading transaction may be harder to fathom.  However, arguments can be 
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that (1) the issuer or insider is, or may be, in possession of material 
information not yet disclosed to the public and (2) the material 
nonpublic information in the actual or possible possession of the 
issuer or insider cannot, or (for strategic or other reasons) should 
not, be disclosed.156  Under these circumstances, the “disclose or 
abstain” rule effectively means “abstain,” and the issuer or insider 
must forgo the desired trading transaction until such time as the 
information is either immaterial or publicly disclosed and 
disseminated.157  This is true regardless of the potential public or 
personal benefits associated with the desired transaction.158  The 
issuer or insider cannot, then, engage in a trading transaction while 
in possession of possibly—but not clearly—material information, 
even if the transaction would tend to increase short-term or long-
term stockholder value.159  Examples of issuer trading transactions 
that might need to be foregone or delayed under these circumstances 
                                                          
made that the purchase of an issuer’s securities by a director or officer is value-
enhancing.  The principle argument in this regard is that the director’s or officer’s 
ownership of the issuer’s securities brings his or her economic interests in line with 
those of other issuer stockholders, thereby incentivizing the director or officer to 
maintain or create market value in the issuer’s shares for the benefit of all 
stockholders.  See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured 
Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 134 (1996); Mark J. 
Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8-10 
(2000).  The public sale of issuer stock by a director or officer also may be seen as 
value-enhancing in that the emotional goodwill engendered by the additional 
compensation represented by any financial gain realized in that sale, while not paid 
to the insider by the issuer, may incentivize the director or officer to higher levels of 
performance on behalf of stockholders on an ongoing basis, especially if combined 
with additional, unrealized equity incentives.  See David M. Schizer, Executives and 
Hedging:  The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 
444 (2000) (arguing that “new unvested grants are supposed to preserve the desired 
incentive”) (footnote omitted).  Alternatively, however, giving an executive complete 
freedom to time his or her sale transaction may result in the executive profiting from 
the sale at the expense of the issuer’s other stockholders.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 751, 759, 829-31 (2002). 
 156. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the 
possible importance of secrecy in merger negotiations).  One can imagine any 
number of situations other than pre-merger discussions and negotiations in which an 
issuer or insider may need or desire to remain silent.  These instances might include, 
for example, the existence of contractual confidentiality restrictions or possible 
involvement as a plaintiff or defendant in significant threatened litigation. 
 157. See Bacastow, supra note 74, at 131-32 (noting that, in the context of insider 
trading, “Rule 10b-5’s inherent inability to provide adequate notice leads to the 
deterrence of legitimate trading activities”); O’Connor, supra note 75, at 366 (noting 
the potential for deterrence of “legitimate activity”); Salbu, supra note 126, at 856 
(“under unclear guidelines . . . transactions that may in fact be legal will be avoided 
by the risk averse because of the chilling effect that results from ambiguous 
standards”).  
 158. See Salbu, supra note 126. 
 159. See supra notes 155 & 157 (discussing value enhancing transactions and the 
potential inhibitions that Rule 10b-5 places on trading activity). 
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include open market stock repurchase programs, self-tender offers to 
retire all or part of an outstanding class or series of economically 
disadvantageous securities, and private and public offerings at 
favorable prices.160 
Suppose, for example, that an issuer has announced a market 
repurchase program with certain established price and timing 
requirements.161  Market repurchase programs generally enhance 
stockholder value because they provide for the distribution of 
corporate funds to stockholders, reduce the number of outstanding 
shares of the issuer (enhancing per-share valuations for ongoing 
stockholders), and typically cause the market price of the issuer’s 
stock to rise (absent offsetting transactions, events, or public 
disclosures), at least for the short term.162  Moreover, market 
repurchases may be a more efficient way to increase stockholder 
value than, for example, the declaration and payment of dividends, 
which would not implicate the insider trading “disclose or abstain” 
rule, since no purchase or sale of securities is involved.163 
Market repurchase programs consist of purchases by an issuer of its 
own securities in the open market.164  Accordingly, under the 
“disclose or abstain” rule, an issuer that desires to institute, or 
continue operating in, a market repurchase program must ensure 
that it is not in possession of material nonpublic information before 
engaging in purchases under the program.165  Where (i) a corporate 
                                                          
 160. Each of these transactions represents a purchase (open market stock 
repurchase program or self-tender offer) or sale (private or public offering) of a 
security by the issuer that is subject to the “disclose or abstain” rule, in addition to 
any mandatory disclosure obligations prescribed by federal securities law or 
regulation. 
 161. See generally F. H. Buckley, When the Medium is the Message:  Corporate Buybacks 
as Signals, 65 IND. L.J. 493, 493-96 (1990) (describing the nature and form of stock 
repurchase transactions). 
 162. See id. at 496 (describing different explanations for stock price increases 
associated with stock repurchases).  See generally Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of 
Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J. CORP. L. 425 (2002) (describing stockholder value 
effects and other attributes of share repurchases). 
 163. See Laurie Simon Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders, 
3 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 129-30 (1989); Song, supra note 162, at 498-99; see also Luca 
Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation:  The Case Against the 
European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165, 1181 (2001). 
 164. See Enriques, supra note 163, at 1179 (discussing the market repurchase 
process); Jesse M. Fried, Open Market Repurchases:  Signaling or Managerial 
Opportunism?, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 865, 865 (2001) (describing an open market 
repurchase as a transaction “in which a corporation buys back stock in the open 
market, usually through a broker, over a period ranging from several months to 
several years.”). 
 165. See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Share holders in Corporate Distributions and 
Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1108 (1983) (“Federal securities laws 
contemplate repurchases but require that the corporation adequately disclose the 
relevant considerations to the sellers.”); Nagy, supra note 10, at 1178-79 (noting and 
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issuer possesses nonpublic information, (ii) a materiality 
determination cannot conclusively be made, and (iii) disclosure of 
the nonpublic information is not an available option,166 the issuer 
typically will not institute (or will suspend operation of) a market 
repurchase program, despite its potential to increase stockholder 
value.  For instance, if Example #2 were related to the application of 
the “disclose or abstain” rule in the context of an issuer stock 
repurchase transaction (rather than director stock purchases), the 
three enumerated facts in the preceding sentence may be deemed to 
be present, and the issuer would suspend its market repurchases.  
Clearer materiality guidelines would enable an issuer in these 
circumstances to better ensure that the determination to forego or 
suspend a market repurchase program is made out of legal necessity, 
rather than legal uncertainty. 
C. Materiality Assessment and Decision-Making as a Management 
Distraction 
Stockholder value is negatively impacted by management’s inability 
to focus on the business and operations of the issuer.167  A director or 
officer can focus on the business and operations of the issuer when 
distractions are minimized (or, ideally, eliminated).  Management 
distractions may include time spent engaged in corporate or personal 
decision-making relating to a possible transaction in the issuer’s 
securities by the issuer or one of its officers or directors.  Especially 
(but not exclusively) if the issuer has a securities trading policy168 in 
                                                          
citing to cases in which the disclose or abstain rule has been applied to issuer stock 
repurchases). 
 166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (positing situations in which an 
issuer may determine not to disclose information). 
 167. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative:  A Social Choice and Game Theoretic 
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 356 (1991) (mentioning 
management distractions in the context of shareholder initiatives as a cost). 
 168. The term “securities trading policy” is used in this article to refer to any 
corporate compliance program that relates to securities trading matters.  These 
programs have their roots in the substance of U.S. insider trading regulation, 
especially the control person liability provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2003), and the 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 
Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in various sections of Chapter 2B of 15 
U.S.C. (2003)), as well as in New York Stock Exchange guidance and the federal 
sentencing guidelines.  See generally Steven Chasin, Comment:  Insider v. Issuer:  
Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
859, 861-64, 869-74 (2003) (describing insider trading compliance policies and the 
bases for issuer liability for an insider’s trading transactions); Kevin B. Huff, Note, 
The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability:  A 
Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252, 1267-72 (1996) (exploring certain 
rationales for compliance programs); Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance 
Programs for Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. REV. 1783 (1994) (examining insider trading 
compliance programs). 
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place, the personal decision-making of an officer or director is 
directly intertwined with the operations of the issuer, making it more 
likely that the decision-making process will be a management 
distraction.169 
In addition, regardless of the existence of a formal securities 
trading policy, an issuer may (and should) choose to institute 
securities trading blackout periods—periods of time during which 
neither the issuer nor its insiders are permitted to trade in the 
issuer’s securities because of the deemed or actual possession by the 
issuer and its insiders of material nonpublic information—at 
appropriate times.170  Before issuing a “no-trading” directive to 
commence such a blackout period, the issuer’s management typically 
participates in determining the materiality of any nonpublic 
information in the possession of the issuer and its insiders.171  During 
the blackout period, management assesses and responds to requests 
from insiders who have an emergent need or desire to trade.  
Management determines when the blackout period ends. 
Even in the absence of a formal securities trading policy or 
corporate directive that expressly prohibits or restricts trading by the 
issuer or insider in an issuer’s securities, the proposed securities 
trader (whether it be the issuer or one of its directors or officers) 
                                                          
 169. Many securities trading policies rely in part on the use of trading windows, 
periods of time during which insiders are permitted to trade in the issuer’s securities 
(absent the possession of material nonpublic information).  See Fried, supra note 75, 
at 345-49.  There are many other different types and forms of securities trading 
policy.  See Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 168, at 1829-36.  See generally Alan 
Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Violations:  A Survey of Corporate Compliance 
Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L. J. 180 (1990). 
 170. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 155, at 830 (referencing the use of trading 
windows and blackout periods as a means of preventing executive stock trading); 
Chasin, supra note 168, at 863 (explaining the nature of a blackout period); Zohar 
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property 
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1261 n.106 (2001). 
 171. See Chasin, supra note 168, at 868-69 (noting that “[m]ateriality presents a . . . 
problematic determination for compliance officers” in the insider trading context).  
Management makes similarly problematic materiality determinations in other 
securities regulation contexts.  See Pritchard, supra note 70, at 936 (noting that 
corporate management and counsel make materiality determinations required by 
disclosure regulation); Scott Russell, Note, Regulation Fair Disclosure:  The Death of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U.L. REV. 527, 539 
(2002) (noting that under Regulation FD, “corporate managers must make 
materiality determinations on-the-spot, without any guidance from the SEC 
regarding what information would be considered material.”); Leonard B. Simon & 
William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation:  The Erroneous Academic 
Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
959, 983 n.93 (1996) (noting that management determines the materiality of a 
lawsuit to an issuer in  assessing whether to disclose it in an annual report); R. 
Gregory Roussel, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery:  Refinement of the Corporate Puffery 
Defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1091 (1998) (noting that materiality determinations 
typically come from corporate officers or other representatives). 
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should, and logically would, assess the materiality of any nonpublic 
information before engaging in securities trading.  This assessment is 
a key element in the decision-making about whether the issuer or its 
insiders will, in fact, trade in the issuer’s securities.  The complexity 
and, in many cases, inconclusive results of the analyses that underlie 
this assessment, whether or not prompted by a formal securities 
trading policy or a corporate desire to identify and communicate the 
existence of securities trading blackout periods, creates significant 
distractions for any director or officer participating in the corporate 
or personal decision-making and for in-house counsel participating 
in that process (as applicable).172  The analytical complexity of 
materiality determinations and the inconclusive nature of the results 
obtained are ordained in principal part by the ambiguity of the 
existing materiality standard.  While no empirical research located to 
date directly demonstrates the magnitude of the costs associated with 
the management distractions created by this complexity and 
inconclusiveness, the distractions logically must detract from 
stockholder value. 
Having said this, however, these distractions should not be of 
concern if the stockholder value benefits of the materiality 
assessment process equal or exceed the costs associated with that 
process.  Under those circumstances (i.e., where stockholder value 
benefits equal or exceed costs), the materiality assessment process 
cannot be said to have a net negative effect on stockholder value.  For 
example, if the materiality assessment process were to effectively 
insulate the issuer and its insiders from prolonged involvement in an 
expensive legal action based on that materiality assessment, we might 
find that the stockholder value benefits of engaging in the assessment 
                                                          
 172.  In the case of a desired trade by a director or officer of the issuer, while the 
formalized decision-making process may not be directly connected with the issuer, a 
director or officer still would be likely to involve the issuer’s counsel and to handle 
transactional questions and decision-making during business hours; potentially 
decreasing the amount or effectiveness of time spent by all on the issuer’s business.   
See Terry Fleming, Perspectives on Business Law:  Telling the Truth Slant—Defending 
Insider Trading Claims Against Legal and Financial Professionals, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1421, 1438 (2002) (“An insider who consults with and relies on the advice of 
legal counsel prior to engaging in a trade may use those circumstances to 
demonstrate good faith and the lack of scienter.”); Patrick D. Harvill, Note:  The 
Forgotten Warrior:  Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Battle Against Insider 
Trading, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 226, 238 (noting the Supreme Court’s view, expressed in 
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner et al., 472 U.S. 299, 317 (1985), that 
“insiders . . . are relatively sophisticated and have access to legal counsel”);  Henry L. 
“Scott” Nearing, III, Note:  Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System:  The Impact of Rule 
10b-5’s Corporate Disclosure Requirements on the Williams Act’s Tender Offer and Best Price 
Rules, 40 VILL. L. REV. 263, 299 (1995) (suggesting that “corporate management . . . 
develop procedures assuring that corporate personnel, familiar with the current state 
of public information, pre-approve all insider trades.”). 
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process exceed the costs of engaging in that process.  Where the 
issuer or an insider decides to trade in the issuer’s securities after 
making such an assessment, however, the vagueness of the existing 
materiality standard and the uncertain results frequently obtained by 
its application to specific facts may tend to encourage, rather than 
discourage, the commencement of litigation (including expensive, 
time-consuming, settlement-focused securities fraud class action 
litigation) against the issuer or insider or both.173  Better materiality 
guidance logically should enable issuers and their insiders to make 
decisions borne out of an increased level of certainty, decreasing the 
risk that litigation is brought or sustained.174 
D. The Cost of Outside Counsel 
Frequently, outside counsel is involved in the materiality 
assessment process when the issuer or one of its insiders desires to 
trade in the issuer’s securities.175  This involvement may occur 
regardless of firm or legal department size and may be most related 
to the perceived visibility, importance, or degree of difficulty of the 
materiality determination.176  Corporate transactional counsel tend to 
face materiality determinations like those emanating from the facts of 
Example #2 (which, as you may recall, invokes the possible materiality 
of premerger negotiations) on a regular basis.  The costs of retaining 
outside counsel may be relatively high.177  For issuers that both 
                                                          
 173. The subject of securities fraud class action litigation is discussed in greater 
detail infra Part V. 
 174. Moreover, civil or criminal enforcement of insider trading prohibitions 
under Rule 10b-5 may be more likely where the materiality of any nonpublic 
information is apparent. 
 175. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 763, 850 n.232 (1995) (regarding outside counsel’s potential role 
in making materiality determinations); see also Jerry Duggan, Note, Regulation FD:  
SEC Tells Corporate Insiders to “Chill Out”, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 159, 182 (2001) 
(noting that law firms stand to benefit from the need for interpretation of 
ambiguous language in Regulation FD).  One securities regulation casebook notes 
that:  “[b]ecause the materiality concept is such a workhorse in securities regulation, 
learning to apply it is probably the most valuable skill a securities lawyer can 
acquire.”  Cox et al., supra note 51, at 40.  A recent survey of lawyers conducted by an 
ABA task force confirms that legal advice is sought on the question of materiality in 
the context of Regulation FD.  Reg. FD Report, supra note 83, at 13. 
 176. Reg. FD Report, supra note 83, at 13; Harold A. Segall, Then and Now:  The 
Commercial Practice of Law for Over Fifty Years, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 570-71 (1997) 
(noting that outside counsel often is retained for important or specialized matters). 
 177. Comparisons of the cost of in-house representation and representation by 
outside counsel in litigation most often indicate that in-house representation is less 
expensive.  See Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys:  Unnecessary Casualties in the 
Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 
205, 241 n.118 (1997).  But see Segall, supra note 176, at 569 (indicating that it may 
cost less to retain outside counsel). 
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employ in-house counsel and retain outside counsel for specialized 
work on corporate transactions, materiality assessments and 
determinations generally are made based on consultation between in-
house and outside counsel, resulting in some duplication of effort 
(and, therefore, cost).178 
The ultimate stockholder value analysis concerning the use of 
outside counsel is the same as that described above with respect to 
management distractions: the ambiguity inherent in the existing 
materiality standard results in the issuer incurring costs that are not 
offset by related benefits.179  In principle, issuer costs associated with 
the retention of outside counsel in the materiality assessment process 
are somewhat easier to quantify than the costs associated with 
management distractions.  Moreover, these cost consist of 
professional fees (typically determined by hourly billing at 
predetermined rates) and disbursements (including, e.g., online 
legal research, telephone, facsimile, and courier costs).180  Hourly 
billing rates for partners and associates in different markets 
periodically are published in trade (and sometimes carried in 
general) news media.181  There are many missing links, however, in 
precisely quantifying the costs associated with outside counsel 
participation in materiality assessments regarding insider trading 
transactions.  These include (1) the number of assessments that are 
made, (2) the seniority of the attorney(s) engaged in the process, 
(3) the number of billable hours spent by each in that process, and 
(4) the dollar amount of any disbursements associated with each 
assessment.  These costs factors vary and frequently are hidden in or 
indistinguishable from those associated with overall considerations 
made in connection with the structuring and implementation of a 
proposed transaction. However, the complex, unguided, fact-based, 
                                                          
 178. Of course, the active involvement of in-house counsel in any matter handled 
by outside counsel may result in cost management benefits.  See Segall, supra note 
176, at 569 (discussing cost issues as part of the reasoning behind employing in-
house or outside counsel).  Moreover, expert outside counsel may be able to provide 
more efficient and cost-effective research on issues of materiality.  These and other 
factors may result in certain efficiencies, but do not negate the fact that the use of 
outside counsel may generate costs beyond those generated by management 
distractions.  Id. 
 179. See discussion supra Part IV.C (describing the potential effects of managerial 
distraction). 
 180. See generally Symposium, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of 
Civil Justice on the American Economy and Policy:  Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in 
Litigation:  What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2003) 
(discussing various types of fee arrangements associated with legal practice). 
 181. See, e.g., A Firm-by-Firm Sampling of Billing Rates Nationwide, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 9, 
2002, at B12; Ruth Singleton, Firms Raised Hourly Rates in 2002, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2003, at 19. 
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individualized nature of materiality assessments under the current 
legal standard makes it likely that outside counsel at both senior and 
junior levels will spend many billable hours at the task.  In addition to 
research and consultation, outside counsel may generate fees by 
preparing for and attending meetings of the issuer’s board of 
directors to advise the issuer on materiality issues, especially where 
the issuer’s trading is under inquiry.  In exceedingly rare cases, 
outside counsel may be asked to render to the issuer a written legal 
opinion on a materiality question.182 
Regardless of the precise, actual costs involved in outside counsel’s 
participation in the materiality assessment process, however, there 
exist clear costs associated with the engagement of outside counsel as 
participants in the materiality assessment process.183  These costs are 
not apparently offset by any actual or perceived stockholder value 
benefits associated with that engagement (apart from a potential 
intangible, institutional satisfaction that materiality determinations 
are being made by the most qualified decision makers). Again, there 
is no evidence, for example, that the involvement of outside counsel 
in materiality determinations: (i) better insulates the issuer or its 
insiders from legal action, including expensive, drawn out securities 
fraud class action litigation; (ii) leads to lower settlement value in any 
securities fraud litigation; or (iii) better ensures victory in such 
litigation after completion of an exhaustive, time-consuming, and 
costly trial and appeal process. In certain circumstances, the best that 
outside counsel can do, as earlier indicated, is to advise the issuer to 
forego or delay commencement of the transaction that causes the 
duty to disclose. 
                                                          
 182. Outside counsel typically would resist rendering such an opinion except in 
the most obvious case (where the client typically would not request an opinion from 
outside counsel).  Even in an obvious case, however, counsel likely would have to 
issue a reasoned or qualified opinion (e.g., “Based upon and subject to the foregoing 
assumptions, limitations, qualifications, and exceptions, while the matter is not 
entirely free from doubt, we are of the opinion that a court with proper jurisdiction 
should find the facts . . . material”).  See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization:  The 
Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 643 n.250 (1998) (“Opinions laden 
with foundational assumptions are known as ‘reasoned opinions.’”).  Any opinion 
rendered in a non-obvious case undoubtedly would be a highly qualified opinion 
with many carefully drawn, expressly stated assumptions, limitations, and exceptions. 
 183. This is a typically noted effect of the use of ex post legal standards.  See Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 569 (1992). 
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V. STOCKHOLDER VALUE IN THE CURRENT CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
The current securities fraud class action environment creates, 
among other things, additional pressure on stockholder value, 
especially in the insider trading context.  The lack of clarity around 
materiality contributes to this effect.  Specifically, the current ill-
defined legal standard governing materiality determinations makes 
pretrial dismissal of an insider trading class action difficult, regardless 
of the overall merits of the action.184  For similar reasons, a trial 
defense based on immateriality is risky at best.  These factors likely 
contribute to the large number and percentage of settlements in 
insider trading actions.  These settlements decrease corporate 
resources available to stockholders (as residual claimants on the 
issuer’s assets), without resulting in a proportional sharing among 
stockholders of the settlement payment or other benefits.185 
This Part begins by briefly placing the current securities fraud class 
action environment into its historical context.  Additionally, it 
provides some basic information about insider trading class actions.  
Finally, this Part describes and discusses the resulting need for 
substantive class action reform to address the materiality issue. 
                                                          
 184. See Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law:  
The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 71, 100 (“Under the definition of materiality adopted, it is difficult for a 
defendant to negate the element as a matter of law on a motion for summary 
judgment.”); Fleming, supra note 172, at 1430 (“Motions for judgment on the 
pleadings and summary judgment are rarely granted, and the decision on materiality 
is ordinarily reserved for the fact-finder.”).  Courts have noted that summary 
judgment on the issue of materiality is not favored.  See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 
(quoting Johns Hopkins U. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)); Caravan 
Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 565 (9th 
Cir. 1985); (“Summary judgment is normally inappropriate for determining the 
materiality of undisclosed information.”).  Yet, a number of cases involving issues of 
materiality are decided on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.  See Stephen 
M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else 
Does—Boundedly):  Rules of Thumb In Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 116 
n.94 (2002) (noting, with respect to a group of review of securities fraud opinions, 
that “[o]f the 91 (out of 100) cases that were decided at the motion to dismiss stage, 
64 involved materiality determinations in favor of the defendants (i.e., over 70 
percent)”). 
 185. For one thing, plaintiffs’ bar attorneys in these class actions generally get 
paid out of any settlement funds.  See Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards:  Why Class 
Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 482 (1997); Denise N. Martin et 
al., Recent Trends IV:  What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 128-31 (1999) (describing class action fee arrangements 
generally).  For another, depending on the facts (including whether the alleged 
injury occurred in connection with a purchase or sale when the action is brought, 
and whether stockholder plaintiffs opt out of participation in the action) the issuer’s 
then existing stockholders may or may not be injured parties or plaintiffs in the 
action.  See infra notes 203 & 204 and accompanying text. 
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A. Historical Context of the Current Securities Fraud Class Action 
Environment 
The 1934 Act does not expressly provide for private rights of action 
for violations of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.  Such a right, however, 
long ago was held to be available.186  Since that time, private actions—
and, in particular, class actions—have become a popular way of 
enforcing securities fraud claims, including insider trading 
allegations.187  By the mid-1990s, concerns about the number and 
propriety of securities fraud class actions had been loudly voiced.188 
Accordingly, in 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995189 (“PSLRA”) as a means of, among 
other things, reducing the number of (assertedly) specious securities 
class actions brought against issuers and reducing the primary role of 
plaintiffs’ bar counsel in initiating those class actions.190  Data suggest 
that the PLSRA may have been largely ineffective at achieving these 
objectives.191  More class action securities litigation was commenced in 
                                                          
 186. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsom Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 187. The manner in which modern class action litigation developed made its 
application to insider trading actions inevitable.  See Susan T. Spence, Looking 
Back . . . in a Collective Way, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2002, at 21 (outlining the history 
of class action law). 
 188. See id. at 24; see also Wager & Ward, supra note 39, at 13; Charles H. Gray, 
Note, An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:  Auctions as an 
Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 829, 830-31, 833 
(2002). 
 189. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C. 
from §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (2000)). 
 190. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Act, Hearing on S.1260 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of 
the S. Comm. on Banking, House & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 4-5 (1998) (testimony of 
John F. Olson, Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher) (“The PSLRA was intended to stem the 
tide of frivolous nationwide class action lawsuits.”); Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, 
Retroactive Legislative History:  Scienter Under the Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act 
of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 316 (2000); Roslyn Falk, May a Shareholder Who Objects to a 
Proposed Settlement of a Derivative Action Appeal an Adverse Decision? A Report on 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Felzen, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 235, 
243 (2000). 
 191. See Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 12 (“[T]he 41% higher likelihood that 
any publicly-traded company will face a suit going beyond a motion to dismiss 
suggests that the plaintiffs’ bar is pursuing fraud more aggressively since PSLRA, 
rather than being limited by it.”); Stanford Law School Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse, supra note 27.  A case can be made that the PSLRA has been 
somewhat effective in that the post-PSLRA average rate of non-voluntary dismissals 
has increased, with a corresponding decrease in settlements.  See Painter et al., supra 
note 39, at 7.  But see Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 5 (“Dismissal rates are 
statistically unchanged since PSLRA, despite the new, more specific standard of 
pleading that it set, with 12-13% of cases dismissed within three years both before 
and after, and few dismissals in subsequent years.”).  The average dollar amount of 
each settlement is up.  See Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 7 (noting that average 
settlements more than tripled from 1996 to the first half of 2003); Painter et al., supra 
note 39, at 9-12. This dollar-value increase appears to be attributable to a few 
extremely large (i.e., high dollar-value) settlements in individual cases.  Id. 
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2002 than in any other year for which data have been collected.192  
Based on data collected and analyzed by Stanford University and 
Cornerstone Research, the number of securities class actions brought 
in 2002 (other than initial public offering allocation cases) was 224, 
up from 171 in 2001. Since 1995, the trend in securities class actions 
has been stable to upward.193 
The mere commencement of securities fraud class action litigation 
may have a measurable negative impact on the market value of the 
stock of a corporate issuer.194  Damages claims and settlement 
amounts can be significant, and litigation costs are known to be 
high.195  With a decreased market value, the corporate defendant may 
                                                          
 192. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings:  2002:  A Year in 
Review, available at Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, supra 
note 27, at 2; see also Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 2 (noting the same trend based 
on an analysis of different data).   
 193. See Buckberg et al., supra note 39, at 2; Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse, supra note 27.  This data also may indicate that the PSLRA has 
failed to achieve its goals.  Alternatively, the data may indicate the existence or 
discovery of more securities fraud, rather than continued or growing speculative, 
settlement-oriented litigation.  It may be too early to tell which explanation carries 
the greatest weight with respect to recent actions, since cases brought in any given 
year settle out or otherwise devolve over a period of years.  See Buckberg et al., supra 
note 39, at 5 (noting that there “has been a slowing of time to disposition due to later 
settlements” since adoption of the PSLRA).  A recent paper suggests that market 
conditions explain best “the amount of securities litigation in federal courts and the 
type of allegations made in plaintiffs’ complaints.”  Painter et al., supra note 39, at 6. 
 194. This seems intuitive.  But see Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:  Litigation 
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 65-66 (1991). 
 195. See Nicole M. Briski, Comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995:  Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and 
Opportunity?, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 156 (2000) (“Once a securities fraud lawsuit 
survives a motion to dismiss, the prohibitive cost of discovery provides an incentive 
for a corporation to settle the lawsuit, regardless of the company's culpability.”); 
Franco, supra note 142, at 336 n.231 (2002) (referencing arguments that securities 
class action litigation overcompensates investors); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re 
Silicon Graphics Inc.:  Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 782-83 
(2000) (describing the costs to defendants in securities class action litigation); Jeffrey 
L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine 
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1039 (2003) 
(referencing “the enormous litigation costs involved in securities fraud class actions” 
and their relationship to settlements); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in 
Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 83 (“The Reform Act recognizes that 
suboptimal liability standards and procedural rules in securities class actions impose 
costs on issuers (good and bad) that are passed on to investors.”); Charles M. Yablon, 
A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 567, 586-93 (2000) (discussing the relationships among damages claims, 
settlements, and class action litigation costs); see also Janine C. Guido, Note, Seeking 
Enlightenment From Above:  Circuit Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act’s 
Heightened Pleading Requirement, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 501, 506 (2000).  One published 
study documents average and median settlement values at $23.3 and $6.3 Million in 
2002 and $14.1 and $5.1 Million in 2001, respectively.  See Cornerstone Research, 
Post-Reform Act Securities Case Settlements:  2001:  A Year in Review, available at Stanford 
Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, supra note 27, at 2. 
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find it more difficult to conduct or finance its operations.  Customer 
and supplier relationships may be damaged.196  Debt and equity 
financing in public and private markets may be unavailable or less 
available; and institutional lenders may be unwilling or less willing to 
loan the issuer operating funds on a cost-effective basis.197  
Accordingly, the availability and value of both short-term and long-
term investments in the issuer may be reduced by the mere 
commencement of a class action lawsuit. 
Many securities class actions are settled before trial, and even 
before adjudication of a motion to dismiss.198  A number of factors 
make settlement of these legal claims attractive to defendants.199  
Moreover, settlements are judicially encouraged—the earlier, the 
better.200  Yet, payments made by an issuer in settlement of a class 
action lawsuit also represent a drain on stockholder value.201  In these 
                                                          
 196. See Johnson et al., supra note 195, at 783 (“[T]he mere existence of the class 
action may disrupt relationships with suppliers and customers, who may be somewhat 
leery of dealing with a party accused of fraud.”). 
 197. Accord Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 581 (1991) (“From the perspective of the 
capital markets, the economic costs of a non-merits-based system of resolving 
securities class actions should cause increases in the cost of capital in the public 
offering market and, to some degree, in the price of insurance.”); Dent, supra note 
41; Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:  
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 976 (1993) (concluding, with 
respect to derivative and class action litigation, that “[t]he failure of prosecutors, 
regulators, and the courts to seek legal rules with bright lines also raises the cost of 
capital by generating costly litigation.”). 
 198. See supra note 191; Guido, supra note 195, at 506; see also O’Connor, supra 
note 75, at 366 (noting that the uncertain legal standards relating to materiality may 
cause defendants to settle).  Although not the subject matter of this article, the large 
number of settlements of securities fraud class actions may have legal effects on 
issuers and insiders in addition to those provided for under the federal securities 
laws.  For example, amounts payable by corporate defendants in settlement of a 
securities fraud claim are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(19) (2000). 
 199. These factors may include (i) the possibility of a large judgment for the 
plaintiff class, (ii) a willingness to settle on the part of individual defendants, many of 
whom control the defendant corporation, (iii) the liability of third-party insurers for 
amounts paid in settlement of class actions, and (iv) the possibility that third-party 
insurers will be obligated to pay amounts in excess of policy limits if they reject 
settlements proposed by the parties.  See Alexander, supra note 195, at 528-34, 548-68 
(1991); see also Guido, supra note 197, at 506; Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon 
Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud 
Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (1998); Yablon, supra note 195, at 586 
(suggesting that a substantial number of “longshot” securities class action claims, 
“coupled with litigation uncertainty, the availability of threshold motions to 
defendants,” and risk aversion by both sides provide, . . . the best explanation of “the 
high number, and low settlement value, of securities class actions.”). 
 200. See Maley v. Del Global Tech. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“In the context of a complex class action, early settlement has far-reaching benefits 
in the judicial system.”); Mashburn v. Nat’l Health Care, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 660, 669 
(M.D. Ala. 1988) (“The law is clear that early settlements are to be encouraged.”). 
 201. To the extent that settlement amounts are covered by available insurance, 
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settlements, those who recover value as members of the plaintiff class 
typically receive an offsetting benefit, albeit less than the damages 
they are alleged to have suffered.202  However, settlement amounts 
earmarked for distribution to the plaintiff class benefit only members 
of the plaintiff class; other investors suffer a loss of stockholder value 
arising from the fraud or the litigation itself and receive no 
compensation from the issuer.203  This result is especially damaging to 
those who buy the issuer’s securities before commencement of the 
class period and continue to hold the securities through the 
settlement payment date.204 
If the issuer should decide to defend itself at trial rather than settle 
with the plaintiff class, the issuer then would be forced to shoulder 
other burdens.  In addition to the operational costs resulting from 
the management distractions, outside counsel fees, and 
disbursements commonly associated with class action litigation 
(similar in effect and likely far greater in magnitude to those 
described above with respect to the materiality decision-making 
process), the prolonged period of uncertainty about the issuer’s 
potential judgment liability during the pendency of the trial may tend 
to depress the overall market value of the firm.205 
B. Insider Trading Claims in the Securities Fraud Class Action 
Environment 
Suits alleging insider trading violations make up a significant 
number of the overall securities fraud class actions brought in any 
                                                          
the drain on stockholder value is lessened.  See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning 
of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 25 (“Testimony that preceded the enactment 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act estimated that 96 percent of securities 
class action settlements were for amounts within the limits of available insurance 
coverage.”); Yablon, supra note 195, at 579-80 (noting that most securities class 
actions settle within applicable insurance policy limits).  The issuer may, however, 
have to pay a higher premium or settle for lesser coverage after an insurer pays off all 
or part of a securities fraud class action settlement.  See Alexander, supra note 197, at 
581. 
 202. See supra note 185. 
 203. See Palmiter, supra note 195, at 83 (“The settlement of securities fraud class 
actions—the nearly universal outcome in these cases—involves payment by the 
company (existing shareholders) to the plaintiff class (a sub-group of existing or 
former shareholders) and to the plaintiff's lawyers.”).  These other investors may 
include both those who opt out of the plaintiff class and those who lack standing to 
be part of the plaintiff class because they did not purchase or sell securities during 
the class period.  See infra note 204. 
 204. These stockholders cannot be members of the plaintiff class because they 
lack standing—they have not purchased or sold securities during the class period.  
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975). 
 205. See W. Kip Viscusi, Remarks of Featured Speaker, A Postmortem on the Cigarette 
Settlement, 29 CUM. L. REV. 523, 545 (1998/1999) (noting similar effects in connection 
with suits against the cigarette industry). 
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given year and often are litigated as part of a larger action involving 
alleged corporate fraud.206  Many factors contribute to this abundance 
of insider trading claims among the many securities class action 
lawsuits, including the ease with which alleged violations may be 
identified and the permissive nature of certain provisions in the 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (the 
“ITSFEA”).207 
Insider trading is a (relatively) easily identifiable type of securities 
fraud.  This is because, under the “disclose or abstain” rule, the duty 
to disclose is triggered by the mere existence of a securities trade by 
the issuer or an insider, and the scienter requirement may be met by 
the mere decision to trade while in knowing possession of nonpublic 
information that is determined to be material.208  Accordingly, the key 
fact in identifying a possible violation (other than the possession of 
material nonpublic information) is the existence of a trading 
transaction by the issuer or an insider.  Existing public disclosure 
requirements under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act make the task of 
identifying trading transactions relatively easy.209  Once potentially 
                                                          
 206. Of the 224 securities class action filings made in 2002, 58 (or twenty-six 
percent) included claims of insider trading.  See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class 
Action Case Filings; 2002:  A Year in Review, available at Stanford Law School Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse, supra note 27, at 17; see also Wager & Ward, supra note 
39, at 17 (“More than 55 percent of new class action filings in 2001 contained 
allegations of improper trading by insiders . . . .”). 
 207. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2003)). 
 208. See supra notes 44 & 59 and accompanying text. 
 209. See generally Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 n.11 (1st Cir. 
1999) (noting that “[b]ecause insiders of a publicly traded company must regularly 
file share ownership and trading reports with the SEC (on Forms 3, 4, 5, and 
144), . . . information [regarding normal securities trading patterns] is readily 
available to plaintiffs.”).  After the end of each of its first three fiscal quarters (on 
Form 10-Q) and its fiscal year (on Form 10-K), each issuer with a class of equity 
securities registered under the 1934 Act must file with the SEC a periodic report that 
includes certain financial information about the corporation, including (among 
other things) specified financial statements for the issuer as at the end of that 
quarter or year.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2003).  The year-end filing includes full, 
audited financial statements (including two years of balance sheet and three years of 
income statements, among other things) with footnotes.  See 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2003).  
Accordingly, at or before the time of filing of the year-end report, the issuer would 
have publicly disclosed any sales or repurchases of its equity securities.  Certain 
insiders also have to comply with disclosure requirements.  Before selling equity in a 
corporation, certain officers, directors, and other persons controlling, controlled by, 
or under common control with the corporation must file a Form 144 to report future 
proposed sales of securities “if the amount of securities to be sold in reliance upon 
the rule during any period of three months exceeds 500 shares or other units or has 
an aggregate sale price in excess of $ 10,000.”  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h) (2003).  
Also, officers, directors, and beneficial owners of ten percent or more of a class of 
the corporation’s equity securities registered under the 1934 Act must report certain 
information about most transactions in those securities after they occur-either by the 
end of the second business day following the day on which the transaction is 
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material nonpublic information has been identified, in many (if not 
most) circumstances, a prospective class action plaintiff or attorney 
can use these public filings to determine whether an issuer or insider 
may have traded while in possession of that information.  Conversely, 
once a public filing has reported a proposed or actual trading 
transaction, a prospective class action plaintiff or attorney need only 
identify the issuer’s or insider’s awareness of potentially material 
nonpublic information in order to identify the key facts for its 
pleadings. 
Congress also has given prospective plaintiffs a clearer path to 
private actions (including class actions) alleging insider trading 
violations.  In 1988, with the adoption of the ITSFEA, persons 
engaging in trading transactions contemporaneous with insider 
trading acquired an express statutory right of action.210  Within the 
first two years after adoption of the ITSFEA, one scholar noted the 
following as a plaintiff-oriented effect of this provision, among others:  
“. . . private attorneys . . . sue in those insider trading cases that 
promise ‘the largest judgment in the least amount of time.’”211  One 
might reform this observation for purposes of the current class action 
environment by replacing the word “judgment” with the word 
“settlement.” 
In this environment, then, many lawsuits alleging insider trading 
are brought and many of those are settled.  Ambiguities in the 
existing materiality standard may make it more likely that an issuer or 
insider will want to settle with the plaintiff class early on (rather than 
suffer through a trial involving complex and uncertain elements of 
proof), especially with courts encouraging early settlements.212  
Moreover, long and protracted defenses of insider trading allegations 
have the capacity to distract management from the operations of the 
issuer and run up large legal costs, further impacting stockholder 
value.213  Under these circumstances, plaintiffs are incentivized to 
bring insider trading class actions in circumstances where it is not 
clear—or even probable—that the nonpublic information possessed 
                                                          
executed (on Form 4) or by the 45th day after the end of the corporation’s fiscal year 
in which the transaction occurred (on Form 5).  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (2003).  
Finally, beneficial owners of five percent or more of a class of the corporation’s 
equity securities registered under the 1934 Act must report material increases and 
decreases in that beneficial ownership promptly after they occur.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-2(a) (2003). 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2003). 
 211. O’Connor, supra note 75, at 371. 
 212. See sources cited supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (including data 
on the high rate of settlement of securities fraud class action litigation). 
 213. See Viscusi, supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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by the trading issuer or insider is material.214  Clearer materiality 
guidance should both limit this incentive to sue and make early 
dismissal of private insider trading actions more probable. 
C. The Need for Substantive Reform 
To date, general securities class action litigation reform largely has 
been procedural or quasi-procedural in nature.215  The adopted 
reforms have not reduced the number or settlement value of 
securities class actions brought.  It is time to give consideration to 
broad-based substantive reform to clarify U.S. insider trading 
regulation.  This reform need not involve federal legislation and can 
be fashioned to have impact both in and outside the class action 
environment.  The SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b5-1 and Rule 10b5-2 in 
the summer of 2000 represents a step in this direction in the context 
of U.S. insider trading regulation.216  Why not continue along these 
lines by providing enhanced guidance on materiality in that context? 
As noted above, greater clarity in defining materiality logically 
should cause a reduction in the number of insider trading class 
actions filed or should result in the dismissal of more of these cases 
on a pretrial motion.  Specifically, after the adoption of effective 
materiality guidance, a class action based on the failure by an issuer 
or insider to disclose nonpublic information in connection with a 
                                                          
 214. Of course, the plaintiff’s access to the courts is not wholly unfettered.  
Counsel to the plaintiff class must act in accordance with all applicable rules of 
attorney conduct and professional responsibility in bringing and settling any insider 
trading litigation. 
 215. There are certain notable exceptions, however.  Professor Leubsdorf 
summarized the overall landscape in this area as follows: 
Although class action law is moving in substantive directions, procedure may 
still have a hand on the wheel. Often, indeed, it is hard to separate changes 
in substantive law from class action changes, particularly in areas where class 
actions have become the predominant remedy. . . .  The “safe harbor” 
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 contain no 
procedural or remedial clauses, but would they have been enacted without 
the growth in securities class action that made securities litigation important 
to corporate management? 
The congressional origin of most class action changes links with their 
substantive impetus. Procedural rulemakers have continued to write general, 
transsubstantive rules. Because so many groups have conflicting interests in 
class action rules, no consensus supporting significant class action changes of 
transsubstantive impact has arisen. Interest groups seeking narrower changes 
have found Congress a more receptive audience whether the changes they 
sought were substantive, procedural, or both. 
John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 455 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted).  An important recent procedural reform impacting securities 
fraud class actions, including actions alleging insider trading, is the extension of the 
statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions (among others) enacted as part of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2003). 
 216. See infra note 219. 
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purchase or sale of securities would survive a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment (if any) if the undisclosed nonpublic information 
is material under new, more precise guidance.  Similarly, after 
adoption of effective materiality guidance, a defendant should be 
able to prevail on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if any 
and all undisclosed information in the possession of the subject issuer 
or insider is immaterial under that definition.  Yet, certain actions 
would survive summary judgment and still not result in a materiality 
ruling favoring the plaintiffs.  That is because it is impossible to 
achieve complete legal certainty and predictability of end results at 
this stage in the proceedings— except under a bright-line rule (which 
is not being advocated here).217  However, by enhancing certainty and 
predictability of result, effective materiality guidance may result in 
fewer insider trading class action settlements, and the value of any 
settlements should better reflect actual, rather than speculative (or 
nuisance), measures of value. 
Of course, where definitions important to a rule of law are 
clarified, unintended loopholes are likely to be identified and 
exploited by those who desire to push that rule of law to its logical—
or illogical—extreme.  Nevertheless, the benefits of clarity to 
transaction planners, litigants, and courts outweigh this possible 
detriment.218  Moreover, a thoughtful, careful decisional and drafting 
process to more precisely define materiality should minimize this 
detrimental effect. 
VI. A PROPOSAL 
Fair and honest securities markets, investor confidence in those 
markets, and accurate and complete public disclosure in the insider 
trading regulation context can be enhanced by the adoption of more 
precise guidance as to information that is material.  Whether that 
guidance comes in the form of legislation, SEC rulemaking, SEC 
                                                          
 217. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
 218. In this regard, on a more general note, Professor Grzebielski observed that: 
while rules perhaps cannot define precisely what does and does not violate 
the law, a greater specific content can be given through them than by relying 
on the provisions of ubiquitous rule 10b-5. The expansive interpretations 
which the courts and the Commission have often afforded rule 10b-5 permit 
its use to reach almost any conduct related to the purchase or sale of 
securities that is deemed unfair. If rule 10b-5 is to be a catchall, it should be 
used to reach conduct not already specifically regulated, rather than to 
swallow up the entire field. 
Ray J. Grzebielski, A Response to Roberta Karmel’s Call for a New Direction in Federal 
Securities Regulation:  Regulation by Prosecution:  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
vs. Corporate America, 57 TUL. L. REV. 930, 937 (1983). 
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interpretive advice, or (at a bare minimum) more methodical, 
rigorous decision making in the courts, enhanced guidance is 
warranted.219  The question then becomes how those guidelines 
should be constructed. 
A. Suggested Approach to Fashioning Appropriate Materiality Guidance 
In fashioning materiality guidance, it is important first to 
determine the specific objective to be served by that guidance.  The 
factual scenarios in which an issuer or insider may trade securities 
while in possession of nonpublic information are limitless.  
Accordingly, it is unrealistic (and arguably undesirable220) to expect 
to fashion guidance that authoritatively defines what is “material” for 
every possible set of facts in every possible subject matter area in the 
insider trading context.  An alternative goal, not inconsistent with the 
PSLRA, is to fashion guidance designed to afford both private 
investors (as prospective private action plaintiffs) and issuers and 
their insiders (as putative defendants) more clarity and certainty.  
Specifically, this guidance would aid litigants and their counsel in 
determining whether to bring and how to respond to complaints, 
motions to dismiss, or motions for summary judgment based on 
knowledge of recurring fact patterns in key subject matter areas.  This 
objective is both attainable and useful to litigants and others in 
addressing the identified disadvantages associated with the current 
lack of clarity and precision in determining materiality.221 
                                                          
 219. A separate article could be written about the benefits and detriments of each 
possible legislative, administrative, and judicial approach to formulating and issuing 
guidance on materiality in the insider trading context.  That scholarly work, which 
logically would integrate principles of legislation, administrative law, and 
jurisprudence (among other disciplines), must be left for another day.  Even without 
the benefit of that further analysis, however, one logically might place the initial 
responsibility for this effort in the hands of the SEC for two reasons.  First, the SEC 
has express authority to adopt regulations under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  See 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003).  Second, the SEC recently has issued specific guidance on 
other definitional issues in the insider trading area through its adoption of Rule 
10b5-1 and Rule 10b5-2.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 
(2003).  The proposal forwarded in this Part represents a logical extension of these 
earlier SEC initiatives. 
 220. Bright-line tests may limit the ability of private and public enforcement to 
adapt to new circumstances, sealing off opportunities to proscribe or punish conduct 
that, while not foreseen, is intended to be regulated.  The Basic Court, for example, 
did not find much merit in the arguments favoring a bright-line test for materiality.  
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236. 
 221. Despite the litigation-oriented nature of this objective, guidance fashioned 
along these lines should be useful to transaction planners, enforcement agents, and 
judges, as well as litigation counsel, since it more directly focuses both ex ante and ex 
post factual inquiries and analyses. 
HEMINWAY.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:09 PM 
2003] MATERIALITY GUIDANCE IN INSIDER TRADING 1193 
1. Recognizing the “disclose or abstain” rule for what it is 
In sum and substance, the “disclose or abstain” rule governing 
insider trading under Rule 10b-5 functions as a transaction-triggered 
mandatory disclosure rule without any existing line-item content 
guidance.222  Said another way, issuers and insiders know that they 
must disclose all material nonpublic information then in their 
possession, but there are no content-oriented disclosure rules directly 
applicable to their disclosure obligation (as there are with respect to 
other transactional disclosure rules relating to, for example, public 
offerings and federally regulated tender offers).  Accordingly, it 
seems logical to approach the task of issuing materiality guidance in 
the insider trading context as one would approach materiality 
guidance in the context of any line-item mandatory disclosure rule.223  
The process of constructing materiality guidance logically involves, 
for each subject matter area or factual context in which guidance is to 
be provided, the identification of the elements of materiality in that 
subject matter area or factual context in the insider trading 
environment, and a recognition of the ways in which the materiality 
of specific information in that area or context and that environment 
can be measured.  Each materiality element and method of 
measurement then would be incorporated into guidance on 
materiality for that subject matter area or factual context. 
2. An existing regulatory example 
The materiality elements and measuring methods used in existing 
mandatory disclosure rules are best illustrated by an example.  Item 
11(c) of Form S-1224 calls for the disclosure of “legal proceedings” in 
accordance with Item 103 of Regulation S-K (“Item 103”) in 
connection with a public offering of securities.225  In that connection, 
                                                          
 222. See supra note 29. After significant guidance is created around specific 
categories of material information, it may make sense to collect that guidance in an 
SEC-promulgated disclosure document designed to allow issues or insiders to report 
material information in connection with a corporate or insider trading transaction 
that is not otherwise reported under existing SEC rules and regulations.  See supra 
note 209 (summarizing briefly certain existing SEC rules and regulations governing 
disclosure responsibilities). 
 223. See Franco, supra note 142. This approach to constructing materiality 
guidance (and, in fact, the desirability (regarding information about the interaction 
of mandatory disclosure rules and antifraud provisions) and efficacy of enhanced 
materiality guidance of any form) rests, in part, on arguments supportive of 
mandatory disclosure rules under the securities laws as a whole. 
 224. See Securities Act Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/s-1.htm (last visited July 7, 2003).  
Form S-1 is the basic registration form under the 1933 Act that is generally used 
when no other form is available. 
 225. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003).  The text of the rule consists of the following 
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the instructions to Item 103 offer guidance as to what is material.226  
The three key elements of materiality identified in those instructions 
include:  (i) the extent to which the proceeding typically 
accompanies the issuer’s business; (ii) the financial effect on the 
issuer of a damages claim; and (iii) the substantive nature of the 
proceeding. 
Methods for measuring materiality vary from element to element.  
For example, as to typicality, Instruction 1 to Item 103 advises the 
issuer that no action for negligence or other claim ordinarily 
resulting from the business of the issuer is required to be described 
“unless it departs from the normal kind of such actions.”227  As to the 
financial effect on the issuer of a damages claim, Instruction 2 to 
Item 103 states that the issuer need not disclose information about a 
proceeding if the proceeding “involves primarily a claim for 
damages” and “the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, 
does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets” of the issuer and its 
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.228  The issuer must aggregate the 
amount involved in all proceedings presenting “the same legal and 
                                                          
brief mandate: 
Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary 
routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of 
its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the subject. 
Include the name of the court or agency in which the proceedings are 
pending, the date instituted, the principal parties thereto, a description of 
the factual basis alleged to underlie the proceeding and the relief sought. 
Include similar information as to any such proceedings known to be 
contemplated by governmental authorities. 
Id.  In explaining the use of materiality in this and other mandatory disclosure rules, 
one scholar states: 
[W]hile Regulation S-K identifies specific information to be disclosed, in 
many cases that information is further “filtered” through the screen of 
materiality. So, for instance, in describing the legal proceedings facing a 
company under Item 103, issuers are required to “[d]escribe briefly any 
material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation 
incidental to the business  . . . .”  The instructions to Item 103 further (and 
helpfully) set out a materiality benchmark of 10% of the current assets of the 
issuer, except in an environmental proceeding against a government entity, 
in which case proceedings with the possibility of a $100,000 fine must be 
disclosed.  When the regulation does not specifically provide a materiality 
benchmark, the general materiality standard prevails. Under this general 
standard, information is defined as material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would deem the information significant 
in the total mix of available information.  Thus, Regulation S-K defines an 
issuer’s disclosure obligations generally, as filtered through the “materiality” 
screen. 
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 226. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003);  see Williams, supra note 225. 
 227. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003). 
 228. Id. 
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factual issues” for calculation purposes.229  Finally, Instructions 3, 4, 
and 5 to Item 103 highlight for consideration three types of legal 
proceedings garnering special attention in making materiality 
determinations under Item 103: 
(x) material bankruptcy, receivership, or similar 
proceedings; 
(y) material proceedings to which any director, officer, 
affiliate, or five-percent beneficial owner of the issuer, or any 
associate of any of the foregoing, 
(i) is a party adverse to the issuer or a subsidiary of the 
issuer or  
(ii) has a material interest adverse to the issuer or a 
subsidiary of the issuer; and  
(z) environmental proceedings.230 
Notwithstanding Instructions 1 and 2 to Item 103, the proceedings 
described in items (x) and (y) are required to be disclosed.231  
Proceedings described in item (z) are required to be disclosed based 
on the existence of any one of three alternative states of facts: 
(1) the materiality of the proceeding to the issuer’s business 
or financial condition;  
(2) the magnitude of the damages claim (in a damages suit), 
monetary sanctions, capital expenses, deferred charges, or 
charges to income to which the issuer may be subject, based 
on the same percentage-of-assets test articulated in 
Instruction 2 of Item 103; or  
(3) the issuer’s belief as to the magnitude of monetary 
sanctions, exclusive of interest and costs, that may be assessed 
against the issuer in a proceeding or group of proceedings to 
which a governmental authority is a party.232 
                                                          
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. Unfortunately, in defining material legal proceedings, these instructions 
use the word “material” without defining it.  See Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished 
Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1965 (1995) (noting that 
materiality is not defined in Item 103).  At best, the use in a definition of an ill-
defined term that is, itself, part of the term being defined apparently violates a tried-
and-true rule of writing typically taught to students in U.S. primary and secondary 
schools:  In defining a term, never use the term itself in the definition.  See Renah R. 
Holmes, First Amendment Rights:  May A School Ban Religious Symbols that Are Arguably 
Gang-Related?, 27 J.L. & EDUC., 511, 514, 515 (1998) (noting a court’s application of 
this rule).  Although “material” is used in these instructions to modify a narrower 
category of information than “litigation” (i.e., bankruptcy, receivership, and self-
dealing proceedings), this approach has little to recommend to it in terms of clarity 
and precision. 
 231. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003). 
 232. Id. (using, again, the term “material” in the instructions); see Williams, supra 
note 225 (detailing the role of materiality in the disclosure of legal proceedings). 
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Although the materiality inquiry under Item 103 for purposes of 
the Form S-1 registration statement does not end here;233 the 
instructions to Item 103 provide important materiality guidance to 
transaction planners, litigants, and courts in the context of the rule. 
3. Defining the key elements of materiality and methods of measurement in 
the insider trading context 
Unlike Item 103 (which references material legal proceedings), the 
insider trading “disclose or abstain” rule references a significantly 
more amorphous and wide-ranging area for disclosure—material 
nonpublic information.  Accordingly, identifying the key elements of 
materiality applicable to specific subject matter areas or factual 
context in the insider trading contexts is a more difficult, broad-
based task.  The key operative question in each subject matter area or 
factual context derives from the applicable legal standard:  what types 
of undisclosed information about the issuer is a reasonable investor 
substantially likely to find important in making an investment 
decision with respect to an issuer’s securities at a time when the issuer 
or one of its insiders is permitted to trade in the issuer’s securities?  A 
number of common, general elements quickly come to mind.  These 
include: (a) the actual or potential impact of the information on the 
financial condition or results of operations of the issuer (“financial 
impact,”);234 (b) the actual or potential impact of the information on 
the business or operations of the issuer, including the actual or 
potential impact of the information on the management of the issuer 
(“operational impact”);235 and (c) the age or currency of the 
                                                          
 233. The instructions to Item 103 are not exclusive.  For example, a third-party 
non-environmental action for negligence or other claim not ordinarily resulting 
from the business of the issuer is not necessarily material (and need not be 
disclosed), even if the amount in controversy exceeds ten percent of the current 
assets of the issuer.  Materiality also has a general meaning in the context of these 
mandatory disclosure rules that is codified in the rules and regulations under the 
1933 Act.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2003) (defining materiality for required 
disclosures under the 1933 Act); id. § 240.12b-2 (2003) (giving the same definition of 
materiality for required disclosures under the 1934 Act).  Moreover, both the 1933 
Act, as pertains to registration statements, and the 1934 Act, as pertains to periodic 
and current reports or transaction disclosure statements, require disclosure of any 
material information not expressly called for by line-item disclosure rules if 
“necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading.”  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2003); id. § 240.12b-
20 (2003). 
 234. See Fedders, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that materiality on the basis of 
financial impact is commonly referred to as “quantitative materiality”); Seligman, 
supra note 230, at 1965 (“The concept of quantitative materiality typically involves a 
percentage of a corporation's assets, earnings, sales, or other numerical 
benchmarks.”). 
 235. See Fedders, supra note 13, at 41 (illustrating quantitative materiality by 
reference to management or other operational effects); Seligman, supra note 230, at 
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information (“informational currency”).236  In specific subject matter 
areas or factual contexts, one or more of these elements may be 
important; some almost necessarily overlap.237  This is a useful, albeit 
general, list of elements to consider in beginning to fashion 
appropriate materiality guidance. 
The method for measuring materiality based on each applicable 
element also may vary with the specific subject matter area or factual 
context in which materiality is being determined.  For example, 
certain measures of financial impact may relate principally to effects 
on an issuer’s balance sheet, and not its income statement.238  Any 
measurement method, however, must comply with existing statutory 
and decisional law, as well as applicable rules and regulations.  
Accordingly, among other things, the measurement method must be 
objective; it must measure, in some way, the importance of the 
information to the reasonable investor.239 
There exist a number of sources for applicable elements of 
materiality and methods of measurement that are instructive in 
creating more precise materiality guidance in the insider trading 
context.  Because insider trading regulation under Rule 10b-5 relates 
to the need for disclosure in connection with the purchase or sale of 
a security, line-item disclosure rules already adopted by the SEC for 
use in the context of purchases or sales of securities represent a key 
(if somewhat generic) source of materiality guidance.240  For example, 
                                                          
1965 (noting as examples of qualitative materiality “matters such as managerial 
conflicts of interest or violations of law”). 
 236. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.301-229.303 (2002) (detailing various time 
requirements applicable to the disclosure of specified financial information). 
 237. For example, operational impact frequently (but not always) will be 
accompanied by actual or presumed financial impact.  See SEC Staff Accounting 
Bulletin No. 99, supra note 32; see also Miller, supra note 26, at 383 (“SAB No. 99 
demands that auditors use qualitative elements to illuminate and expand the 
traditional quantitative materiality analysis, not undertake a qualitative analysis 
completely divorced from the quantitative analysis.”). 
 238. See, e.g., supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing the asset test 
under Regulations S-K Item 103). 
 239. See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 240. In point of fact, the line-item mandatory disclosure rules are both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive.  See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1056-57.  Cf. Steven G. 
Sanders, Comment:  Line-Item Disclosure Provisions and the Materiality of Preliminary 
Merger Negotiations After In re George C. Kern, Jr., 59 BROOK.. L. REV. 175, 234 (1993) 
(noting that “mandatory disclosure requirements . . . do not predicate disclosure 
upon materiality”).   On the one hand, required disclosures may be insufficient in 
conveying all material facts, as determined under existing law, about a particular 
matter; more information may need to be disclosed to satisfy materiality 
requirements.  See Brian Neach, Note, Item 303’s Role in Private Causes of Action Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741, 770-73 (2001) (explaining a 
presumption, expressed in cases and other legal resources, that the information 
required to be disclosed under line-item disclosure rules is material); Franco, supra 
note 142, at 291-92 (“[M]andatory disclosure makes antifraud regulation more 
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disclosure rules for issuer-tender offers (purchases by the issuer of its 
own securities) can be instructive with respect to issuer or insider 
purchase transactions.  Moreover, disclosure rules relating to public 
or private offerings of securities may be helpful in determining 
materiality in the context of issuer or insider securities dispositions.  
Line-item disclosure rules applicable to periodic reporting and other 
statutory and regulatory reporting requirements (e.g., Form 144 
under Rule 144 under the 1933 Act, and reports on Forms 3, 4, and 5 
under Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act)241 also may be instructive under 
certain circumstances because they are intended to effectively inform 
market participants of important information regarding the trading 
of issuers and insiders in an issuer’s securities.242 
Existing decisional law is another valuable source for more 
concrete materiality measurement principles.  For example, certain 
                                                          
potent as a signaling mechanism by establishing a minimum disclosure floor-
affirmative disclosure requirements . . . .”).  This has been true, for example, in the 
area of required management disclosures of prior legal proceedings under Item 
401(f) of Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. 229.401(f) (2003).  See Haskell v. Wilson, [1991-
1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,543 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding 
fifteen year-old securities violations material where line-item disclosure requires a 
five-year look-back); Bertoglio v. Tex. Int’l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 661 (D. Del. 1980) 
(reasoning that a history of violations are material because of their chronic nature, 
even if these violations are fifteen years old); Securities Act Release No. 5,758, [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,783, at 87,031 (Nov. 2, 1976) 
(averring that events occurring outside the five-year disclosure period “may be 
material and should be disclosed”).  But see SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no violation of Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act where 
the registrant failed to disclose a seventeen-year old embezzlement conviction and a 
just-more-than five-year-old securities violation).  The “gap-filler” materiality rules 
under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act expressly recognize that the line-item disclosure 
rules may not call for the disclosure of all material information. See 17 C.F.R. § 
230.408 (2002); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2002).  On the other hand, certain line-item 
disclosure rules may compel disclosure of facts beyond those that are material for 
Rule 10b-5 purposes. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(regarding Item 303 of Regulation S-K); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1200 n.26 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting the SEC’s authority “to 
require registrants to disclose ‘nonmaterial’ but economically significant 
information.”); John W. Bagby et al., How Green was My Balance Sheet?:  Corporate 
Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 271 (1995) (noting that 
critics of the SEC’s environmental disclosure rules believe that they require 
disclosure of immaterial information); Sanders, supra note 240, at 217 n.207 
(indicating that the SEC may require disclosure of information that is immaterial).  
This under- and over-inclusiveness may be the inevitable result of the generic, one-
size-fits-all manner in which mandatory disclosure rules are drafted.  See generally 
Sanders, supra note 240, at 209-23 (1993) (providing an interesting, albeit somewhat 
dated, discussion of the interplay between mandatory disclosure rules and materiality 
in a specific context). 
 241. See supra note 30. 
 242. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (contending that the regulation of 
insider trading under Rule 10b-5 is a form of disclosure regulation); see also supra 
notes 151 & 153 and accompanying text (noting that unregulated insider trading 
may lead to greater accuracy in the market price of securities). 
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fact patterns repeat themselves in cases decided by a number of 
different federal district or circuit courts.243  These courts may have 
identified applicable materiality elements and used methods of 
measurement that Congress, the SEC, or other courts can use in 
providing more specific advice on materiality.  The areas of 
materiality analysis in which these common fact patterns arise 
represent excellent choices for subject matter areas in which more 
precise materiality guidance should be given. 
Once information is assembled in a particular subject matter area 
regarding the appropriate measures and elements of materiality, the 
author of the guidance (whether that be Congress, the SEC, or the 
courts) may avail itself of this information to better define materiality 
using, for example, rebuttable presumptions or per se rules regarding 
materiality or immateriality.244  The nature and quality of the 
guidance that can be provided necessarily may be limited in some 
respects by materiality interpretations under existing law and 
regulation, except where the authority issuing the guidance chooses 
to exercise the authority to overrule that law or regulation (as 
applicable). 
B. Application of the Suggested Approach to the Two Examples 
To illustrate the operation of this suggested approach to fashioning 
materiality guidance, let us return to the two examples set forth in 
Part II.A of this Article.  Applying the suggested approach, Congress, 
the SEC, or the courts could provide clearer and more precise 
materiality guidance useful in each of the subject matter areas 
represented by the examples.245 
                                                          
 243. See supra note 48 (noting that the examples presented and analyzed supra 
Part II, and also used infra part VI.B, have been chosen, in part, for their typicality). 
 244. Although it is easy to see how the clarity of per se rules could positively impact 
stockholder value, it may be harder to understand how presumptions could be 
similarly beneficial.  To obtain the level of precision needed to warrant the cost 
associated with ex ante regulation, any presumptions associated with materiality 
guidance must be accompanied by specific factors allowing for rebuttal of those 
presumptions.  The proposal set forth in this article incorporates this principle as an 
essential element. 
 245. The application of the suggested approach to the two examples set forth in 
this article is not intended to provide complete, final guidance, but rather a 
preliminary basis for thought and discussion on appropriate guidance.  As such, 
many details, including those relating to the precise manner in which quantitative 
and qualitative measures of materiality might be integrated, remain to be 
determined.  The specific illustrations should provide those who favor enhanced 
materiality guidance with a tangible foothold in accomplishing their objectives—a 
framework that gives legislators, regulators, and the judiciary an incentive to 
proceed.  Even if the application of the suggested drafting approach to the examples 
does not meet these lofty objectives, at the very least, consideration of these 
illustrations, by reference to existing mandatory disclosure rules, enables us to take 
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1. Example #1—Improper balance sheet accounting 
The Corporation in Example #1 has overstated its assets by an 
amount equal to two percent of its total assets because its booked 
reserves were inadequate.  This information was not publicly available 
at the time the CFO sold the Corporation’s securities; however, this 
information was or should have been known to the CFO at the time 
of the sale transaction.  Example #1 relates primarily to financial 
impact and, more specifically, a misstatement on the Corporation’s 
balance sheet.  Reserves are understated, so assets are 
correspondingly overstated.  Other financial statements, we shall 
assume, are not significantly impacted by this misstatement.246 
Precise guidance on the method of measuring the materiality of 
misstatements of or changes in assets is not widespread in the 
mandatory disclosure rules.  Since the release of SAB No. 99,247 
however, it has been clear that, in determining the materiality of 
financial misstatements, “quantifying, in percentage terms, the 
magnitude of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of 
materiality; it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full 
analysis of all relevant considerations.”248  Specifically, SAB No. 99 
references the acknowledged use of a five-percent quantitative 
threshold used by accountants and executive officers prior to the 
adoption of SAB No. 99.  Omissions and misstatements under that 
threshold amount were, according to SAB No. 99, routinely 
determined to be per se immaterial “in the absence of particularly 
egregious circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by 
senior management.”249  SAB No. 99 rejects that approach to 
determining materiality in favor of a combined quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, but SAB No. 99 does not provide details on the 
substance of that combined analysis.  SAB No. 99 does include a list 
of relevant qualitative considerations,250 several of which are or may 
                                                          
another hard look at the sufficiency of existing mandatory disclosure rules in 
transactional and periodic reporting. 
 246. In an effort to prevent this part of the article from resulting in a detailed 
accounting analysis, an overly simplistic asset-oriented fact pattern has been chosen 
as a basis for Example #1.  An adjustment to the Corporation’s income statement 
likely would be made as a result of corrections to be required to be made to the 
Corporation’s balance sheet; however, the reader is asked to assume that the income 
statement adjustment would represent a de minimis change to the Corporation’s 
revenues. 
 247. See generally SEC SAB No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (referenced 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).  
 248. Id. at 45,151. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. at 45,152.  In this regard, SAB No. 99 states as follows: 
Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively 
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be present here,251 but the list is nonexclusive and the various listed 
considerations are not weighted in terms of their significance to the 
overall materiality determination.  Accordingly, SAB No. 99 does not 
provide sufficient guidance in determining the materiality of the 
Corporation’s failure to properly account for its reserves and assets. 
Several important asset-based touchstones do exist, however.  Item 
2 of Form 8-K under the 1934 Act mandates disclosure of certain 
information regarding the acquisition or disposition by the registrant 
of “a significant amount of assets, otherwise than in the ordinary 
                                                          
small misstatement of a financial statement item are— 
• Whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise 
measurement or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of 
imprecision inherent in the estimate. 
• Whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends. 
• Whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus 
expectations for the enterprise. 
• Whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa. 
• Whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the 
registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role in 
the registrant’s operations or profitability. 
• Whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with 
regulatory requirements. 
• Whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan 
covenants or other contractual requirements. 
• Whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s 
compensation—for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of 
bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation. 
• Whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful 
transaction. 
This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the 
materiality of a quantitatively small misstatement. Among other factors, the 
demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in response to 
certain types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors 
regard quantitatively small misstatements as material . . . .  When . . . 
management or the independent auditor expects (based, for example, on a 
pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement may result in a 
significant positive or negative market reaction, that expected reaction 
should be taken into account when considering whether a misstatement is 
material. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  This list and commentary can be incorporated into more 
specific materiality guidance in the insider trading context, as needed.  The SEC 
later issued further non-specific materiality guidance that also may be of some help 
to issuers and insiders.  The SEC’s release concerning Regulation FD includes a 
nonexclusive list of events, circumstances, and information that may be material.  See 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,  supra note 32.  
 251. For example, the facts of Example #1 raise the possibility that (i) the 
misstatement arises from an estimate, requiring an assessment of the degree of 
imprecision inherent in the estimate, (ii) the misstatement concerns a segment or 
other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a 
significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability, and (iii) the 
misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensation by increasing 
the value of the employee stock options exercised by the CFO. 
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course of business.”252  Instruction 4 to Item 2 of Form 8-K informs us 
that an acquisition or disposition involves “a significant amount of 
assets (i) if the registrant’s and its other subsidiaries’ equity in the net 
book value of such assets or the amount paid or received 
therefore . . . exceeded 10 percent of the total assets of the registrant 
and its consolidated subsidiaries, or (ii) if it involved a business . . . 
which is significant . . . [under paragraphs (b) and (d) of Item 11-01 
of Regulation S-X].”253  If these mandatory disclosure rules only 
require interim public disclosure of dispositions of more than ten 
percent of a registrant’s assets, why should we require interim public 
disclosure of a decrease in two percent of the Corporation’s total 
assets in the insider trading context posited by Example #1?  
Materiality guidance in the context of insider trading should at least 
take into account the measurement of asset significance in the Form 
8-K filing requirement, or consideration must be given to the 
modification of that requirement. 
In addition, Item 404 of Regulation S-K mandates disclosure of 
transactions between an issuer and any director nominee or current 
director of the issuer, where the “nominee or director is, or during 
the last fiscal year has been, an executive officer of, or owns, or 
during the last fiscal year has owned, of record or beneficially in 
excess of ten percent equity interest in, any business or professional 
entity to which the registrant or its subsidiaries was indebted at the 
end of the registrant’s last full fiscal year in an aggregate amount in 
excess of five percent of the registrant’s total consolidated assets at 
                                                          
 252. SEC Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin/forms/8-k.htm.  In general, Form 8-K requires disclosure of asset 
dispositions at this level. A registrant may voluntarily disclose a disposition of assets at 
a lower level of financial significance under Item 5 of Form 8-K. 
 253. Id.  Item 11-01 of Regulation S-X requires the presentation of pro forma 
financial information:  (i) in the event of the acquisition of a business constituting, 
among other things, more than twenty percent (based either on investments in and 
advancements to the business or on a proportionate share of the total assets of the 
business) of the total consolidated assets of a registrant and its subsidiaries as of the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year; or (ii) in the event of the disposition 
of a business constituting ten percent (based either on investments in and 
advancements to the business or on a proportionate share of the total assets of the 
business) of the total consolidated assets of a registrant and its subsidiaries as of the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year.  See 17 C.F.R. § 210.11-01(b), (d) 
(2003); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02(w)(1)-(2) (2003).  The ten percent tests derive from 
the definition of “significant subsidiary” in Regulation S-X.  See 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-
02(w) (2003).  The term “significant subsidiary” is also used and defined in the rules 
and regulations under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 
(2003).  These “significant subsidiary” definitions also include a ten percent income 
statement test not referenced here (because Example #1, on its facts, raises no 
significant income statement issues).  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02(w)(3), 230.405, 
240.12b-2 (2003). 
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the end of such fiscal year.”254  Under this disclosure rule, a liability in 
excess of five percent of assets is deemed significant under 
circumstances that indicate insider self-interest.255 
Existing decisional law also can play an important role in crafting 
more precise materiality guidance applicable to Example #1.  As 
noted above, the facts in Example #1 are based in part on the facts 
found by the court in Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc.256 In that case, the 
court upheld a Rule 12 dismissal of the action because, among other 
things, a two-percent overstatement of assets in connection with a 
“high risk/high yield investment opportunity in a company with a 
history of very rapid growth” was not material as a matter of law 
because disclosure of the overstatement would not have significantly 
altered the total mix of information available to investors.257  The 
court also relied on the “bespeaks caution” doctrine in rendering its 
judgment on materiality.258  Parnes has been cited with approval on 
this point, with specific reference to the two-percent asset 
overstatement.259 
Based on the foregoing materiality guidance on improper balance 
sheet accounting, could be constructed so that it: (i) renders per se 
material all asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts 
exceeding ten percent of an issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken 
individually or collectively for any given reporting period), based on 
the most recently reported balance sheet of the issuer; (ii) presumes 
material all asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts 
exceeding five percent (but not in excess of ten percent) of an 
                                                          
 254. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(b)(3) (2003). 
 255. See id.  In the insider trading context, it may fairly be said that self-interest 
always exists because of the issuer’s or insider’s involvement in a securities trading 
transaction. See Langevoort, supra note 131, at 1328 (“Because the riches from insider 
trading can be so great and the opportunity to ‘pull it off’ otherwise so simple for 
those with special access to sensitive information, insider trading poses the 
quintessential temptation in a larger company to pursue self- interest rather than stay 
in role as a habitually virtuous fiduciary.”). 
 256. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 257. See id. at 546-48 (noting “[t]ere are a variety of reasons why an alleged 
misrepresentation or omission may, as a matter of law, be immaterial” and citing to 
some of those reasons). 
 258. See id. at 548-49.  The “bespeaks caution” doctrine permits the court to 
render immaterial any statement that is accompanied by specific, meaningful 
cautionary language.  Id. at 548. 
 259. See Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2002) (“In Gateway 
2000, we upheld a Rule 12 dismissal because a two percent overstatement of assets by 
a high-risk/high-yield investment opportunity would not have significantly altered 
the total mix of information available to a reasonable investor.”); see also Blatt v. Muse 
Techs., Inc., Nos. Civ.A. 01-11010-DPW, Civ. A. 01-12173-DPW, 2002 WL 31107537, 
*30 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002) (citing to Parnes and including a parenthetical 
reference describing the basic facts and resolution of the case). 
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issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken individually or collectively for 
any given reporting period), based on the most recently reported 
balance sheet of the issuer (which presumption is rebuttable by the 
trading issuer or insider based on a list of specified factors derived 
from current law and regulation); and (iii) presumes immaterial all 
asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts equal to or 
less than five percent of an issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken 
individually or collectively for any given total reporting period), 
based on the most recently reported balance sheet of the issuer 
(which presumption is rebuttable by an investor plaintiff or 
prosecutor based on a list of specified factors derived from current 
law and regulation).260 
2. Example #2—Failed merger discussions 
Example #2 raises issues of financial impact, operational impact, 
and informational currency, all in one factual package.  Specifically, 
the facts of Example #2 relate to trading in Target’s securities by 
directors of Target in light of undisclosed past, spurned offers made 
by Acquiror for the acquisition of Target.  All acquisitions, as 
extraordinary corporate transactions, have an undeniable (even if 
unpredictable and, in some cases, indefinable) effect on the financial 
condition and results of operations of the acquisition target and the 
business and operations of that target; including the continued 
engagement and employment of the target’s management.261  
Accordingly, the existence of a plan, proposal, discussion, or 
negotiation relating to or resulting in an issuer’s acquisition is always 
a matter for serious consideration by transaction planners and courts 
under the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test.262 
                                                          
 260. This list of factors should take into consideration, for example, the factors set 
forth in SAB No. 99.  See supra note 250.  Admittedly, reliance on a rebuttable 
presumption of immateriality, at any threshold level, may appear inconsistent with 
SAB No. 99, in that SAB No. 99 requires that all materiality determinations be made 
based on both quantitative and qualitative criteria.  Id.  However, the referenced lists 
of factors will permit (and are designed to compel) consideration of tailored 
qualitative criteria. 
 261. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Since a 
merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a 
small corporation’s life, to wit, its death, we think that inside information, as regards 
a merger of this sort, can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case 
as regards lesser transactions—and this even though the mortality rate of mergers in 
such formative stages is doubtless high.”).   
 262. See Kitch, supra note 61, at 823.  Professor Kitch notes that: 
In the insider-trading context, it is inconceivable with respect to 
negotiations, specifically, that the Court would hold that merger 
negotiations were not material. The issue is whether an insider, knowing that 
merger negotiations were underway and looking to the consummation of a 
merger at a significant premium over the price of the issuer’s stock, could 
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Of course, where a target corporation is engaging in transaction 
planning in the wake of a mere proposal for an acquisition, even if 
made at a specific price, the financial impact and operating impact of 
the proposal and any subsequent acquisition are highly speculative 
and difficult to measure.  Existing disclosure rules in this area 
measure the need for disclosure first by focusing primarily on the 
type of transaction proposed.  For example, under Item 1006(c)(1) 
of Regulation M-A,263 referenced in Item 6 of Schedule TO,264 an 
issuer engaging in an issuer tender offer265 must “describe any plans, 
proposals or negotiations that relate to or would result in . . . [a]ny 
extraordinary transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or 
liquidation. . . .”266  Similarly, Item 1005(b) of Regulation M-A,267 as 
incorporated into Item 5 of Schedule TO,268 requires that a third-
party tender offeror disclose “any negotiations, transactions or 
material contacts during the past two years between the filing person 
[offeror] . . . and the subject company [target] or its affiliates 
concerning any (1) [m]erger; (2) [c]onsolidation; (3) [a]cquisition; 
(4) [t]ender offer for or other acquisition of any class of the subject 
                                                          
proceed to purchase shares of the issuer on the market. Obviously not, 
because the fact of merger negotiations is the kind of confidential material 
that insiders should not be permitted to exploit for their own gain. 
Id. 
 263. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(1) (2003). 
 264. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003). 
 265. These disclosures also must be made in connection with third-party tender 
offers in accordance with Schedule TO.  Id.  The term “tender offer” is not defined 
in the 1934 Act or the related rules and regulations adopted by the SEC.  See HAZEN, 
supra note 32, at 486-93 (noting the absence of a statutory and regulatory definition 
and describing the SEC’s current eight-factor test); Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 819 n.148 
(2002) (“The Williams Act does not define the term ‘tender offer,’ leaving its 
definition to judicial determination.”); Hon. Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. 
Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 569, 605 (2002) (“Neither the Williams Act nor the SEC defines a 
‘tender offer.’”); Michael D. Ebert, Comment:  “During the Tender Offer” (or Some Other 
Time Near It):  Insider Transactions Under the All Holders/Best Price Rule, 47 VILL. L. REV. 
677, 678 (2002) (“Because neither Congress nor the SEC has clearly defined the 
term ‘tender offer,’ courts have been left to decide when and if a Rule 14d-10 
violation has occurred in this non-classic situation.”); Rusty A. Fleming, A Case of 
“When” Rather Than “What:”  Tender Offers Under the Williams Act and the All Holders and 
Best Price Rules, 27 S. ILL. U. L. J. 263, 263 (2003) (“Congress left the term ‘tender 
offer’ undefined in the Williams Act.”). 
 266. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(1) (2003). It is particularly appropriate to reference 
disclosure rules regarding self-tenders in providing guidance on Example #2, since 
the directors of the Target in Example #2 purchased (rather than sold) the Target’s 
securities while in possession of nonpublic information.  The reference would be 
similarly apt if Example #2 had related to a stock repurchase by the Target.  
Conversely, Example #1 relates to circumstances in which insiders sold securities of 
the issuer while in possession of undisclosed information. 
 267. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003). 
 268. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003). 
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company’s securities; (5) [e]lection of the subject company’s 
directors; or (6) [s]ale or other transfer of a material amount of 
assets of the subject company.”269  These disclosure requirements are 
consistent with, and (from the standpoint of financial impact and 
operational impact) arguably more inclusive than those envisioned by 
the Basic Court in adopting the “probability versus magnitude” test.270 
With respect to informational currency, the key element of 
materiality is the passage of time.271  Time defines both the existence 
and continuity of relationships (including insider status) in and 
under the federal securities laws and the connection between those 
relationships and the required disclosure of information in 
accordance with those laws.  In fact, time-defined disclosure is an 
omnipresent element of mandatory (especially periodic) disclosure 
regulation, which calls for disclosure of various items, including 
financial information, as of a particular date or for, or during, a 
particular period of time.272  In many cases, time is used as a means of 
limiting the volume of required disclosure.273  As events become more 
distant in time, their importance to the reasonable investor may fade.  
Under the facts of Example #2, the informational currency element 
of materiality reflects the recognition (acknowledged supra Part II) 
that the status of a plan, proposal, or negotiation does not change 
overnight simply because the issuer or another party says so; a 
reasonable investor would be substantially likely to continue to find 
information about a plan, proposal, or negotiation important for a 
period of time after that plan, proposal, or negotiation is abandoned 
or terminated.  In Example #2, then, assuming that Acquiror’s offer is 
material under the Basic “probability versus magnitude” test274 when 
received by Target, transaction planners and judges may wonder for 
                                                          
 269. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003).  Note that these disclosures are not required 
for issuer tender offers. 
 270. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-39 (1988) (citing SEC v. Geon 
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) and setting forth basic criteria for evaluating 
the magnitude of preliminary merger discussions). 
 271. As noted below, when analyzing informational currency in Example #2, the 
analysis assumes that the premerger discussions between Acquiror and Target were 
material at the time they were occurring.  The question then becomes when, if ever, 
those discussions cease being material.   
 272. See generally sources noted infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text. 
 273. Id. 
 274. In the exercise of prudence, a premium offer by the Acquiror for the Target 
would be treated by the Target as presumptively material, pending the Target’s 
response, especially in the insider trading context.  See supra notes 261 & 262 and 
accompanying text.  Accordingly, controllable transactions triggering a duty to 
disclose on the part of the Target (e.g., an offering or stock repurchase program) 
would be delayed or held in abeyance until the course of conduct between the 
parties with respect to the offer is resolved (one way or the other). 
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how long the information about an offer for Target remains material 
after Target rejects the offer.  In other words, when can Target and 
its insiders trade in the market without disclosing the offer? 
As with the other areas of materiality, there are helpful guideposts 
with respect to informational currency in the law and the SEC’s rules 
and regulations governing mandatory disclosure.  Potentially relevant 
time periods under these rules and regulations range from three 
months to two years (as described below).  Under the SEC’s rules and 
regulations, from the perspective of substantive transactional 
disclosure regarding acquisitions, the two-year period is highly 
relevant.275  As earlier noted, Item 1005(b) of Regulation M-A,276 as 
incorporated into Item 5 of Schedule TO,277 requires that a third-
party tender offeror “describe any negotiations, transactions or 
material contacts during the past two years between the filing person 
[offeror] . . . and the subject company [target] or its affiliates . . .” 
regarding any one of a number of types of acquisition transaction.278  
Similarly, in connection with the disclosure of facts regarding the 
fairness of a “going private” transaction under Rule 13e-3 under the 
1934 Act,279 Instruction 2 of the instructions to Item 1014 of 
Regulation M-A280 provides that 
[t]he factors that are important in determining the fairness 
of a transaction to unaffiliated security holders and the 
weight, if any, that should be given to them in a particular 
context will vary.  Normally such factors will include, among 
others, . . . whether the consideration offered to unaffiliated 
security holders constitutes fair value in relation to: . . . (viii) 
[f]irm offers of which the subject company or affiliate is 
aware made by any unaffiliated person, other than the filing 
persons, during the past two years for: 
(A) [t]he merger or consolidation of the subject company 
with or into another company, or vice versa . . . 281 
Moreover, in two court opinions, both responding to motions for 
summary judgment, a two-year period after an acquisition offer had 
                                                          
 275. Two-year informational currency also is prevalent in periodic financial 
disclosures required under Regulation S-X.  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 (2003) 
(“There shall be filed, for the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated, audited 
balance sheets as of the end of each of the two most recent fiscal years.”). 
 276. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003). 
 277. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003). 
 278. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (2003). 
 279. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2003). 
 280. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (2003). 
 281. Id. 
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an important role.  In each of Caruso v. Metex Corp.282 and Levinson v. 
Basic Inc. (the Basic case, on remand to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit),283 the court found that undisclosed information 
about acquisition offers more than two years old is not per se 
immaterial (in other words, could be material), as a matter of law.284  
Under the rule of these cases, information about a foregone 
acquisition proposal that is under two years old may or may not be 
material to an acquisition target.285 
These disclosure measures and cases suggest a possible rule that 
provides for the presumptive immateriality, to an acquisition target, 
of information regarding an acquisition proposal made and 
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned more than two years prior to the 
issuer or insider transaction triggering disclosure.  Again, the 
presumption would be rebuttable based on a group of identified 
factors derived from current law and regulation, many of which can 
be drawn from cases.286  But what of nonpublic acquisition proposal 
information that is two years old or less?  Is an acquisition proposal 
per se or presumptively material?  If so, until what point in time after it 
is withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned is it material?  Can it be that the 
issuer and its insiders cannot trade in the market for two years after 
an undisclosed acquisition proposal without some level of security 
that information about the proposal is immaterial? 
Interestingly, when an issuer provides disclosure in connection 
with an issuer tender offer, arguably the transaction most analogous 
to the director stock acquisitions in Example #2, the issuer is required 
to disclose in its Schedule TO287 only one item related to acquisition 
proposals.288  Pursuant to Item 6 of Schedule TO,289 the issuer is 
                                                          
 282. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,967, at 94,130 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 1992).  The 
Caruso court stated: 
Defendants argue that even if the discussions regarding the acquisition of 
D&M were material in 1987, they were no longer material when the merger 
occurred in 1989. We find that the issue of whether the $18.5 million buyout 
proposal constituted ‘stale’ information in 1989 is a factual question to be 
decided by the jury. The jury must determine whether an offer made in 1987 
to acquire D&M for $18.5 million ‘would have assumed actual significance in 
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder . . .’ when deciding whether 
to approve the merger in 1989. 
Id. (citing Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus. Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1533 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 283. 871 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 284. See infra note 285; but see Shahmoon v. Gen. Dev. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 94,308, at 95,038 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1973) (finding two-year-old information 
“obviously out of date” and, therefore, immaterial). 
 285. Caruso, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,143; Levinson, 871 F.2d at 564. 
 286. The identification of factors is a creative process.  SAB No. 99 again may be 
helpful here, even if not directly relevant.  See supra note 250. 
 287. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2003). 
 288. The tender offer disclosure regulations under Regulation M-A, like the line-
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required to describe under Item 1006(c) of Regulation M-A290 any 
“plans, proposals, or negotiations that relate to or would result in: . . . 
[a]ny extraordinary transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or 
liquidation, involving the subject company or any of its subsidiaries; 
[or] . . . [a]ny purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of 
assets of the subject company or any of its subsidiaries . . .”291  The 
additional Regulation M-A disclosure items referred to above (as well 
as others not cited here) are not applicable to issuer disclosures in 
connection with issuer tender offers.292  The absence of these 
required disclosures in the issuer tender offer context may indicate 
an SEC intention that only current, active acquisition plans, 
proposals, and negotiations are material per se, even in a context 
where the issuer is trading in its own securities.  Perhaps, then, this 
mandatory disclosure requirement indicates guidance that presumes 
an acquisition proposal is material, subject to rebuttal based on a list 
of specified factors derived from current law and regulation,293 for two 
years after it has been withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned.294 
However, there are indications elsewhere in the federal securities 
regulations and related case law that, as noted above, a reasonable 
investor is substantially likely to continue to find information about 
an acquisition proposal important for a more limited period of time 
after that proposal is withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned.295  Should a 
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned offer remain per se material for a 
period of three months?  Is a period of six months more prudent?  
Disclosure requirements relating to directors and executive officers 
in other contexts may give some guidance.296 
                                                          
item disclosure regulations under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act generally are qualified 
by the additional requirement that the disclosing party “[f]urnish such additional 
material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not materially misleading.”  
17 C.F.R. § 229.1011(b) (2003). 
 289. 17 C.F.R. § 2240.14d-100 (2003). 
 290. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c) (2003). 
 291. Id. 
 292. See HAZEN, supra note 32, at 517-18  (describing filing and disclosure 
requirements applicable to issuer tender offers). 
 293. Here, factors may include whether the acquisition proposal had been 
formally withdrawn by the putative Acquiror, as opposed to it having been rejected 
by the target or abandoned.  Other factors may be obtained from existing decisional 
law. 
 294. In the interest of completeness, the guidance also should address the 
question of when a proposal is deemed withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned. 
 295. See infra notes 297-308 and accompanying text. 
 296. For purposes of this part of the informational currency analysis, directors and 
executive officers of a corporation are presumed “insiders” of the corporation.  A 
review of the reach of basic reporting requirements for these insiders—especially the 
extent to which they continue for a period of time after the director or officer ceases 
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A possible, albeit weak, justification for a three-month per se 
materiality period derives from Rule 144 under the 1933 Act.297  The 
three-month period regarding affiliate status under Rule 144(k)298 is 
intended to ensure, by the passage of time, that a seller of securities 
under the rule that once was an affiliate of the issuer has no 
remaining control relationship with the issuer at the time a sale of 
issuer securities is made by the former affiliate.299  The rule assumes 
that control no longer exists after three months and, accordingly, 
terminates the affiliate’s disclosure obligations under the rule (as 
applicable to sales of unrestricted securities and restricted securities 
held for two years or more at the conclusion of that period).300 
A possible justification for a six-month per se materiality period 
derives from Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act (“Section 16(b)”)301 and 
the duration of the related reporting obligations provided for under 
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.302  Under Section 16(b), directors, 
officers, and ten percent beneficial owners of publicly traded stock303 
of an issuer are held responsible to the issuer for deemed profits 
from a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the issuer’s 
securities within a six-month period.304  The liability for these deemed 
“short-swing profits” is strict and prophylactic.  The express purpose 
of the provision is to prevent “the unfair use of information which 
[sic] may have been obtained . . . by reason of  . . . [the subject 
person’s] relationship to the issuer.”305 
                                                          
to be engaged in a corporate capacity—may be deemed to provide additional 
guidance on informational currency.  See infra note 297 (regarding a requirement of 
this kind in Rule 144(k) under the 1933 Act). 
 297. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2003).  Paragraph (h) of Rule 144 provides, among 
other things, for affiliates of an issuer, including its directors, to publicly disclose 
their intention to sell the issuer’s securities before sales are made.  Id.  Paragraph (k) 
of Rule 144 effectively provides that those who, at the time of the sale and for three 
months prior to the sale, are not affiliates of the issuer’s need not give advance 
public warning of their proposed sales of securities other than restricted securities 
held for less than two years.  Id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id.  Although the three-month rule in Rule 144(k) relates to a change in 
status of the insider trader and not a change in the status of the information 
possessed by that insider, it remains instructive here, if for no other reason than that 
previously required disclosures no longer are required based merely on the passage 
of time. 
 301. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2003). 
 302. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2003). 
 303. For these purposes, publicly traded stock is stock that is registered under 
Section 12 of the 1934 Act. 
 304. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2003). 
 305. Id.; see HAZEN, supra note 32, at 710 (“The legislative history reveals 
congressional recognition of such a great potential for abuse of inside information so 
as to warrant the imposition of strict liability.”). 
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Supportive of the six-month strict liability provisions in Section 
16(b) are the filing requirements of Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.306  
Under Section 16(a), directors, officers, and ten percent beneficial 
owners of publicly traded stock of an issuer must file initial and 
periodic reports of beneficial ownership of the issuer’s securities on 
Forms 3 and 4, respectively, and also may be required to file an 
annual report of beneficial ownership on Form 5.307  A director or 
officer of the issuer is required to report nonexempt transactions in 
the issuer’s securities that occur after he or she ceases being a 
director or officer of the issuer if those transactions are “[e]xecuted 
within a period of less than six months of an opposite transaction 
subject to Section 16(b) of the Act that occurred while that person 
was a director or officer.”308  Based on the foregoing, it may then be 
sufficient to adapt disclosure guidelines that label an acquisition 
proposal as (a) per se material during the time it is actively being 
considered and for three months or six months after it is withdrawn, 
rejected, or abandoned, (b) presumed material after that three-
month or six-month period until two years have passed since the 
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal (which 
presumption is rebuttable by the issuer or insider based on a list of 
specified factors derived from current law and regulation), and 
(c) presumed immaterial after two years have passed since the 
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal (which 
presumption is rebuttable by an investor plaintiff, or prosecutor 
based on a list of specified factors derived from current law and 
regulations). 
CONCLUSION 
The single uniform legal standard governing materiality, while well 
settled, often lacks clarity when applied.  Transaction planners, 
litigants, the SEC and its staff, representatives of the DOJ, and 
judges—each of whom is charged with using this ambiguous standard 
in critical decision-making—would benefit from additional guidance 
in making materiality determinations, especially in the insider trading 
context.  The ambiguities inherent in interpreting and applying the 
existing materiality standard are not essential to the promotion of 
policy objectives underlying U.S. insider trading regulation.  
                                                          
 306. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2003). 
 307. See 17  C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (2003). 
 308. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2003).  The note to paragraph (b) explains that “an 
acquisition and a disposition each shall be an opposite transaction with respect to the 
other.”  Id. 
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Moreover, the vagueness in the existing materiality standard 
negatively impacts stockholder value in a manner that may undercut 
those policy objectives (including by the encouragement of expensive 
and time-consuming securities class action litigation that is likely to 
settle for substantial dollar amounts, regardless of merit). 
Fair and honest securities markets, investor confidence in those 
markets, and accurate and complete public disclosure in the insider 
trading regulation context all can be enhanced by the adoption of 
more precise materiality guidance for use in insider trading analysis.  
This guidance for determining materiality can be fashioned by 
creating a meaningful overarching process for determining 
materiality, consistent with existing law, and rigorously applying that 
process to common factual settings in various areas of materiality 
analysis.  If properly crafted, the materiality guidance resulting from 
this process would support applicable policy and enhance 
predictability and certainty in the ex ante and ex post application of 
Rule 10b-5 in the insider trading context.  Given the desirability of 
fostering market integrity and confidence in the current securities 
trading environment, Congress, the SEC, or the courts should take 
action to provide enhanced materiality guidance for use by issuers 
and insiders as part of a more comprehensive post-Enron agenda. 
